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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Capital Flows to Latin American Countries: Effects of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Remittances on Growth and Development. (August 2007) 
Diego Eduardo Vacaflores Rivero, B.A., University of Pittsburgh; 
M.A., The University of Akron 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis W. Jansen 
 
 
The significant restructuring of international capital flows to developing 
countries – in particular to Latin American countries – observed in the last quarter 
century has generated significant research in the area to examine its potential impact on 
development efforts. The resurgence of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 
increasing significance of remittances, both as shares of gross domestic product (GDP), 
have made these types of capital flows the most analyzed. 
Despite the large fraction of empirical studies that find a positive and significant 
relationship between FDI and economic growth, an important fact that has been so far 
overlooked in the literature is its impact on standards of living in host countries. This 
dissertation first establishes the strong complementary connection between FDI and 
economic growth in Latin America, measured by increases in GDP per capita growth 
rates, to then examine additional channels through which it could affect the welfare of 
the region. I first show that FDI has a positive effect on central government tax revenues, 
which is mainly channeled through its effect on taxes on goods and services. I then show 
that FDI has a positive and significant effect on the employment rates in these host 
countries, with female employment rate getting the largest impact – relative to males.  
Remittances are another capital flow that plays a large and important role in 
certain economies, exceeding 10% of GDP in some countries.  The impact of 
remittances on the main macroeconomic measures of a small open economy is analyzed 
in the last section using a stochastic limited participation model with cash in advance 
constraints and costly adjustment of cash holdings.  After verifying that the model 
 iv 
responds adequately to standard shocks, a remittances shock is introduced to examine 
the dynamic response of the representative economy. The results show that a positive 
remittances shock forces the exchange rate to depreciate and lowers both output and 
consumption in the period of the shock. The positive shock lowers utility during the 
shock but raises it from the following period onwards, improving discounted utility after 
10 years when remittances are 10% of GDP and there are no adjustment costs. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the past quarter century we have observed a significant restructuring of 
international capital flows to many developing countries, especially through the 
resurgence of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the increasing importance of 
remittances. At the same time, other components – like international aid, portfolio equity 
investment, and portfolio debt investment – have decreased and become less influential. 
The flow of FDI and remittances to developing countries have increased significantly in 
this period, moving from $104 billion in 1980 to $472 billion in 20051. 
Such capital flows from rich to poor countries are immensely interesting because 
they can finance investment and consumption, stimulating economic growth, helping 
improve the standard of living, and potentially increasing welfare in the developing 
world. Moreover, since a key aspect in economic development relies in the acquisition of 
financial and physical assets to incorporate advance technologies and create wealth, the 
reliance of foreign capital helps bridge the gap between savings and investment in 
capital-scarce economies. These capital inflows are also believe to encourage 
technological upgrade and financial modernization, and contribute to the growth and 
productivity of countries with enough human capital and infrastructure. 
They are particularly important for Latin American economies for their 
technological lag and low levels of domestic savings, which has prompted local 
governments to engage in bold policies to circumvent their lack of capital. These 
countries have modified their government policies to become more attractive, 
abandoning their import-substitution policies, opening up their markets, liberalizing 
capital flows, loosening price and labor market controls, and making extensive use of tax 
incentives. At the same time they have reduced their public role in the generation of 
employment, privatized or capitalized most public enterprises, and concentrated on 
achieving a stable political and economic environment, thus increasingly relying on 
international capital flows for the propulsion of growth and development in the region. 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the American Economic Review. 
1 World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
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These policy changes have not been without cost, and political unrest has grown in 
response to imbalances and perception of gains – or lack thereof – from such initiatives 
and the role of foreign capital flows, at least among some segments of society.  
Recent capital flows data show that in the mid-1970s the region experienced a 
flood of dollars in the form of loans from U.S. and European banks (recycling Middle 
East oil revenues), followed by an economically devastating outflow of capital from the 
region after the Mexican debt default of 1982 (that spread throughout the region), with 
capital inflows resuming in the early 1990s (with portfolio and direct investment 
achieving prominence) and maintaining significant levels despite economic slowdowns, 
and introducing an additional important source of foreign capital in the form of 
immigrants’ remittances beginning in the late 1990s. The last 15 years gave prominence 
to FDI and remittances in the overall capital flows into the region, both in terms of 
significance as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) and for their lower volatility 
compared to other types of capital flows.  
Quantitatively, about $670 billion flowed to developing countries in Asia and 
Latin America in the 1990 – 94 period, which is about five times the $133 billion 
recorded in the previous five years, when there was a debt crisis and many of these 
countries had little o no access to international capital markets (Calvo et. al. (1996)). 
While this surge in capital inflows was initially attributed to significant improvements in 
domestic policies and stronger economic performance of some developing countries, it 
eventually became clear that this pattern was affecting countries with very diverse 
characteristics, thus suggesting that integration of world capital, globalization of 
investments, and other global factors – like cyclical movements in interest rates – were 
significantly important too. 
The extensive structural reforms carried out by the majority of the countries in 
the region, together with relatively favorable external factors and increasing integration 
of global finance, seems to have achieved the intended goal of attracting significant 
amounts of foreign investment throughout this period, and particularly during the 1990s. 
As observed in Figure 1.1, aggregate FDI inflows to Latin America and the Caribbean 
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have reached record levels in the past decade, jumping from $6.1 billion in 1980 (around 
0.87 percent of GDP) to $7.8 billion in 1990 and to a remarkable $76.9 billion in 2000 
(around 4 percent of GDP)2, with the major recipients in the region being Brazil, 
Mexico, and Argentina, accounting for around 60 percent of total flows. While this 
increase in FDI into the region is of an important magnitude it is somewhat misleading, 
since the actual share of FDI flowing to developing economies has fallen for Latin 
America from 52 percent in the 1970s to around 33 percent since the 1990s. 
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Figure 1.1: Trends of net FDI into Latin American and the Caribbean 
 
The integration of global finance, combined with continuous flow of immigrants 
to developed economies, and to some degree better reporting methodology, has also 
resulted in a significant increase of immigrants’ remittances into the region during the 
same period, as shown in Figure 1.2. While by the end of the 1980s the flow of 
remittances into Latin America slowly reached $5 billion (around 0.55 percent of GDP), 
by 2000 this flows reached $20 billion, and since then it almost tripled until 2005, 
reaching $54 billion (2 percent of GDP). Its estimated growth rate is around 10 percent 
per year, and it is expected to keep increasing at this pace. This graph also shows that 
                                                 
2 Based on data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and World Bank.  
 4 
while international capital flows have fluctuated with market cycles, remittances into the 
region have consistently increased, even during global slowdowns. 
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Figure 1.2: Trends of immigrant’s remittances into Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
These two flows have clearly outpaced the other components of international 
capital movements, and multinational development institutions have intensively 
examined their potential links to economic growth, becoming prominent actors in the 
promotion of FDI and remittances to induce faster and more efficient growth of less 
developed economies. While the great intensification of global trade and increased FDI – 
which are profit driven – has been accompanied by the increasingly accepted belief that 
this flows are strongly related, directly and indirectly, to growth and development, recent 
research also points out to immigrants’ remittances as an additional source of growth, 
which despite not being profit driven also can promote economic growth by fueling 
domestic demand and improving human capital. Independently of the way in which they 
can generate economic growth, the understanding of the channels through which they 
can affect growth efforts in developing countries become crucial for policy enactment, 
and unveiling their impact in the region is the purpose of this dissertation. 
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The importance of FDI for growth and development arises from the widely 
accepted notion that FDI has the potential to increase the volume of investment and its 
efficiency, generate technological diffusion, augment the existing stock of knowledge, 
allow local firms to learn by watching, and finance flows that do not generate 
repayments of principal and interests from the local government. At the same time, this 
perception has given multinational corporations (MNCs) a strong bargaining position as 
countries intensively compete amongst themselves to attract such investment. As a 
result, MNCs often get significant subsidies for FDI, which gives rise to the question of 
whether the potential benefits of FDI are sufficient to justify subsidies and still yield a 
positive return to the countries involved. Theoretical models provide the framework for 
such positive effects of FDI on economic growth, but empirical studies are still not able 
to systematically corroborate this notion. 
This perceived importance of FDI on economic growth is probably best 
described by the quote from the United Nations Conference on Development in 
Monterrey, Mexico, posted in the Business Roundtable’s3 web page: 
Private international capital flows, particularly foreign direct investment ... 
are vital complements to national and international development efforts. 
Foreign direct investment contributes toward financing sustained 
economic growth over the long term. It is especially important for its 
potential to transfer knowledge and technology, create jobs, boost overall 
productivity, enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, and 
ultimately eradicate poverty through economic growth and development. 
 
The site further emphasizes the concrete ways in which FDI stimulates global 
economic growth, highlighting that “FDI creates jobs and improves worker’s wages,” 
“stimulates competitive markets,” and “contributes to growth in government revenues.” 
However, even though a large fraction of empirical studies find a positive and 
significant relationship between FDI and economic growth (i.e. Borensztein et. al. 
(1998), De Mello (1999), Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), Choe (2003), Li and Liu 
(2005)), suggesting that FDI does in fact spur growth, an important fact that has been so 
                                                 
3 Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. corporations, committed to 
advocating public policies that ensure vigorous economic growth, a dynamic global economy, and the well-trained and 
productive U.S. workforce essential for future competitiveness.  
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far overlooked in the literature is the real improvement in the standards of living in the 
host countries, by some palpable measure, questioning the validity of those concepts of 
growth and development heavily measured by traditional national economic terms, like 
GDP. That is why assessing the influence of FDI on developing countries should also 
include its effect on factors that affect the standard of living more directly such as its 
effect on tax revenues and employment generation. Assessing the consequences of 
promoting FDI for national welfare through these additional measures is clearly an 
important task that will help scholars and policy makers to better understand the overall 
relevance of FDI for economic growth and development.  
The first part of this dissertation fills this gap. I go beyond the increasingly 
accepted notion that FDI positively affects economic growth, measured as improvements 
in GDP or GDP growth rates, to empirically study how that positive relationship 
translates into palpable benefits for the host country, specifically measuring its effect on 
employment generation and collection of central government tax revenues in the host 
country. This section starts from the view that FDI’s effect on economic growth should 
not only be measured through its effect on the level and growth rate of real GDP per 
capita, but also through its influence on other factors that are relevant to domestic 
governments, like on government tax revenues and employment levels. This is related to 
the study of Braunstein and Epstein (2002), but differs in the modeling strategy, the 
analysis of Latin American economies instead of Chinese provinces, and in the 
econometric specification. Here the econometric specification is based on a more 
comprehensive theoretical background that enables one to control for the main 
determinants. This study is also able to examine more closely the channels through 
which FDI has its greatest impact. This has the potential of yielding important insight 
because, from a theoretical perspective, understanding the way in which FDI affects 
specific sectors or components may have important repercussions for development 
efforts. 
The second section shows that there is a strong complementary connection 
between FDI and economic growth in Latin America, showing that foreign investment 
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does contribute to the economic growth of Latin American countries, at least in terms of 
improvements in the real GDP per capita growth rate, so the policies implemented in 
order to attract FDI to foster economic growth seems to have generated the expected 
results. Once this positive relationship is established, I introduce the notion that 
developing countries are perhaps more interested on the effect of FDI on more relevant 
indicators, from their perspective.  
In the third section I examine the effect of FDI on the performance of central 
government tax revenues. The idea here is that while greater foreign investment will 
generally lead to the production of greater output, both directly and indirectly, the 
intensive use of tax incentives and frequent adjustments of the tax systems to attract FDI 
makes its effect on tax revenues uncertain. This counteracts to some extent the 
traditionally conceived tax gains that occurs if FDI spurs growth, and potentially distorts 
this link. However, the results show that FDI has indeed a positive effect on central 
government tax revenues, which is mainly channeled through its effect on taxes on 
goods and services. FDI is found to be beneficial to less developed countries and that its 
effect became positive during the later period of the sample – period when inflows of 
FDI increased significantly.   
Further insight on the effect of FDI on economic growth and development is 
found in the fourth section when I examine its impact on the employment rate in the 
region. The rise of concerns about the overall effect of FDI on domestic employment is 
examined using real remunerations to proxy for average wages. I also examine its 
specific effect on both male and female employment rates to examine if its impact has a 
differential effect on these gender groups.  The results show that FDI has a positive and 
significant effect on total employment rate in these host countries, and this effect is 
larger for female employment rate than for male employment rate. This positive effect is 
particularly important for economies with low level of development and for those 
attracting low inflows of foreign investment, but also shows that only countries with 
high level of informality accrue this benefit. FDI’s exerts a positive impact on periods of 
low inflation, with its effect becoming significant on the later period of the sample.  
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I then move to the examination of the other capital flow that has gained 
importance in the last few years, remittances, as its share has recently surpassed FDI in 
many countries of the region. While most of the literature on remittances has examined 
the immigrant’s behavior and the factors that determine its remittances pattern, or the 
effects of such remittances on the welfare of the relatives left behind in the country of 
origin, here I analyze the effect of remittances flows at the macroeconomic level. In 
particular, the impact of remittances’ shock on consumption, output, interest rates, and 
exchange rates is analyzed. Since this approach is novel, the effect of monetary and 
technology shocks on these real variables are also examined to verify consistency with 
existing analyses.  
Section 5 shows that a remittances shock in the model without adjustment costs 
will slightly increases the nominal interest rate, decreasing slightly output and 
consumption, and generating a small but continuous depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate.  When there are adjustment costs the dynamic response of the nominal 
interest rate is reversed in sign and increased in magnitude.  The response of output and 
consumption are also magnified.  In addition, adjustment costs also produce the 
overshooting of the nominal exchange rate. It is also found that relaxation of the cash-in-
advance constraint or the loanable-funds constraint have only marginal impact on the 
dynamic responses of the main variables to a shock, with only the magnitudes being 
affected but not the signs. Also, its impact on the steady state of the economy shows that 
a doubling of remittances decreases output, physical capital, and worked hours, while it 
slightly increases consumption.  
The results show that utility falls as a result of a one percent positive remittances 
shock irrespective of the existence of adjustment costs or the share of remittances in the 
economy, but it quickly recovers to levels above the initial utility level and remains 
higher thereafter. This means that while the positive remittances shock has a negative 
effect on utility the period of the shock, the negative effect slowly diminishes as we 
discount future utility, and can even result in a welfare improvement as shown in the 
case of no adjustment cost for the economy with remittances being 10 percent of GDP. 
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With regards to the impact of the remittances shock on the trade balance, I find that the 
positive remittances shock decreases the trade deficit the period of the shock irrespective 
of the existence of adjustment costs or the share of remittances in the economy, but that 
while the trade deficit quickly returns to levels beyond the initial deficit when there are 
no adjustment costs, the improvement in the trade balance is long lived when there are 
positive adjustment costs, having smaller deficits for up to 10 periods. 
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2. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND  
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this section is to determine if there exists a positive impact of 
FDI on economic growth in Latin America, measured by the traditional GDP per capita 
growth rate. Theoretical models provide the framework for a positive effect of FDI on 
economic growth, but empirical studies are still not able to corroborate this notion 
consistently, perhaps due to the different econometric techniques and samples used. 
While a large fraction of empirical studies find a positive and significant relationship 
between FDI and economic growth for developing economies, suggesting that FDI does 
in fact spur economic growth, specific studies of such relationship to measure its impact 
in Latin America is minimal.  
This section analyzes the different factors that contribute in the actual allocation 
of FDI in Latin America and its influence in promoting growth and development in these 
developing nations, to then establish in the next two sections if the perceived link 
between the relative national economic growth of each country and the implied relative 
improvement in the standard of living of their people is in fact accurate. The main-
stream studies in this area are largely concentrated in the growth induced at a national 
level, GDP, standardized economic mean, per-capita GDP (in levels or growth rates), or 
other close variations of these economic measures - which is done in this section - but 
they only imply that such effect would translate in real improvement in the standards of 
living in developing countries, which at the end is perhaps more relevant to developing 
countries and their people. 
The economic literature suggests that a higher level of foreign investment 
contributes to the creation of wealth in host countries, in particular in developing 
countries. When one examines the relationship between inflows of FDI and the level of 
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GDP per capita in Latin America, for the period 1980 – 2002, a clear positive 
relationship is observed if one excludes the outliers at low levels of real GDP per capita. 
The high levels of FDI at low levels of GDP per capita shown as outliers are the massive 
investments done in Bolivia and Nicaragua in the late 1990’s. This initial positive 
interdependence between FDI and GDP per capita is shown in Figure 2.1 below, with 
FDI as a percentage of GDP graphed in the vertical axis and real GDP per capita in the 
horizontal axis. 
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Figure 2.1: FDI and real GDP per capita for sample countries 
 
However, when one uses real GDP per capita growth rates to measure economic 
growth this relationship becomes less clear, as observed in Figure 2.2. Here we have FDI 
as a percentage of GDP in the vertical axis and the annual real GDP per capita growth 
rates in the horizontal axis. The large cluster at low levels of FDI and growth rates is still 
present if one controls for outliers. In addition, while no basic relationship can be found 
between these two measures, a bigger concerns arises when one tries to establish 
causality, since solid arguments suggests both  that higher levels of FDI will fuel higher  
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Figure 2.2: FDI and real GDP per capita growth rates for sample countries 
 
rates of growth and that higher rates of economic growth will generate higher levels of 
FDI into the country. 
The expected positive impact of FDI on economic growth arises from the 
perception that FDI increases the stock and quality of physical capital in the recipient 
economy, and by inducing human capital development – both in MNCs and domestic 
firms – that promotes technological upgrading throughout the economy. Additionally, 
potential externalities also contribute to fuel economic growth, like from the 
implementation of superior managerial practices and improved chains of production. 
This positive effect on growth requires some degree of complementary with domestic 
investment, infrastructure, and human capital (De Mello (1999), Borensztein et. al. 
(1998), Alfaro et. al. (2004), Damijan et. al. (2003)), at least in the short run. 
FDI is an instrument that allows firms to transfer capital, technology, and 
organizational skills from one country to another. It requires the parent company to hold 
at least 10 percent of equity in the affiliate of the receiving country. The considerations 
that influence the firm’s investment abroad can be described as stressing differences in 
the cost and quality of productive factors in different countries, the possibility of using 
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entirely different technological processes, and the use of economies of scale in 
production. The essence of FDI for MNCs lies in the transfer and exploitation of 
knowledge, and maximizing economic rent on that knowledge follows as the appropriate 
aim for choosing this type of operation. 
From the perspective of developing countries, particularly since the new growth 
theory highlighted the role of technology, human capital, and knowledge, the MNCs are 
seen as a major vehicle for accessing technology and frontier knowledge. This is because 
MNCs are characterized by high levels of research and development, placing them 
amongst the world’s most technologically advanced enterprises, and hence, potentially 
major sources of knowledge. Clearly, for a given firm to have become international 
suggests that it has outperformed domestic competition as well as foreign competition in 
some dimension. Moreover, local governments tend to favor MNCs since they are 
usually larger, more capital intensive, have higher factor productivity, hire more skilled 
labor, pay their workers higher wages, and are greatly inclined to export relative to 
domestic firms.  
These potential benefits – and the liberalization of international trade – have 
provided the incentives for both sides to increase foreign investment, with developing 
countries competing amongst themselves to attract a larger share of FDI and with MNCs 
capitalizing on this notion to achieve the largest concessions possible. But are incentives 
that important in attracting FDI? Most governments seem to agree that they are, but 
many economists place them only at the margin, arguing that other factor act as more 
important determinants.  
MNCs are usually more inclined to penetrate foreign markets through FDI when 
trade costs are low, firm-level scale economies are high, plant-level scale economies are 
low, and when the host-country’s market size is large. They also respond to the existing 
stock of FDI, the quality of infrastructure, and the level of industrialization of the 
receiving economy. In addition, MNCs will also take into account differences in labor 
costs, tax rates, and economic conditions when making their location decisions. 
Furthermore, theory also predicts that firms will penetrate foreign markets through 
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vertical FDI when factor-costs differences between countries are large and through 
horizontal FDI when countries are similar in terms of markets size and factor cost. 
Because FDI affects growth directly by increasing the stock of physical capital in 
the recipient economy, and indirectly by inducing human capital development and 
promoting technological upgrading, international organization like the World Bank, 
World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund have being promoting 
FDI as the best way to channel funds and technology to developed and developing 
countries in order to promote higher rates of economic growth. Countries have 
systematically embarked on this reasoning and began to actively promote their countries 
in order to attract MNCs (FDI).  
Among the approaches taken by countries to attract more FDI include a general 
improvement in the investment environment in the receiving countries, mainly through 
improvements in infrastructure, liberalization of the economy, and granting of various 
incentives, among them tax incentives. These improvements induce multinational firms 
to invest abroad as they lower production costs and so raise the incentives to create 
patents, trademarks, or other assets which sustain headquarters activities. It raises the 
economic benefits of FDI relative to exporting and arms-length production in the host 
country, with subsidies only enhancing the relative attractiveness of locating production 
in the country offering the largest incentives. 
Borensztein et. al. (1998) findings also suggest that FDI is in fact an important 
vehicle for the transfer of technology, contributing to growth in larger measure than 
domestic investment. Moreover, they find that there is a strong complementary effect 
between FDI and human capital. That is, the contribution of FDI to economic growth is 
enhanced by its interaction with the level of human capital in the host country, which 
tends to improve the human capital levels in the domestic economy. In a similar note, De 
Mello (1999) argues that the extent in which FDI is growth enhancing depends on the 
degree of complementarity and substitution between FDI and domestic investment. 
While these contemporaneous effects are established under such interactions, UNCTAD 
 15 
(1999) shows that FDI also affects the following period’s growth rate if a given level of 
human capital is present. 
Tsai (1994) points out that the market size and the growth rate of the host country 
are two significant determinants in the allocation of FDI too. The market size becomes 
important for MNCs interested in servicing the host market, as it requires a significant 
market size to allow the MNCs to efficiently utilize their economies of scale and scope. 
The idea is that the host country would need to be of an acceptable market size to attract 
FDI, and after reaching a given threshold it is expected to induce a continuous inflow of 
FDI. This in turn will induce further growth through the additional foreign investment 
flowing into the country due to this positive signal. So, if the host country hast a growing 
economy, it will attract FDI – as it provides better opportunities to make profits than a 
static or slow growing one – and if more FDI flows into a country, it will accelerate 
economic growth in the receiving country. 
This last point is the center of discussion of recent research, as the relevance of 
the potential endogeneity between economic growth and FDI became central for 
estimation accuracy, and recent studies actively test for its existence. Choe (2003) uses 
panel VAR to show that there exists a strong positive association between FDI inflows 
and economic growth (FDI Granger-causes growth, and vice versa), while Bengoa and 
Sanchez-Robles (2003) and Li and Liu (2005), among others, tackle this issue applying 
various econometric methods in their panel data samples, and they find a significant 
endogenous relationship between FDI and economic growth. The approach taken here is 
similar to the one taken in these studies, actively testing for endogeneity between FDI 
and economic growth, and correcting for it if necessary in the corresponding estimation. 
 
2.2 Data and Methodology 
 
The data for this section comes from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 2004 (WDI), from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean’s (ECLAC’s) 2004 Statistical Yearbook, and from Barro and Lee’s measures 
 16 
of educational attainment (1995). The sample used is composed of 17 Latin American 
countries and encompasses the period 1980-2002, with yearly observations.4 The sample 
excludes countries that serve as offshore financial centers, are too small, have special 
governmental controls, or lack adequate data. These countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Jamaica, México, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 Following Romer (1990), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Li and Liu (2005), a set 
of robust variables for modeling growth are identified. In addition to the standard 
determinants used in the literature to explain economic growth, the world interest rate is 
also used to incorporate the notion that international economic conditions also matter in 
the decision to invest abroad (Calvo et. al. (1996)).5 However, measures like black 
market premium and the inflation rate were omitted in the analysis, as it was not possible 
to obtain sufficient data for the former and the latter had an extremely volatile behavior 
in the sample period, with many countries experiencing hyperinflations.  
The growth equation used in the study is: 
titititititititi XFDIINVSCHPOPyg ,,,5,45,3,25,10, ln εβββββββ +++++++= −−  
where tig ,  is the GDP per capita growth rate of country i at time t, 5, −tiy  is the lagged by 
five years GDP per capita to account for initial economic conditions, tiPOP ,  is the 
population growth rate to control for market size growth, 5, −tiSCH  is a lagged by five 
years measure of education to evaluate existing human capital (proxied by secondary 
school attainment),  tiINV ,  is the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP (% of GDP), 
and the  tiFDI ,  is the ratio of FDI inflow to GDP (% of GDP). The matrix tiX ,  is 
composed of additional variables used to include further determinants, like an 
infrastructure measure given by the number of fixed and mobile telephone lines per 1000 
                                                 
4 Li and Liu (2005) have used a panel of yearly observations. In order to control for business cycles here, similar 
analysis was done with 5-year averages also, but the tests for endogeneity were negative. 
5 Measures for civil liberties and political rights were also included to incorporate Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) 
notion of the importance of domestic stability in investment decisions, but they did not add any significant effect nor 
altered significantly the results, so they are not included in the results. 
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people and a gap measure to calculate the technological disadvantage of a country 
relative to a leading economy (here I use the U.S. as the leading economy).6 This last 
measure is expected to be negatively related to growth, as a larger technology gap makes 
harder the adoption of new technology and thus tend to slow down economic growth.  
The second equation is given by a foreign direct investment equation: 
tititititititi XtradeSCHygFDI ,,,45,3,2,10, ln εαααααα ++++++= −  
where tiy ,  is the current GDP of country i at time t and measures income and the 
strength of the market,  titrade ,  is the ratio of trade to GDP and measures trade openness 
(imports plus exports over GDP). The matrix tiX ,  is composed of additional variables 
used to include further determinants, like the domestic interest rate, world interest rate, 
political rights, civil liberties, and others.  
 Common in the growth literature was to estimate these two equations separately, 
which will give rise to biased estimates if there is an endogenous relationship between 
FDI and economic growth, and vice versa. Furthermore, even if one corrects for such 
endogeneity by employing instrumental variable estimation, there is still the omission of 
the potential correlation among the disturbances of the different structural equations, 
thus requiring the use of a system of equations to take into account the variance-
covariance matrix of the disturbances of the whole system. In order to decide if it is 
necessary to use an instrumental variable, i.e., whether a set of estimates obtained by 
least squares is consistent or not, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression 
test, referred as DWH from here on) for endogeneity is performed on each equation 
separately, as suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).7 
If the DWH endogeneity test suggests that FDI is endogenous in the growth 
regression, and that GDP per capita growth is endogenous in the FDI equation, then the 
                                                 
6 Explicitly, tititti yyygap ,,, /)max( −= , where U.S. GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) is used as ymax. 
7 Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) suggest an augmented regression test (DWH test), which can easily be performed 
by including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side variable, as a function of all exogenous variables, in a 
regression of the original model. If the estimate of the “endogenous” variable is significantly different from zero, then 
the estimate is not consistent and we have endogeneity. 
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appropriate estimation technique should be simultaneous equations (Baltagi (2001)). 
Consequently, when endogeneity runs both ways, a 3SLS estimation procedure would be 
implemented in order to study the effect of FDI on economic growth, following 
Baltagi’s (1981) error components methodology. His proposed estimator is given by: 
[ ] [ ]yPZyPZZPZZPZ
XXXXSLSEC
)('~)('
~
)('
~
)('
~ˆ 1
1~
111
1~
1
3 ⊗Σ+⊗Σ⊗Σ+⊗Σ=
−−−−−
υυδ  
where variables with a tilde represent within transformations and variables with a bar 
represent between transformations. AP  represents the projection matrix of A. This 
estimator is obtained by first estimating the within and between 2SLS estimates of each 
structural equation, computing the disturbances of the covariance matrix 1Σˆ  and υΣˆ  and 
then obtaining the Cholesky decomposition of 11
ˆ −Σ  and 1ˆ −Συ , transforming the system by 
the resulting matrices and applying 3SLS on the transformed system with the relevant set 
of instruments. 
Consistent estimates of 1Σˆ  and υΣˆ  can be obtained using within 2SLS and 
between 2SLS residuals with 
 )1(/)ˆ()'ˆ(ˆ 2,2,
2 −−−= TNZyQZy SLSWlllSLSWjjjjl δδσν  
 NZyPZy SLSBlllSLSBjjjjl /)
ˆ()'ˆ(ˆ 2,2,
2
1 δδσ −−=  
where Zi is the matrix composed of right-hand side endogenous and exogenous variables 
for each structural equation i, yi is the NTx1 matrix of left-had side dependent variables 
for each structural equation i, P is a matrix which averages the observations across time 
for each individual country, Q is a matrix which obtains the deviations from individual 
means, and the iδˆ  is the vector of parameter estimates through within estimation in the 
first equation and through between estimation in the second equation, for each structural 
equation i. 
 
2.3 Results 
 
In order to decide if fixed-effects or random-effects is the  right  specification  for 
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the estimation of each equation, I first perform a Hausman tests on each of the basic 
specifications, rejecting the null that the individual invariant effects are not correlated 
with the explanatory variables. These tests suggest that fixed effects should be used for 
both the growth and the foreign direct investment equation8, and that is how estimation 
proceeds. 
The results for the growth equation are presented in Table 2.1, with column 1 
showing the estimates of the basic specification that led to the use fixed-effects (F.E.). 
The coefficients are in general consistent with previous estimates obtained in the growth 
literature, with the exception that two of the “robust” determinants of growth are not 
statistically significant even if they have the correct sign.9 The effect of the lagged GDP 
measure is negative and significant, which is in accord with the convergence literature 
that indicates that countries further away from their steady state will grow faster, and the 
effect of the human capital measure is positive and significant, indicating that higher 
levels of human capital facilitate economic growth. The measure for technology gap is 
negative and significant, also in accord with the notion that countries with further lags 
from leading technological levels will grow slower. With regards to the infrastructure 
measure, its effect is in the opposite direction than hypothesized, but it is statistically 
insignificant at any conceivable level. 
The effect of the variable of interest in this study, the foreign direct investment 
measure, is positive and significant when entered alone, indicating that a higher level of 
FDI – as a percentage of GDP – leads to a higher growth rate of GDP per capita in Latin 
American economies. The estimate suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
share of FDI to GDP will result in almost a 1 percentage point increase in the growth 
rate of GDP per capita. When FDI is interacted with the technology gap measure, the 
estimate is negative and statistically significant, indicating that a higher level of FDI 
combined with a smaller technological gap leads to higher growth rates. 
                                                 
8 A poolability test was performed for each specification across countries, but the results are not fully satisfactory in 
all of its dimensions. Given that this is the norm rather than the exception, I continue using the panel. 
9 The population growth measure is not significant throughout the study, perhaps for the way that yearly data is 
constructed, while the domestic investment measure insignificance is perhaps due to potential substitutability with 
foreign investment.   
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Table 2.1 – Growth Specification 
 (1) F.E. (2) Early 
Period 
(3) Later 
Period 
(4) Less 
Developed 
(5) More 
Developed 
Const. 44.602**   
(17.831) 
23.167   
(31.657) 
104.13***   
(31.555) 
36.740**   
(18.777) 
70.972*   
(41.751) 
Log(Lagged GDP) -5.3555**   
(2.2227) 
-3.5672   
(4.0368) 
-11.107***   
(3.9743) 
-5.115**   
(2.3905) 
-5.6438   
(5.2653) 
Pop. Growth -1.2910   
(1.0399) 
.75059   
(2.0126) 
-3.2005   
(2.1980) 
-.22911   
(1.1529) 
-5.4610**   
(2.4708) 
Dom. Investment .01906   
(.04892) 
.01233   
(.08867) 
.00095   
(.07495) 
.11466**   
(.05002) 
-.15389   
(.12450) 
Sec. School Attain 3.1540*   
(1.9156) 
1.2654    
(5.0273) 
-.73575     
(3.4806) 
-.68234   
(2.7085) 
3.6774   
(3.2074) 
FDI .62140*    
(.32915) 
.77426   
(2.1358) 
-.14378   
(.36526) 
.89714**   
(.36790) 
.05703   
(1.0533) 
Infrastructure -.00574   
(.00502) 
.06245   
(.05590) 
-.01146**   
(.00521) 
.00785   
(.00676) 
-.01151   
(.00914) 
Tech. Gap -.18372*   
(.10636) 
-.13311   
(.16838) 
-.63919***   
(.23615) 
-.05827   
(.10601) 
-2.2123**    
(.95739) 
FDI*Infrastructure -.00094   
(.00109) 
.00887   
(.02560) 
.00106   
(.00111) 
-.0023**   
(.00117) 
-.00148   
(.00307) 
FDI*Tech. Gap -.00174   
(.01029) 
-.04322   
(.08447) 
.01000   
(.01148) 
-.01014   
(.01127) 
.14669   
(.14027) 
 
R-square 0.0962 0.0576 0.2439   0.1362 0.1628 
Notes: Values with *** are significant at the 1% level, ** are significant at the 5% level, and * 
are significant at the 10% confidence level. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
 
The remaining columns are part of a sensitivity analysis. Columns two and three 
present the results for the 1980-1991 and 1992-2002 sample periods, respectively.  In the 
first sample period most of the independent variables have the correct sign, with the 
exception of the human capital, but are not statistically significant at any conceivable 
level. While this cut surprisingly lacks explanatory power, these results are in a sense 
expected since the 1980’s are considered as the “lost decade” for Latin America, a 
period with high volatility of many economic indicators and slow growth rates. The 
second sample period has the initial economic level and the technological gap measure 
being statistically significant, with their impact in the expected direction, but results in 
the infrastructure measure being statistically significant and negative, suggesting that 
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less infrastructure accelerates economic growth. This result contradicts previous 
findings, and is perhaps driven by the proxy for infrastructure.  
Even if the 1990’s were more stable and the region grew at a higher rate, it seems 
that the “robust determinants” are not as strong as believed to explain growth in the 
region. Columns four and five present the results for samples with lower and higher 
GDP per capita levels, with an initial GDP per capita of U.S. $2,500 being the threshold. 
In the sample for countries with low GDP per capita levels we have four statistically 
significant variables, all with the expected sign, with the FDI measure having a larger 
effect on economic growth than in the whole sample (0.897 instead of 0.621), while in 
the sample for countries with higher GDP per capita we can observe that we loose 
explanatory power with relation to the previous cut, with the technology gap having the 
expected negative impact and with the population growth having the expected negative 
effect on economic growth. The rest of the determinants are not statistically significant 
at any conceivable level. So in general, while FDI affects positively the growth rates of 
Latin American economies, it does it in a larger scale in poorer countries relative to the 
whole sample. 
 The results for the foreign direct investment equation are presented below in 
Table 2.2, where column one also shows the basic specification that leads to the use 
fixed effect. Here the estimates are also consistent in general with results previously 
found in the growth literature, with the exception of the human capital and the domestic 
interest rate. The purchasing power of the economy has a positive and significant effect 
on the attraction of FDI, signaling that increases in income make countries more 
attractive for MNCs, perhaps indicating that the type of foreign investment in Latin 
America is to satisfy domestic demand. The effect of the trade and the infrastructure 
measures are both positive and statistically significant, indicating that countries with 
higher levels of openness and with higher infrastructure are able to attract higher levels 
of foreign direct investment into their economies, and the effect of the world interest rate 
is negative and statistically significant. This last estimate supports the point that external 
conditions are also important in the determination of investment patterns in Latin 
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America raised by Calvo et. al. (1996). The effect of GDP per capita growth rate is 
positive and statistically significant, which indicates that higher growth rates lead to 
higher flows of FDI coming into the domestic economy. 
As it is done in Table 2.1, here the remaining columns are also part of a 
sensitivity analysis, with columns two and three presenting results for the 1980-1991 and 
1992-2002 sample periods, and columns four and five presenting results for countries 
with lower and higher levels of initial GDP per capita, respectively. In the first sample 
period, the purchasing power of the domestic economy and the openness measures are 
positive and statistically significant, while in the second sample period the purchasing 
power of the domestic economy and the infrastructure measures are positive and 
statistically significant. Having higher incomes helps attract higher levels of FDI, 
irrespective of the sample period. When looking at countries according to their level of 
development, I find that the infrastructure measures and the growth rate of  the  economy  
 
Table 2.2 – Foreign Direct Investment Specification 
 (2) F.E. (3) Early 
Period 
(4) Later 
Period 
(5) Less 
Developed 
(6) More 
Developed 
Const. -8.6670   
(6.2719) 
-26.470***   
(6.1570) 
-62.358***   
(17.245) 
-10.395   
(7.3844) 
-2.8544   
(11.414) 
GDPPC growth .06656***   
(.02079) 
.00635   
(.01323) 
.02990   
(.04545) 
.09660***   
(.03078) 
.04596**   
(.02273) 
Log(GDP) 1.3380*   
(.80305) 
3.3441***   
(.80559) 
8.2961***   
(2.2868) 
1.5889   
(1.0170) 
.36848   
(1.3675) 
Trade .01783**   
(.00783) 
.01812***   
(.00607) 
.00483   
(.01756) 
.01435   
(.00935) 
.03600**   
(.01403) 
Sec. School Attain .53824   
(.73902) 
1.8248   
(.83898) 
.71704   
(1.8869) 
2.7549**    
(1.1838) 
-1.5355*   
(.78681) 
Interest Rate .00040   
(.00175) 
.00011   
(.00090) 
-.01029   
(.01195) 
.00121   
(.00200) 
.00028   
(.00428) 
World Int. Rate -.15258***   
(.03160) 
.00566   
(.02798) 
-.04010   
(.11104) 
-.17958***   
(.04144) 
-.03464   
(.04213) 
Infrastructure .00518***   
(.00136) 
-.00077   
(.00792) 
.00379**   
(.00185) 
.00406**    
(.00202) 
.00721***   
(.00155) 
 
R-square 0.3806 0.1876 0.2328 0.4303 0.4116   
Notes: Values with *** are significant at the 1% level, ** are significant at the 5% level, and * are 
significant at the 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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exert a positive and statistically significant effect on the attraction of FDI, irrespective of 
the level of development of the economy. The world interest rate measure has a negative 
and statistically significant effect on FDI, and the human capital measure has  a  positive  
and significant effect on FDI, for countries with a low GDP per capita, while openness 
has a positive and statistically significant on FDI, but the human capital present a 
negative and statistically significant effect on FDI, for the other set of countries. This 
last negative effect of human capital is the only effect which is not in accord with 
previous results, perhaps suggesting that MNCs are looking for countries with large 
pools of unskilled labor – low levels of education.  
It is interesting to note that the suggestion that GDP per capita growth rates affect 
FDI decisions positively is confirmed here for the whole sample and for more and less 
developed countries. 
The results above clearly show that FDI is a significant determinant of real GDP 
per capita growth rate, and the real GDP per capita growth rate is a significant 
determinant of FDI. This means that FDI has a positive impact on economic growth, 
which in turn also affects positively the level of FDI, implying that the results found 
with separate equations may be biased estimates. This gives rise to the need to test for 
the interdependency of these two variables. As mentioned earlier, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test for endogeneity is applied to each equation, and since the test was not able 
to reject the null of endogeneity in neither equation, 3SLS estimation is used to estimate 
the system of the two equations. 
The results of the error components 3SLS estimation are presented below in 
Table 2.3, which summarizes the estimates of all of the parameters obtained by applying 
2SLS to the within dimension of the data, EC2SLS10, and EC3SLS. As the interest of 
this analysis is in the effect of FDI on economic growth, I will concentrate in the 
estimated coefficients of the two variables of interest, the FDI measure and the growth 
rate. In column one it is shown that all of the within estimates that are statistically 
significant have the theoretically expected signs, with  the  exception  of  the  purchasing  
                                                 
10 Since the within and between estimates are obtained in order to perform the error components three-stages least 
squares, the results are also included in the table for comparison. 
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Table 2.3 – Simultaneous Equation Estimation 
 (1) (2) EC2SLS (3) EC3SLS 
Variables Within Growth FDI Growth FDI 
Constant ____ 15.003*        
(5.4429)      
____ 13.474        
(9.1878)      
____ 
FDI 6.1502*        
(1.6301) 
3.4025*        
(0.5936)      
____ 1.6591*        
(0.6814)      
____ 
Education -3.7134        
(3.1875) 
-0.7361        
(0.6757)      
____ -0.8568        
(1.1840)      
____ 
Pop. Growth 4.2023*        
(2.0760) 
-1.0993*        
(0.3175)      
____ -0.7134        
(0.5024)      
____ 
Infrastructure 0.0221*        
(0.0103)      
0.0086*        
(0.0045)      
____ -0.0170*        
(0.0049)      
____ 
Investment -0.0178        
(0.0652)     
-0.0166        
(0.0317)      
____ -0.0042        
(0.0382)      
____ 
Lagged GDP -1.7847        
(3.0950)     
-1.8933*        
(0.6128)      
____ -1.2822        
(1.0349)      
____ 
Tech. Gap 0.2683        
(0.1899)      
0.0004        
(0.0639)      
____ -0.2061*        
(0.0750)      
____ 
FDI*Tech.gap -0.1435*        
(0.0425)     
-0.0826*        
(0.0173)      
____ 0.0033        
(0.0179)      
____ 
FDI*Infrastructure -0.0132*        
(0.0037)     
-0.0075*        
(0.0016)      
____ -0.0002        
(0.0017)      
____ 
      
Constant ____ ____ 9.2601*        
(2.1300)      
____ 9.6550*        
(2.0310)      
RGDPPCG 0.4785*        
(0.0825)      
____ 0.3562*        
(0.0595)      
____ 0.4727*        
(0.0466)     
World Int. Rate -0.0519        
(0.0488)     
____ -0.0878*        
(0.0445)      
____ -0.0561*        
(0.0336)     
Education -0.3218        
(1.0654)     
____ 0.5773        
(0.6032)      
____ 0.5040        
(0.5444)      
Trade 0.0163        
(0.0111)      
____ 0.0055        
(0.0062)      
____ 0.0046       
(0.0054)      
Infrastructure 0.0126*        
(0.0024)      
____ 0.0093*        
(0.0018)      
____ 0.0102*        
(0.0016)      
Log(GDP) -3.1209*        
(1.4391)     
____ -1.0492*        
(0.2845)      
____ -1.1430*        
(0.2699)     
Dom. Int. Rate 0.0042*        
(0.0020)      
____ 0.0022        
(0.0024)      
____ 0.0009        
(0.0017)      
Note: Values with * represent significance at least at the 10% confidence level. Standard Errors in 
parentheses. 
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power of the domestic  economy11  in  the  foreign  investment  equation,  and  the  
population  growth measure and the interaction of FDI and infrastructure in the 
economic growth equation. Beginning in this step, the results show that both variables of 
interest – FDI and the growth rate – are positive and statistically significant. 
The second column of Table 2.3 presents the error components 2SLS as derived 
by Baltagi (1981), where the dependent variable of each equation is the indicated in the 
heading of each column. In the growth equation all the statistically significant variables 
– with the exception of the measure that accounts for the initial economic conditions – 
have the expected sign, as it does the FDI measure when entered alone and when entered 
in the interaction with the technology gap measure, but it presents a somehow 
conflicting sign when entered in the interaction with the infrastructure measure, 
indicating that higher levels of FDI together with higher levels of infrastructure lead to 
lower growth rates. In the foreign direct investment equation both the growth rate and 
the  infrastructure  measures  are  still  positive  and  statistically  significant,  while  the 
international interest rate also becoming statistically significant and presenting the 
expected sign. The purchasing power of the domestic economy is still statistically 
significant and continues to the opposite sign than expected (see footnote 11 above). 
The results obtained when accounting for the variance-covariance matrix of the 
disturbances of the whole system in the error components estimates are presented in the 
last column. This is the econometric technique that accounts for all the specification 
concerns raised in previous analyses. The results of the growth equation show that the 
technology gap measure and infrastructure are both negative and statistically significant, 
indication that closing the technological difference to the leading economy will 
contribute to higher growth rates in the first case, which is in accord to the theory 
discussed above, but that further improvement in infrastructure will slow down 
economic growth in the region, which opposes existing arguments on the expected effect 
of infrastructure. With regards to FDI, it continues to exert a positive and significant 
                                                 
11 All of the estimates of the domestic purchasing power in the simultaneous-equations estimation are negative and 
statistical significant, indicating that a MNCs investment in the region is attracted by cheap labor costs (workers in 
countries with low incomes) and perhaps producing for foreign markets. 
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effect on economic growth, indicating that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of 
FDI to GDP will increase the growth rate of the receiving economy by more than 1.6 
percentage points. 
The results of the foreign direct investment equation show that the positive effect 
of infrastructure on the attraction of FDI is statistically significant, corroborating the 
previous findings that have led developing countries eager to attract foreign investment 
to invest heavily in their infrastructure capability to facilitate the production efforts of 
MNCs. The results also show the negative and statistically significant effect of both the 
international interest rate and the domestic purchasing power on FDI, the first in accord 
with  the claim that MNCs will take advantage of lower international interest rates to 
expand production to foreign markets (Calvo et. al. (1996)) but the second in 
contradiction with its hypothesized effect, which suggests that MNC’s are perhaps 
chasing lower labor costs to produce for foreign markets instead of domestic ones. It also 
shows that economic growth has a positive and significant effect on the attraction of 
FDI, indicating that a 10 percentage points increase in the growth rate will lead to almost 
5 percentage points increase in the share of FDI to GDP.  
These results show that the main variables of interest are both positive and 
statistically significant throughout the estimation, and only their magnitude fluctuates as 
we introduce the additional steps required to estimate the system of equation through 
error components 3 stages least-squares. The magnitude of the unbiased FDI coefficient 
is almost a third of the estimate under the within dimension and almost half of the 
estimate obtained in the 2SLS, while the magnitude of the unbiased FDI coefficient is 
practically the same than the one obtained under the within dimension of the data and 
almost 30 percent larger than the one obtained through the error components 2SLS 
estimation. These results are consistent with those found in other studies, in the sense of 
the positive and significant effect, and while not comparable, shows its effect being 
around three times larger than that found by Li and Liu (2005) for a group of 84 
countries and Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) for 18 Latin American countries, both 
using data from 1970 to 1999. Even if some of the determinants of economic growth are 
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not statistically significant in the simultaneous-equations estimation, the fact that they 
are used as controls to investigate the effect of FDI on economic growth should lessen 
their statistical importance here. 
 It can be argued that one of the problems of the current specification is the fact 
that yearly observations are used in the analysis, thus incorporating all the noise that 
arises from the business cycles that have affected the region in the sample period. In 
trying to deal with this matter, the same analysis was done with 5-year averages but the 
DWH endogeneity tests came out negative, allowing one to conclude that endogeneity is 
not present and that single equation estimation is the proper estimation technique to be 
used. Also, while some researchers argue that FDI’s impact on economic growth 
presents a lag, the estimation through a system of equations does not allow one to 
examine this. However, it is also argued that most of FDI’s effect occurs in the 
implementation of the project, and thus being contemporaneous, which seems reasonable 
since enough time is allowed then for FDI to exert its impact in the receiving economy. 
Here the estimation using yearly data then is the appropriate choice for this study. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
This section shows that there is a strong complementary connection between FDI 
and economic growth in Latin America. This gives support to the economic policies 
implemented in Latin America for the last decades in order to spur economic growth. 
The potential benefits attributed to FDI seems to have materialized, and that the increase 
in the volume of investment and its efficiency has generated technological diffusion 
sufficient to augment the existing stock of knowledge, facilitating the use and 
exploitation of local raw resources, and thus enhancing the growth initiatives in the 
region.  
While the modeling strategy used in the analysis does not allows one to fully 
determine the impact of the main variables that influence economic growth in the region, 
the contribution of these determinants to control for such effects and allow one to 
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estimate the impact of FDI on economic growth is what is important. However, this 
modeling strategy allows one to incorporate the simultaneous dynamics of foreign 
investment and economic growth, and the results reinforce the advice given by the 
multinational organizations working in the promotion of economic growth about the 
importance of infrastructure and the health of the receiving economy to attract FDI. The 
study quantifies the effects of the main determinants of economic growth and FDI 
inflows, accounting for the interdependency of economic growth and FDI, and provides 
unbiased estimates of these two effects.   
The results indicate that foreign direct investment does contribute to the 
economic growth of Latin American countries, at least in terms of improvements in GDP 
per capita growth rates. However, the current analysis shows the economic 
improvements in Latin America brought about by the inflow of FDI but does not 
indicate improvements in the living standard of its population. As previously noted, 
improvements in GDP per capita do not necessary translates in higher incomes, lower 
unemployment rates, or higher tax revenues in the future, so this results provide us with 
the general benchmark of economic growth to allow us to further explore the ways in 
which economic growth might translate in better standards of living. More specifically, 
in the next two sections I examine the effect of FDI on central government tax revenues 
(as total tax revenues and as the main components of it) and employment levels to verify 
if the economic growth induced by FDI in fact generates palpable benefits for its people, 
measured by these additional indicators. 
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3. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT’S EFFECT ON  
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUES 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous section it was established that FDI exerts a positive and 
significant effect on GDP per capita growth rates, which usually fuels economic growth 
and generates higher levels of output. Following this notion, the conventional wisdom 
presumes that FDI also increases government tax revenues. It can affect government tax 
revenues in a variety of ways. For example, higher investment levels in a country are 
expected to increase production, thus directly increasing domestic taxes on income and 
on goods and services if the production is sold in the country, and indirectly through 
increases in the quantity and perhaps quality of domestic income that result in higher 
levels of income taxes if it is sold abroad. Part of the inputs of production could be 
imported, thus constituting in a potential increase in taxes on international trade. 
Furthermore, as it is also argued that FDI will foster greater activity in the domestic 
firms participating in the production chain, and thus, expected higher productivity of 
these firms provide an additional channel through which tax revenues are expected to 
increase. Of course, the above analysis is dependent on the type of FDI, the sector where 
it is embedded, and the potential externalities that it is expected to generate. 
This view is shared by many of the leading economic and political scholars, and 
assumes that higher levels of economic activity generate higher levels of production, and 
consequently higher levels of government revenue, all else equal. This implied 
additional benefit have led developing countries in Latin America, and the rest of the 
world, to further compete amongst them in order to attract potential foreign investment. 
While countries usually improve their investment environment through infrastructure 
upgrading, macroeconomic stabilization, and liberalization of the economy, they are 
increasingly granting firm specific incentives, among them tax incentives like tax 
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holidays, tax breaks, and subsidies. However, while intense competition for FDI makes 
the granting of tax incentives almost inevitable, with tax incentives becoming tools that 
are actually preferred by the governmental departments in charge of attracting FDI, the 
inherently competitive dynamics of promotion diminishes the potential benefits of FDI, 
at least in terms of revenue collection. 
Governments implement tax policies to raise revenues for their public sector, 
correct market distortions, provide protection for their local industry, improve the terms 
of trade by favorably affecting world market prices, and to improve the distribution of 
income at home, all geared to maximize social welfare, but the implementation of 
second-best tax policies to attract FDI creates distortions that can contradict these goals, 
affect the competitiveness of domestic firms, and influence in the collection of tax 
revenues. As such, quantifying the magnitude of the hypothesized effect of FDI on 
government tax revenues and understanding the channels through which FDI affects the 
main components of total tax revenue is of vital importance. 
The performance and evolution of central government tax revenues in the sample 
of Latin American countries is presented below in Table 3.1, and shows similar trends 
than those observed for other regions. For the period 1980 to 2002, the average total tax 
revenue of the countries in the sample is about 14 percent of GDP. The main 
contribution comes from taxes on goods and services, which is almost twice the 
contribution from taxes on individuals, profits, and corporations, and almost three times 
the contribution from taxes on international trade. The second set of rows show with 5-
year averages the evolution of total tax revenue and its main components for the sample 
period, demonstrating that the collection of total tax revenues increased by almost 1 
percentage point of GDP during this period, that taxes on individuals, profits, and 
corporations have stagnated throughout the period, and that the region has adequately 
shifted its reliance towards taxes on goods and services and away from taxes on 
international trade.  
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Table 3.1 – Evolution of Tax Revenues and FDI (as a % of GDP) 
 Total Tax 
Revenue 
Taxes on 
Individuals, 
Profits, and 
Corporation 
Taxes on 
Goods and 
Services 
Taxes on 
International 
Trade 
FDI 
1980-2002 14.199 3.132 6.194 2.217    
 
2.054 
Evolution during sample period 
1980-84 13.318 3.312 4.982 2.541 0.728 
1985-89 13.980 2.953 5.695 2.673 0.933 
1990-94 14.899 3.102 5.962 2.312 1.599 
1995-99 14.545 3.065 7.369 1.767 3.974 
2000-02 14.288 3.293 7.474 1.505 
 
3.687 
By time periods 
1980-91 13.808 3.161 5.347 2.575 0.909 
1992-2002 14.626 3.101 7.117 1.825 
 
3.303 
By level of development 
Less Dev. 11.927 2.207 5.151 2.402 2.130 
More Dev. 16.471 3.925 7.088 2.057 
 
1.986 
Note: Shares are obtained from the sample of 17 Latin American economies, author’s calculations. 
 
These dynamics are better contrasted when the sample period is analyzed 
accounting for the two economically distinct time periods: the earlier economically 
stagnant period and the more economically vibrant later period. Here the transition away 
from international trade taxes, which show a decline of 30 percent from the earlier to the 
later  periods, and towards  a  greater  reliance on taxes on goods and services, which 
show an increase of almost 35 percent in the later period compared to  the  earlier  
period, is clearly seen. When the sample is examined according to the countries’ level of 
development, additional dynamics are uncovered, such as the greater capacity to collect 
higher taxes for the more developed countries.  This greater tax collection in more 
developed countries arises mainly from the higher contribution of taxes on individuals, 
profits, and corporation and taxes on goods and services. 
The importance of FDI to economic growth is commonly analyzed in the 
economic literature through its effect on GDP per capita growth rates, and while the 
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consensus suggests that greater foreign investment will generally lead to the production 
of greater output and consequently higher tax revenues – making the analysis of the 
effect of FDI on GDP levels or growth rates perhaps sufficient to measure its importance 
– the fact that governments make intensive use of tax incentives to attract FDI introduces 
a potential distortion on this link. Furthermore, as countries continuously adjust their tax 
system to be able to compete in the attraction of FDI, it further accentuates the 
potentially different effect of FDI on tax revenues then its effect on some measure of 
GDP, making it necessary to explicitly analyze this particular channel. 
This section and the next one – builds on the idea that FDI’s effect on economic 
growth should not only be measured through its effect on the level and growth rate of 
GDP per capita, but also through its influence on other factors that are relevant to 
domestic governments, such as on government tax revenues. This is related to views 
expressed in Braunstein and Epstein (2002), but differs in the modeling strategy, the 
analysis on Latin American economies instead of Chinese provinces, and in the 
econometric specification. Here the econometric specification is based on a more 
comprehensive theoretical background that enables one to control for the main 
determinants of tax revenue performance. This paper is also able to examine more 
closely the channels through which FDI can affect the collection of central government 
tax revenues. This has the potential of yielding important insight because from a 
theoretical perspective the disaggregated tax revenues may respond differently to 
changes in FDI. 
In this section I examine the different factors that contribute to the generation of 
government tax revenues in Latin American countries, with a special focus on the effect 
of FDI, but the effectiveness in the use of the potentially higher tax revenues is not 
discussed here. While the tax systems of Latin American countries share many features 
with those of the rest of the world, the regional macroeconomic difficulties encountered 
in the last 20 years have prompted a high degree of tax adjustments, which has resulted 
in a gradual reform that has improved the tax system, making it simpler to administer 
and easier for taxpayers to achieve compliance (Tanzi 2000). 
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The performance of government tax revenues is mainly determined by a number 
of structural factors. The adequate modeling of the behavior of government tax revenues 
emphasizes the structural characteristics of the countries in question, but also 
incorporates macroeconomic policies and international factors that affect economic 
activity in general, and tax revenue performance in particular. These main factors have 
been already identified in the existing literature, and for convenience are briefly 
discussed below. 
The so-called structural characteristics that affect the tax revenue performance 
of a country are the factors that influence the tax handles of an economy - like the level 
of income, the existence of subsistence sectors, and the dependence on the taxation of 
trade - and determine the magnitude of the tax base. Countries with large populations 
may be able to exploit economies of scale in the collection of tax revenues. However, the 
informal nature of much of the economic activity also becomes important when they are 
large, as in the case of Latin America. The tax bases in the region are notoriously 
difficult to assess in rural areas, prompting governments to concentrate in taxing 
incomes, goods, and services in the traditional urban areas, as well as industrial output 
and agricultural exports. But as urbanization increases the capacity to tax, it also 
increases the need for tax revenues, as greater urbanization leads to a greater need for 
public services. In addition, as a large percentage of the agricultural production is 
intended for self-consumption or commercialized in small-scale (or informal markets), 
the performance of tax revenues is also thought to depend on the relative size of the 
agricultural sector.  
Among the macroeconomic policies that exert the greatest influence on tax 
revenue performance are the governmental debt stance, the government’s current and 
past budget position, and the potential reliance on inflationary tax in order to generate 
revenue, all extremely important in Latin America. The first affects the tax collection by 
altering the pressure to collect taxes in order to finance public spending, as it happened 
in the 1980s when most Latin American countries were forced to cut public spending 
and increase taxation levels in the debt crises. Ghura (1998) shows that increases in 
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external grants lowers tax revenue, which could be indicative of a substitution between 
domestic tax revenue mobilization and the availability of external grants, but could also 
reflect a reverse causality problem, whereby countries with lower tax revenue to GDP 
ratios receive larger loans. With respect to the budget position, it is expected that 
governments incurring in budget deficits will be pressured by lending organizations to 
improve their fiscal accounts and to generate higher revenues, including tax revenues. 
Perhaps the factor that has affected tax performance in the region the most is the 
use of loose monetary policy, with inflationary financing of public spending becoming 
rampant in the region throughout the 1980s, and reaching hyperinflationary levels in 
many countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, to name a few. The problem 
arises when inflation reaches high levels and tax collection lags are significant, making 
the positive impact of the fiscal drag on tax revenue to be overwhelmed by the negative 
impact of the Tanzi effect12, which could be reinforced the higher the initial average tax 
ratio (Tanzi 1978). This negative effect has its largest impact on income taxes, as they 
generally have longer lags than other taxes. High inflation also reduces the tax base 
because in order to protect the real value of their wealth, economic agents make portfolio 
adjustments in favor of assets that typically escape the domestic tax net (such as land, 
jewelry, and foreign capital).  
Among the most important external factors effecting government’s tax revenue 
performance are the terms of trade, the exchange rate, and the liberalization of the 
economy. A strengthening of the terms of trade, measured as the export price index 
divided by the import price index, makes exporting industries more profitable and 
consequently generates higher tax revenue from income and possibly from imports used 
as inputs, but has a negative effect on the level of imports, and consequently any tax 
revenues gained from imports. Changes in the exchange rate directly alters the size and 
composition of the tax base through its effect on imports and exports, affecting the level 
                                                 
12 If tax revenue assessed in a year’s income is received in the following year and meanwhile prices have increased, 
the real value of these revenues will have fallen in comparison with their value in the assessed year. The higher the 
rate of inflation and the greater the lags on tax collection the lower will be tax revenue in real terms for any given set 
of formal tax rates. 
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and composition of aggregate demand according to the own-price elasticity’s of both 
tradable and non-tradable goods.  
While these two factors continually affect tax systems, the factor that perhaps 
influenced the tax system the most in Latin America, and the rest of the world, is trade 
liberalization. Liberalization usually takes the form of lower non-tariff barriers, larger 
import quotas, easier capital flows, and lower trade taxes, but also involves a reduction 
of the effective tariff rate, a movement towards a uniform tariff rate on all imports, and 
the eventual phasing out of tariffs. However, while the relative simplicity to assess and 
enforce trade taxes makes developing countries prone to use them as a major source for 
government revenue, the liberalization process has a direct effect on the collection of 
this type of taxes, and consequently on the others as well. 
That is why one of the main concerns with liberalization is that efforts to 
liberalize trade could result in revenue losses, unless the liberalizing countries 
successfully replace the foregone revenue from trade with revenue from other (domestic) 
sources. These effects on trade tax revenues – and on government revenues in general – 
depends on several factors, including the structure of liberalization, how the level and 
coverage of tariffs changes, and the elasticity of supply of import substitutes.  
 Given that trade liberalization was one of the major structural changes in the last 
quarter century, and was perceived to have influenced the tax revenue performance the 
most, it is the factor that has generated the largest amount of research in the tax revenue 
literature. Khattry and Rao (2002) find that both low-income and upper middle-income 
countries of a sample of 80 countries have experienced declines in total tax revenues, 
which was attributed to the falling of both income and trade tax revenues since the onset 
of trade liberalization. They argue that structural characteristics associated with these 
developing countries have limited their ability to make the transition from trade to 
domestic taxes. Agbeyegbe et. al. (2004) argue that the relationship between trade 
liberalization and tax revenue is sensitive to the measure used to proxy trade 
liberalization. Their results show that the traditional measure of trade liberalization is not 
strongly linked to aggregate tax revenue or its main components in general, but that the 
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collected-tariff liberalization measure is linked to higher income tax revenue. This 
undermines Ghura’s (1998) earlier finding that the level of openness of an economy is 
positively related to tax revenues, in addition to income and improvements in human 
capital.13 
With an emphasis on the external factors, Adam, Bevan, and Chambas (2001) 
examine the relationship between tax revenue, exchange rates, and trade openness in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and find that openness raises overall tax revenue in CFA Franc zone 
countries while it has little effect in countries outside the zone.14 They conclude that the 
poor tax revenue performance in this group of countries reflected mainly differences in 
environmental and structural factors, with misalignments of the exchange rate 
exacerbating its impact. The inverse relationship between a country’s tax revenues and 
the real level of its official exchange rate was earlier noted by Tanzi (1989), who argued 
that overvaluations have a direct effect on taxes by suppressing import and export bases 
measured in domestic currency terms, thus reducing the collection of international trade, 
sales, and excise taxes.  
While trade liberalization was geared to achieve gains from trade, the subsequent 
awareness about the importance of new technologies for economic growth has further 
expanded the liberalization movement to also include foreign investment, with the 
majority of emerging economies dramatically reducing barriers to FDI and 
implementing attractive tax incentives. The anticipation that their tax structure affects 
the firm’s choice to locate in a particular country has led them to adjust it and make it 
more flexible to international firms, becoming in many cases even more attractive than 
for domestic firms.  
Current literature in the area provide increasing agreement that taxation strongly 
influences both the volume of FDI and the operational behavior of multinational firms, 
all else equal. The evidence suggests that high tax rates discourage FDI by depressing 
                                                 
13 The human capital index constructed in his study is meant to proxy for the provision of public services by the 
government, such that a satisfactory level would induce people to contribute with higher tax rates. 
14 Adam, Bevan, and Chambas (2001) develop a comprehensive theoretical model, and analyze the effect of the real 
exchange rate and its misalignment on the tax revenue, especially on its three components:  indirect taxes, trade taxes, 
and income taxes. 
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after-tax investment returns and by changing the opportunities available to firms that 
have discretion in reporting the location of taxable income. For example, before 
investing abroad, MNCs contemplate the tax structure of its own country – as it may 
offer relief from double taxation – and the bilateral treaties in place between its own 
country and the potential host country. These treaties lower trade barriers and reduce tax 
uncertainty over the long term (Chisik and Davies (2004)). 
However, the most important tax consideration for their investment decision is 
perhaps the tax incentives offered by the host-country. High tax rates are usually 
associated with reduced investment by multinational firms and with reported profit rates 
that are lower than industry averages. Desai et. al. (2002) find that 10 percent higher 
taxes are associated with 5 percent lower FDI, controlling for parent company and 
observable aspects of local economies. The effort to lower taxes include the extension of 
tax holidays, exemptions from import duties, investment allowances, tax credits, 
accelerated depreciation, and the offer of direct subsidies. While there is a general trend 
to lower corporate income tax rates, most countries have extended the use of such 
incentives to stretch even further the granting of exemptions to foreign corporations 
making inward direct investments. These exemptions usually lower the tax rate but some 
times eliminates all tax liabilities, generally lasting for periods up to 10 years - although 
long-lived exemptions are also found in some cases.  
Other important incentives that MNCs receive come in the form of subsidies. 
Direct subsidies are usually offered in a case-by-case basis and are generally 
unpublicized arrangements, but their granting is common and can reach important 
magnitudes. Some examples - among others - of this type of incentives are the $400 
million subsidy to Multibras to construct a manufacturing plant for air conditioners and 
microwave ovens in Brazil in 1998, the $230 million spent by the state of Alabama in 
order to induce Mercedes-Benz to locate its new assembly plant in the state, and the 
$250 million each - in straight subsidies and temporary exemptions from value-added 
taxes and import duties - granted to General Motors and Ford Motors by the Brazilian 
state of Rio Grande do Sul (Keller and Yeaple (2003), Hanson (2001)). 
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This subsidization of FDI through tax incentives brings to light the potential 
harm that greater foreign participation can produce on domestic firms, as the partial or 
total crowding out of domestic firms increases the possibility that some domestic factors 
of production may loose with higher levels of FDI. Glass and Saggi (1999) show that if 
the impact of MNCs on the profitability of domestic firms is sufficiently negative, FDI 
may lower host-country welfare, such that the optimal policy towards FDI should indeed 
be a higher level of taxation. Hanson (2001) also finds that, in his case study of General 
Motors and Ford Motors in Brazil and Intel in Costa Rica, subsidy-induced increases in 
production appears that have laid upward pressure on the relative wages of skilled 
workers, thus reducing the profitability of domestic firms, and that while there were only 
a few firms in their line of business that faced the increase in relative wages, it also 
meant that there were only a few firms that benefited from the potential spillovers.  
However, the effectiveness of these policies in attracting FDI is highly uncertain. 
Beyer (2002) shows in his study of 15 post-socialist countries that having tax holidays or 
other relieves which affect taxation in the short-term appears to be less important than 
risk, success in their political transformation, or economic stability, finding no 
significant relationship between the introduction of tax incentives and the level of FDI 
inflows. This finding seems logic since investors generally do not consider incentives as 
a determining factor in their investment strategies if the incentives are more or less 
matched by competitor countries. In other words, only when investors are considering 
alternative locations that offer acceptable and roughly comparable conditions for 
producing for foreign markets, the potential tax reductions obtained helps them shield 
themselves from potential competition from investors who could choose one of the 
alternative locations (Bergsman 1999).  
While the above analysis represents a wide range of research examining the 
determinants of tax revenues and the implications of such for the attraction of foreign 
investment, empirical work on the effect of FDI on government tax revenues is almost 
nonexistent, and thus its direction and magnitude still unreported. The only exception is 
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the aforementioned work of Braunstein and Epstein (2002)15, who study the impact of 
inward FDI on tax generation in China during 1986-1999, by running a panel regression 
analysis on provincial level data, and distinguishing the impact of FDI inflows to that of 
economic liberalization. They find that inward FDI has a negative impact on tax revenue 
while trade has a positive impact. To the extent that FDI contributes to trade, they argue 
that it may be contributing indirectly to tax revenue. 
One common problem in the empirical work that examines impacts on 
government tax revenues is that it is often difficult to control for the impact of all 
relevant regional characteristics, the firm specific level of taxation and subsidies, and the 
changing structure of the tax systems in each country. Since my interest on the effect of 
FDI on government tax revenues is rather narrow, I abstract from the implications of 
varying and changing tax rates and the inherent aggregation problems of the tax revenue 
measures used in the study, and provide a general explanation of how tax revenues are 
affected in the short run by changes in FDI. This task is done in the following sub-
sections. 
 
3.2 Data and Methodology 
 
The data for this study comes from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 2004 (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF), from the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’s (ECLAC’s) 2004 Statistical 
Yearbook, from the Government Finance Statistics yearbooks (IMF), and from the 
Oxford Latin American Economic History Database. The sample consists of the same 17 
Latin American countries used in the previous section over the period 1980-2002, with 
annual observations. The sample excludes countries that serve as offshore financial 
centers, are too small, have special governmental controls, or lack adequate data.  
While it is not possible to control directly for the evolving structure of the tax 
system, the use of panel data methods allows one to control for unobservable time-
                                                 
15 This study is related to the idea that the effect of FDI on economic growth should include additional factors, but I 
am looking at the specific effects on tax revenues more systematically. 
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invariant country-specific characteristics that determine tax revenue performance. With 
respect to the nature of the observations, it is argued that yearly observations introduce 
noise from the cyclical dynamics of some explanatory variables. In this case the 
potential benefit of accounting for such dynamics on a yearly basis gives me a reason to 
use them instead of few-years averages. 
I examine the performance of tax revenue by regressing the share of central 
government tax revenue to GDP (and its main components) on the variables that reflect 
the structural characteristics of the economy (tax base), the macroeconomic policies, and 
the main external factors. Early econometric specifications for analyzing government tax 
revenue performance use a fixed effects model to account for the unobserved time-
invariant country-specific effects (Khattry and Rao (2002)). The recognition of the high 
degree of persistence of the tax revenues over time has moved recent empirical analysis 
to use dynamic panel data estimation (Agbeyegbe et. al. (2004)). This method was 
originally developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond 
(1991), and it has been widely implemented since. 
However, the linear generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator obtained 
after first differencing has been found to have large finite sample bias and poor precision 
when the autoregressive parameter is moderately large (or the relative variance of the 
fixed effects increases), the series are persistent, or the number of time series is 
moderately small (Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), Bond, 
Hoeffler, and Temple (2001)). The bias and poor precision arises as the instruments used 
in the standard first-difference GMM estimator become less informative (weak), and can 
be corrected by using the system GMM estimator, which exploits additional initial 
condition and generates efficient estimators for dynamic panel data models when the 
above problems are present. The system GMM estimator is composed of equations both 
in first-differences and levels, and uses instruments in first differences for equations in 
levels and instruments in levels for equations in first differences. 
The econometric specification is based on Khattry and Rao’s theoretical model 
(2002) and considers the influential variables commonly used in the tax literature, but it 
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presents a slight deviation as it accounts for the effect of government expenditures 
through the governmental budget stance instead of just government expenditures, and 
uses the central government long-term debt instead of the more broad measure of a 
country’s external debt. It also includes a measure of the variable of interest (FDI) to 
estimate its effect on tax revenues. The estimated econometric model16 is: 
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tr  is the tax yield as a percentage of GDP , GDEBT  is the central government 
long-term debt as a percentage of GDP , FDI is the ratio of foreign direct investment to 
GDP , lPOP  is the natural logarithm of the population of each country, URB  measures 
the percentage of the population that lives in urban areas, TRADE  is the level of trade 
openness measured as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP , SURPLUS  is the 
central government budget stance as a percentage of GDP, AGS  measures the economic 
activity of the agricultural sector as a percentage of GDP , INF  measures the level of 
inflation of each country, and lGDPpc  is the natural logarithm of real GDP  per capita. 
The vector of time dummy variables that controls for common time-varying effects is 
denoted by ts , and the error term follows the standard one-way error specification 
  tiiti ,, νµε +=  
where iµ  denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and ti,ν  denotes the 
remainder disturbance. 
Drawing from the existing literature, the  conjecture  is  that  population, real  
GDP   per capita, and urbanization are positively related to tax revenues, while the 
agricultural share, the budget stance, and the inflation rate are expected to be negatively 
                                                 
16 This is the base specification in order to estimate the effect of FDI of total tax revenues controlling for all the 
relevant determinants of tax revenues, and it is slightly modified in order to better specify its effect on each of the 
main components.  
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related to tax revenues. Given that contracting new debt exposes countries to 
international pressure, the current changes in debt are expected to be positively related to 
tax revenues, but the lagged effect is expected to be negative, as countries would be less 
constrained to finance public spending.17 The measure of trade openness (TRADE ) has 
an ambiguous a priori effect. The effect of FDI was found to be negative in Braunstein 
and Epstein (2002), but the theoretical literature suggests that it should be positively 
related to tax revenues, so the direction of such effect here is ambiguous. 
Since the time series of some of the variables are clearly persistent ( lGDPpc , 
lPOP , URB ), the lagged levels of the series provide weak instruments for subsequent 
first-differences, providing the initial reason to lean towards the system GMM 
estimation. This estimation technique is asymptotically more efficient relative to either 
of the alternatives when instruments are weak. Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple (2001) also 
note the considerable strength of the system GMM estimator to obtain consistent 
parameter estimates even in the presence of measurement error and endogenous 
variables, so that endogeneity concerns arising from independent variables like the 
government stance, inflation, and debt can be disregarded. 
Given the nature of the data, and to detect whether serious finite sample biases 
are present, a comparison of the first-differenced GMM results to alternative estimates of 
the autoregressive parameter is first performed. As it is well known, the OLS on levels 
will give an estimate of the autoregressive parameter that is biased upwards in the 
presence of individual-specific effects. The within group estimator will give an estimate 
of the autoregressive parameter that is seriously biased downward in relatively short 
panels. From the above specification18 we obtain an estimate of 0.88970 for the 
autoregressive parameter using OLS, and an estimate of 0.62156 for the autoregressive 
parameter using fixed effects. The autoregressive parameter estimate using the 
traditional first-differenced Arellano and Bond (1991) method is 0.62673, which lies 
                                                 
17 Measures for terms of trade and the exchange rate are also used in the specification for taxes on international trade, 
with the expected effect being ambiguous a priori for both. 
18 Complete results are included in the Appendix in Table A.1. 
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only slightly above the within group estimate, a signal that biases due to weak 
instruments may be important in the first-difference estimator. 
The parameter estimate of the autoregressive coefficient of total tax revenue 
using system GMM is 0.76880, which lies comfortably above the fixed-effects estimate 
and below the OLS estimate. The additional instruments from the system GMM seem to 
be valid and highly informative in this context. In addition, neither the Hansen’s over-
identification test nor the tests for second-order serial correlation detect any problems 
with neither instrument validity nor the serial correlation assumptions.19 The results 
suggest that there is a finite sample bias problem caused by weak instruments in the first-
differenced GMM results, which I address in the remaining analysis by using the system 
GMM. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
The results obtained in this study are short from perfect given that many details 
and dynamics of the tax systems of the sample countries cannot be observed and 
consequently cannot be addressed. One of the main difficulties is that neither MNCs nor 
host-country’s publish or are willing to describe the incentive’s packages (tax breaks or 
subsidies) that are provided to the specific MNCs in order to entice them to set their 
production facilities in their countries. Another important limitation is the lack of data to 
discern the industry participation of foreign investment, as it is hypothesized that FDI 
could have a significantly different effect according to the industry where it is injected. 
While corporate taxes – a subcomponent of taxes on individuals, profits, and 
corporations – suggests itself as the most adequate measure to analyze the effect of FDI 
on tax revenues, the lack of consistent data makes its use unfeasible. These limitations 
are taken into account when interpreting the results, and caution is exercised when 
making generalizations. 
                                                 
19 In order to have the disturbances ti,ν not being serially correlated, there should be evidence of significant negative 
first order serial correlation and no evidence of second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. 
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While the emphasis of my empirical analysis is to estimate the effects of FDI on 
government tax revenues, I also stress the channel through which FDI may influence tax 
collection in Latin American countries. In particular, through the estimation of the main 
components of the overall government tax revenue, I try to disentangle the main 
channels through which FDI potentially has an effect on government tax revenues. 
In Table 3.2 the main regression results are presented, where one can 
immediately observe the high degree of persistence that tax revenue collection presents. 
The estimation for the overall government tax revenue is presented in the first column, 
which represents the broader measure of tax revenues. It shows that FDI has a positive 
and significant impact on total tax revenues, after controlling for the main determinants 
(the structural characteristics, macroeconomic policies, and external sector). This 
estimate implies that an increase in FDI of 10 percentage points results in slightly more 
than a 1 percentage point increase in total tax revenues. This finding suggests that the 
greater attraction of FDI into the region has indeed benefited the local governments, and 
its people, through higher collection of tax revenues. 
Inflation also has a positive and significant effect, suggesting that higher inflation 
– a proxy for expansionary fiscal policies – improves tax revenue collection. This 
finding contradicts Tanzi’s hypothesis but it could be explained by the significant 
deceleration of inflation after the hyperinflationary episodes. However, this effect is 
small, as a 10 percentage point decrease in the inflation rate decreases the tax yield by 
around 0.003 percentage points. The effects of current and lagged government debt are 
also significant, indicating that as a country increases its long-term debt, in the current 
period, it falls under greater international pressure to improve its tax collection ratio and 
does so, while if it has increased its long-term debt in the previous period it can have 
some slack in its current tax collection effort. Also positive and statistically significant is 
the effect of real GDP per capita, indicating that a increase in income raises the 
collection of tax revenues, which is also in accord with the existing literature. The 
remaining control variables are not statistically significant but have  the  expected  signs.  
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Table 3.2 – Effect of FDI on Total Tax Revenues and Main Components 
 Total Tax 
Revenues 
Taxes on 
Individuals, 
Profits, and 
Corporations 
Taxes on 
Goods and 
Services 
Taxes on 
International 
Trade 
Constant -2.6562   
(2.5698)     
-3.2320*   
(1.5015) 
-2.5880   
(2.1904) 
-1.8091   
(1.1135) 
Taxlag .76880***   
(.05242)     
.77196***     
(.02550) 
.67263***   
(.04623) 
.70199***   
(.10133) 
Inflation .00032***   
(.00008)      
-.00005    
(.00004) 
.00011   
(.00006) 
____ 
Gov. debt .01174***   
(.00199)      
.00407***     
(.00062) 
.00570***   
(.00100) 
.00228***   
(.00050) 
Gov. debt -1 -.00858***   
(.00178)     
-.00356***   
(.00066) 
-.00430***   
(.00102) 
-.00067   
(.00054) 
FDI  .11108**   
(.03978)      
.01280     
(.01560) 
.06407**   
(.02747) 
-.00302   
(.02071) 
ln of GDP per capita .61434*  
(.35818)      
.27808*     
(.15463) 
.23024   
(.26515) 
.00639   
(.12000) 
Agricultural Share -.04900   
(.03901)     
-.01680   
(.02856) 
____ ____ 
ln of Population -.37826   
(.35906)     
.26533**     
(.12144) 
-.24164   
(.25530) 
-.07773   
(.09244) 
Urbanization .00689   
(.01170)      
-.01414**   
(.00585) 
.02940**   
(.01039) 
.00470   
(.00507) 
Budget Surplus -.00411   
(.01955)     
-.00418   
(.00626) 
-.02108   
(.03074) 
.02974**    
(.01287) 
Trade .45243   
(.45598)      
.59932*     
(.33239) 
.34577   
(.49344) 
.50313**   
(.20829) 
Terms of Trade ____ ____ ____ .00294   
(.00198) 
Exchange Rate ____ ____ ____ -.00002   
(.00007) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.001 0.124 0.003 0.020 
AR(2) Test 0.299 0.330 0.605 0.479 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence level, and * for 
10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not presented. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
 
The exception is the population measure, which coefficient suggests that diseconomies 
of scale are present in the region. 
In order to analyze the channels through which FDI affects government tax 
collection, I estimate  specific  formulations  for  the  main  components  of  government  
tax  revenue.  The specification for taxes on goods and services omits the agricultural 
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share since most agricultural production escapes this type of taxation anyway. The 
specification for taxes on international trade also omits the agricultural share and 
includes measures for the terms of trade and the exchange rate, due to their importance 
to determine trade performance, and omits inflation, since its effect is indirectly 
accounted for in the fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
As I report in the second column, FDI has a positive effect on taxes on 
individuals, profits, and corporations but it is no longer statistically significant at 
standard significance levels. Government debt still has the same influence than in total 
taxes but its effect is much smaller for both current and lagged one period government 
debt. With respect with the level of income, and in accord with previous analyses, I find 
that an increase in real GDP per capita in the current period raises the percentage of 
taxes on individuals, profits, and corporations. Economies of scale are also found to be 
statistically significant for these taxes, as the population size measure has a positive 
effect. The effect of trade is also found to be positive and significant, also in accord with 
the existing literature, but the effect of urbanization is found to be negative and 
significant, perhaps because it is accompanied by a proliferation of small-scale 
enterprises and a growth in the informal sector in Latin America, affecting these types of 
taxes negatively (Rao (1999)). With respect to inflation, it has a negative effect, in 
accordance with the Tanzi effect, but it is not statistically significant. 
The estimates of the regression of taxes on goods and services – presented in the 
third column – shows that it is through this channel that the effect of FDI on government 
tax revenues exerts in main influence. The effect of FDI on taxes on goods and services 
is positive and statistically significant, indicating that a 10 percentage points increase in 
FDI leads to a 0.64 percentage point increase in taxes on goods and service. The 
dynamics of the effect of government debt on taxes on goods and services is similar to 
that on total taxes for the current and lagged-one-period debt, but its effect is less than 
half its magnitude on the effect on total taxes. The urbanization measure indicates that as 
a country becomes more urbanized it increases the share of taxes on goods and services, 
which is understandable given the fact that taxes on goods and services are more easily 
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imposed and collected in contrast with the taxes on individuals, profits, and corporations. 
Inflation is found to be positive here, suggesting also a reverse Tanzi effect, but it is not 
statistically significant. 
The final column of Table 3.2 presents the results on the specification for taxes 
on international trade. The effect of FDI on these taxes is negative, but it is not 
statistically significant at any conceivable confidence level. The effect of government 
debt is dynamically similar to the previous tax shares but only the positive current effect 
is statistically significant. Not surprisingly, the effect of trade is positive and significant, 
due to the fact that this factor is the base for the collection of this tax component. These 
results also show that the variable measuring the lagged-one-period surplus of the central 
government has a positive and significant effect, perhaps reflecting the fact that 
countries with budget surpluses during the previous year are indicative of good 
economic performance, affecting the overall economy in general and the collection of 
international trade taxes in particular. With respect to the additional variables, while they 
contribute as controls and present the correct sign, they are not statistically significant. 
The results shown in Table 3.2 show that FDI exerts a positive effect on total tax 
revenues, which is channeled through its effect on taxes on goods and services, but is 
leaves questions about individual contribution of each tax component on the overall 
effect since it does not add up to the effect on total tax revenues. Given that there is no 
data available for the remaining components, calculating the remaining portion of the tax 
share and estimating the effect of FDI on this remain one obtains a positive but 
insignificant effect of FDI of 0.02386, which added to the contribution of the previous 
shares gives us close to the overall effect. Also, since the estimated effect of FDI is for 
current flows, and since there are some arguments that the effect of FDI is delayed, I 
also estimated the same specification using lagged FDI by one and two years.20 The 
results show that lagged-one-year FDI has a negative effect on total tax revenues, on 
taxes on individuals, profits and corporation, and on taxes international trade, and a 
positive effect on taxes on goods and services, but the estimates are not statistically 
                                                 
20 See Table A.2 for magnitudes and standard errors of all FDI estimates. 
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significant at any conceivable levels. These same dynamics are also present in the 
specification using the lagged-two-years FDI, but its effect is not statistically significant 
in this case either. 
In order to exploit the dimensionality of the data and investigate the robustness of 
these results, in Table 3.3 I also consider the potentially different effects that FDI could 
have on government tax revenues according to the level of development of the country, 
as less developed countries are hypothesized to be able to reap greater benefits from FDI 
than do more developed countries, with its corresponding repercussion on the collection 
of taxes. The assumption of same variance across the two groups is used here – and in 
the specifications that follow – as there is no indication suggesting that these two groups 
of countries have different volatility. To this end, a dummy variable DEV  is introduced, 
with the dummy taking the value of one for countries that had an initial real GDP per 
capita higher than U.S. $2,500 in the year 1980 and zero otherwise.  
While the effects of inflation and government debt on total tax revenues are 
similar than those of Table 3.2, accounting for the level of development reveals how 
distinct are the effects of FDI on the two country classifications, as an increase of 10 
percentage points in FDI – on less developed countries – results in slightly less than a 
1.5 percentage point increase in total tax revenues. For the most  developed  countries,  
while the estimates suggest that the same 10 percentage points increase in FDI leads to a 
small but positive 0.12 percentage point increase in total tax revenues, statistical tests 
reveal that this effect is not statistically different than zero. It is also observed that the 
income measure looses its statistical significance on total tax revenue when one accounts 
for the level of development of the receiving country. 
The effect of FDI on total tax revenue for the group of less developed countries 
also come from the effect of FDI on taxes on goods and services, as it is found that the 
positive effect is statistically significant. However, while the estimates also suggest that 
this effect is only slightly smaller for the most developed countries, statistical tests show 
that when both estimates are taken together they are not statistically different than zero. 
The dynamics for the other two components of  total  tax  revenues  are  similar  to  those 
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Table 3.3 – Effect of FDI on Total Tax Revenues and Main Components by 
Level of Development 
 Total Tax 
Revenues 
Taxes on 
Individuals, 
Profits, and 
Corporations 
Taxes on 
Goods and 
Services 
Taxes on 
International 
Trade 
Constant -1.2586   
(3.4741) 
-4.8395**    
(2.1824) 
3.4467   
(3.4934) 
-3.1304   
(2.3112) 
Taxlag .76013***   
(.04702) 
.76506***     
(.02990) 
.64717***   
(.04763) 
.69712***   
(.09899) 
Inflation .00031***   
(.00008) 
-.00004   
(.00004) 
.00009    
(.00007) 
____ 
Gov. debt .01167***   
(.00191) 
.00432***    
(.00054) 
.00577***   
(.00112) 
.00229***   
(.00050) 
Gov. debt -1 -.00876***   
(.00165) 
-.00345***    
(.00074) 
-.00463***   
(.00117) 
-.00055   
(.00046) 
DEV  1.0672**   
(.48786) 
-.35943   
(.30376) 
1.3152**   
(.43959) 
-.33038   
(.34939) 
FDI  .14750***   
(.03374) 
.02584    
(.01740) 
.05101**   
(.02113) 
-.00488   
(.02281) 
DEVFDI *  -.13522   
(.08003) 
-.02652    
(.05350) 
-.01357   
(.04364) 
.01672   
(.03605) 
ln of GDP per capita .30336   
(.52028) 
.51130**    
(.20426) 
-.56557   
(.45280) 
.18585   
(.22901) 
Agricultural Share -.02748    
(.03528) 
-.02589   
(.02614) 
____ ____ 
ln of Population -.35880   
(.34027) 
.24942*    
(.11752) 
-.22344    
(.26920) 
-.09366    
(.09253) 
Urbanization .00647   
(.01200) 
-.01364*   
(.00640) 
.02595**   
(.01112) 
.00619   
(.00554) 
Budget Surplus -.00328   
(.01967) 
-.00406   
(.00587) 
-.02074   
(.03058) 
.02991**   
(.01305) 
Trade .52594   
(.40227) 
.63906    
(.38435) 
.28215   
(.42500) 
.51094**   
(.21605) 
Terms of Trade ____ ____ ____ .00313   
(.00217) 
Exchange Rate ____ ____ ____ -.00004   
(.00008) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.001 0.116 0.004 0.018 
AR(2) Test 0.298 0.330 0.570 0.489 
Note: Statistical significance given by ***  for 1% confidence level, **  for 5% confidence level, and * 
for 10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not presented. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
 
presented in Table 3.2, and suggest that the effect of FDI on taxes on individuals, profits, 
and corporations and on taxes on international trade is null, irrespective of their  level  of  
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development. 
As the sample spans the period from 1980 to 2002, I also examine the potentially 
different effect of FDI on tax revenue performance by dividing the sample into two 
comparatively distinct time periods. The natural break is given by the fact that the 
1980’s have been considered as the “lost decade” for economic development in Latin 
America, while the more prosperous 1990’s presented the region with a significantly 
improved economic prospect and performance. In addition, the investment activity in the 
region also presents this distinct pattern according to these two time periods, with the 
share of FDI flowing into the region more than tripling in the later period. I incorporate 
this distinction through the dummy variable Later  that takes the value of one for the 
period between 1992 and 2002, and zero otherwise.  
The results are presented in Table 3.4 below, and show that FDI’s effect on total 
tax revenue is positive but is not statistically significant for the earlier period of the 
sample. With regards to the effect of FDI on the main tax components, I find that its 
effect on taxes on individuals, profits, and corporations and on taxes on goods and 
services is negative, while its effect on taxes on international trade is positive during this 
earlier period. However, neither of these effects is statistically significant at any 
conceivable level.  
FDI’s effect on the later period of the sample is more informative, because even 
if the individual coefficients are still not statistically significant, testing of the two 
relevant estimates together show that FDI has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on total tax revenues and on its main component (taxes on goods and services). 
The results show that a 10 percentage points increase in FDI results in a 1.1 percentage 
point increase in total tax revenues, and that a similar 10 percentage points increase in 
FDI results in almost 0.8 percentage point increase in taxes on goods and services. The 
effect on total taxes is similar than the effect on the whole sample period, but the effect 
on the main component is almost 20 percent larger than the effect on the whole sample 
period (Table 3.2). As the magnitude of FDI as a share of GDP has grown by more than 
300 percent in this later period, it seems that the higher levels of FDI did in  fact  exert  a  
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Table 3.4 – Effect of FDI on Total Tax Revenues and Main Components by 
Time Periods (1980-1991 and 1992-2002) 
 Total Tax 
Revenues 
Taxes on 
Individuals, 
Profits, and 
Corporations 
Taxes on 
Goods and 
Services 
Taxes on 
International 
Trade 
Constant -2.6513   
(2.5545) 
-3.3647**    
(1.4730) 
-2.8310     
(2.1224) 
-1.7255   
(1.0975) 
Taxlag .76880***   
(.05231) 
.77119***     
(.02790) 
.66768***     
(.04915) 
.69945***   
(.10006) 
Inflation .00032***   
(.00008) 
-.00005     
(.00004) 
.00010     
(.00006) 
____ 
Gov. debt .01175***   
(.00197) 
.00400***     
(.00069) 
.00562***      
(.00101) 
.00238***    
(.00053) 
Gov. debt -1 -.00858***   
(.00175) 
-.00353***     
(.00070) 
-.00423***     
(.00100) 
-.00071   
(.00053) 
Later    1.1843   
(.70316) 
-.29473     
(.72215) 
.49197     
(.33322) 
-.14902   
(.32754) 
FDI  .11256    
(.12190) 
-.03417     
(.08830) 
-.06313      
(.08750) 
.05385   
(.09835) 
LaterFDI *  -.00166   
(.12431) 
.05330      
(.09858) 
.14400     
(.10473) 
-.06529   
(.09524) 
ln of GDP per capita .61405*   
(.33833) 
.28585*     
(.14309) 
.24271     
(.26710) 
.00158   
(.11402) 
Agricultural Share -.04903   
(.03900) 
-.01598      
(.02759) 
____ ____ 
ln of Population -.37841   
(.35937) 
.27169*     
(.13235) 
-.23574     
(.25617) 
-.08108   
(.09231) 
Urbanization .00688     
(.01173) 
-.01389**     
(.00568) 
.03060**     
(.01073) 
  .00446   
(.00523) 
Budget Surplus -.00410   
(.01950) 
-.00445     
(.00587) 
-.02197     
(.02942) 
.02995**   
(.01244) 
Trade .45170    
(.44815) 
.62167     
(.36885) 
.40666     
(.48742) 
.48518**    
(.22391) 
Terms of Trade ____ ____ ____ .00287   
(.00199) 
Exchange Rate ____ ____ ____ -.00002   
(.00007) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.001 0.122 0.003 0.021 
AR(2) Test 0.281 0.330 0.600 0.478 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence level, and * for 
10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not presented. Standard Errors in parentheses 
 
 
positive effect on total tax revenues, effect that became channeled through its effect on 
taxes on goods and services again.  
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While the results presented until now mainly investigate the potentially different 
impact of FDI on total tax revenues and its main components, through the general 
specification but also controlling for specific factors that could give rise to differential 
effects, the fact that the reverse Tanzi effect found in these results are somehow at odds 
with other empirical studies (Tanzi (1978), Ghura (1998), Adam, Bevan, and Chambas 
(2001), Agbeyegbe et. al. (2004)) necessitates further examination. To this end, I now 
also control for the potentially different effect of inflation on tax revenues by also 
subjecting to the possibility that its slope could be different according to the level of 
inflation – as it is known that hyperinflationary pressures affected many countries in the 
sample. The dummy variable used for this purpose is HI and it has the value of one for 
years when inflation reached levels higher than 50%, and zero otherwise. 
Table 3.5 below presents the results. I find that the effect of inflation on total tax 
revenues - and its main components – is negative for low levels of inflation and it 
remains positive (almost identical to the estimates of the general specification) for higher 
levels, but neither effect is statistically significant. It seems that the deceleration of 
inflation after the hyperinflationary episodes is indeed driving the reverse Tanzi effect 
found on the estimation. However, interesting dynamics are found for the effect of FDI 
on total tax revenues and its main components. The estimation for the overall 
government tax revenue shows that FDI has a positive and significant impact on total tax 
revenues, implying that an increase in FDI of 10 percentage points results in slightly less 
than a 1 percentage point increase in total tax revenues when inflation is below 50 
percent per year, but it increases by more than 4 percentage points when inflation is 
above 50 percent per year. This larger effect is corroborated when statistical testing of 
both estimates together is performed. 
The results for the estimation of the main components of tax revenue shows that 
the effect of FDI on tax revenues is mainly channeled through its effect on taxes on 
goods and services when the inflation level is below 50 percent, as a 10 percentage 
points increase in FDI results in a half a percentage point increase in taxes on goods and 
services. However, when the inflation level is above 50 percent per year, FDI’s effect on  
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Table 3.5 – Effect of FDI on Total Tax Revenues and Main Components 
Controlling for the Level of Inflation (Inf<50 and Inf>50) 
 Total Tax 
Revenues 
Taxes on 
Individuals, 
Profits, and 
Corporations 
Taxes on 
Goods and 
Services 
Taxes on 
International 
Trade 
Constant -2.7456    
(2.4233) 
-2.9181   
(2.0689) 
-2.2794   
(2.1345) 
-2.0021*   
(1.1208) 
Taxlag .77360***   
(.05061) 
.71964***    
(.05975) 
.68068***   
(.04084) 
.70219***   
(.10275) 
HI  -.67311    
(.6002) 
-1.3592*   
(.77561) 
-.07749   
(.30443) 
-.14480   
(.10144) 
Inflation -.01110   
(.01756) 
-.02546   
(.02008) 
-.00085   
(.00839) 
____ 
Inflation*HI .01144   
(.01752) 
.02543    
(.02006) 
.00096   
(.00839) 
____ 
Gov. debt .01198***   
(.00206) 
.00519***    
(.00059) 
.00571***   
(.00100) 
.00239***   
(.00051) 
Gov. debt -1 -.00883***   
(.00177) 
-.00375***    
(.00076) 
-.00444***   
(.00104) 
-.00064   
(.00053) 
FDI  .09068**   
(.04120) 
-.01061   
(.02257) 
.04947*   
(.02654) 
-.00229   
(.02038) 
HIFDI *  .33777**   
(.13153) 
.37662***    
(.09691) 
.27377**   
(.09988) 
-.02716   
(.05938) 
ln of GDP per capita .62397*   
(.34916) 
.37118    
(.23883) 
.17167   
(.24902) 
.04317   
(.12347) 
Agricultural Share -.04773   
(.03696) 
-.03575   
(.03029) 
____ ____ 
ln of Population -.37351   
(.38037) 
.31652    
(.18711) 
-.26137   
(.24581) 
-.07112   
(.09425) 
Urbanization .00940   
(.01269) 
-.01942   
(.01154) 
.03114**    
(.01059) 
.00441   
(.00523) 
Budget Surplus -.01028   
(.01920) 
-.01706   
(.01331) 
-.01895   
(.02826) 
.02609*   
(.01394) 
Trade .45926   
(.50258) 
.69709    
(.45631) 
.35667   
(.51234) 
.48957**    
(.21088) 
Terms of Trade ____ ____ ____ .00283   
(.00199) 
Exchange Rate ____ ____ ____ -9.76e-06   
(.00007) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.001 0.095 0.004 0.020 
AR(2) Test 0.273 0.310 0.544 0.537 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence level, and * for 
10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not presented. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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tax revenues is much stronger, and is channeled through two of the main components: 
through taxes on  individuals,  profits,  and  corporations,  which  increases  by  almost  4 
percentage points as a  result  of  the  same  10  percentage  points  increase  in  FDI,  
and through taxes on goods and services, which increases by around 3 percentage points 
as a result of the 10 percentage points increase in FDI. Statistical testing shows that both 
effects for periods of high inflation are statistically different than zero when both 
estimates are tested together. This result indicates that the level of inflation influences 
FDI’s effect on tax revenues, and somewhat surprisingly, it shows that FDI’s largest 
effect is when the inflation level is relatively high. 
Since the level of inflation that could affect the fundamental behavior of the tax 
system, and other important determinants of the economy, varies according to the view 
of different authors, I have also performed the analysis using thresholds of 20 percent 
and 100 percent inflation levels, and the results are attached in the Appendix as Table 
A.3 and Table A.4, respectively. The results are similar than those of Table 3.5 for the 
case when the threshold is 100 percent inflation and show that the reverse Tanzi effect 
found in this study arises from the periods of high inflation levels, while is not that 
conclusive for the case of 20 percent inflation. In additional, the effect of FDI on tax 
revenues is also similar than that found in Table 3.5 for periods with low inflation levels, 
but that this effect is null for periods with high inflation levels when one tests for the 
overall effect of FDI on tax revenues for both total taxes and taxes on goods and 
services. Interestingly, when the threshold inflation level is 20 percent, the only channel 
through which FDI affects tax revenues positively when inflationary periods are 
relatively high is through its effect on taxes on international trade. 
Additional robustness check was performed relaxing the initial assumption of 
same variance across the two relevant groups, and while they are differences in 
magnitude, the qualitative validity of the results is reinforced.21 To conclude this section, 
it is noteworthy to point out that econometric methods may ignore the potential 
heterogeneity of the slope parameters of the data, as well as of other panel data used to 
                                                 
21 Results are not included in the Appendix but available from the author on request. 
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analyze structurally different countries (Pesaran and Smith (1995), and Lee, Pesaran and 
Smith (1997)), and thus produce results that are biased. However, given that the sample 
period of this study is relatively short, the individual country equations cannot be 
estimated separately to calculate explicitly the best possible parameters from the 
averages of the estimated country-specific parameters. While this problem is inherent in 
the sample data, the use of interactive groups for the main variable of interest and time 
dummy variables ameliorates this bias. 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
This section shows that FDI exerts a significant positive effect on central 
government tax revenues, which is channeled through its effect on the most important 
component of tax revenues, the taxes on goods and services. This positive effect on tax 
revenues is perhaps reinforced by the fact that greater foreign investment increases 
production in the formal sector, thus contributing to the collection of tax revenues. It 
also shows that such effect is also channeled through its effect on taxes on international 
trade when inflation is above 20 percent per year and through taxes on individuals, 
profits, and corporations when inflation is above 50 percent per year.  
The positive effect of FDI on tax revenues is especially important for less 
developed economies, which corroborates the notion that less developed countries have 
a greater opportunity to benefit from the potential spillovers from foreign direct 
investment. Also, the larger inflows of FDI of the 1990s has had a positive impact on the 
effect of FDI on the collection of taxes on goods and services, which has risen by almost 
20 percent relative to FDI’s effect on the overall sample period, but its effect on total 
taxes on this later period has remained the same than the effect on the whole sample 
period. Another interesting result found is the existence of a reverse Tanzi effect in Latin 
America during the sample period. While this effect is in conflict with that of other 
studies, mainly African countries, the particular dynamics of the highly inflationary 
episodes experienced in Latin America in the 1980s and early 1990s leads me to 
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conclude that it is driven by the subsequent deceleration of inflation rates, and perhaps 
by the changing expectations of inflation (see also Tanzi (2000) for further analysis of 
this reversal). 
These results render support to the economic policies implemented in Latin 
America for the last decades in order to spur economic growth. I find evidence that the 
larger flows of FDI into the region not only contributes to improvements of real GDP per 
capita growth rates, but it also contributes to the better performance of a factor that 
perhaps is more relevant to domestic standards of living, from the perspective of the 
host-countries. While these results could induce developing countries to intensify the 
promotion of FDI through enhanced incentives, the structural changes generated after 
the disappointing 1980s should also be taken into consideration. In addition, further 
examination of the ways in which FDI can affect positively receiving economies needs 
to be undertaken before accepting the conventional wisdom unchallenged. This task is 
taken in the next section.  
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4. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT’S EFFECT  
ON EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two sections demonstrate that FDI has a positive effect on 
economic growth in Latin America, measured by improvements in GDP per capita 
growth rates, and on the collection of tax revenues, especially taxes on goods and 
services. Such positive effects seem to back up the claims of the leading development 
agencies and growth theorists, making local governments restructure their incentive 
policies even further to compete for foreign investment. However, while most countries 
consider foreign investment important for the above reasons, another channel through 
which FDI can potentially affect the standard of living of people in countries receiving 
this inflow is through its effect on employment levels, an effect that has been so far 
overlooked in the literature and to which we turn in this section.  
While Multinational Corporations (MNCs) engage in productive activities in host 
countries for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways, they all have the potential to 
generate additional employment. They can do so through direct hiring of people for their 
plants, through indirect employment as they create links with suppliers and service 
providers as well as with other affiliates that are attracted to the country by their entry, 
and through their contribution towards higher incomes, which can also increase 
employment through the inducement of higher levels of consumption, savings and 
investment22. Resource and cost considerations influences the MNC’s decision to 
relocate the operation of their labor-intensive stages to developing countries, with 
manufacturing being the main industry sector taking advantage of the lower wages in 
developing countries (Lipsey (2004)). 
                                                 
22 See Lall (2004) for a comprehensive review. 
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Of course, these positive effects on employment induced by larger FDI flows 
have to be weighted against the potential employment losses to really understand the 
overall effect. The MNCs’ entry could induce local competitors to reduce employment to 
become competitive, force existing firms out of business if they introduce cost-saving 
technology, or shed employees themselves if entry is by acquiring control of local firms. 
However, even if the aggregate employment effect results in short-term employment 
losses, these losses may be more than offset by longer-term employment gains if FDI 
raises the competitiveness, efficiency and export-orientation of domestic firms, or 
generates chains of new local suppliers (Lee and Vivarelli (2006)).  
Despite the remarkable flows of FDI into the region during the 1990s, and the 
induced higher rates of economic growth, the rate of growth in employment has been 
lower in the 1990s than in the second half of the 1980s, both in the region as a whole and 
in most individual countries (Marquez and Pages (1997), Lora and Olivera (1998)). At 
the same time, the region has experienced a significant expansion of employment in the 
informal sector, with 80 percent of the net increase in employment during this period 
going into this sector. Also increasing in Latin America during this period – and putting 
downward pressure on employment rates – was labor supply, mainly due to the increase 
in women’s labor participation, being draw in both formal and informal markets through 
increases in female schooling and through increases in participation rates at given 
schooling levels (Duryea, Cox, and Ureta (2004)). This disappointing pace in job 
creation has prompted governments to reassess whether the newly introduced structure 
of international trade and investment are part of the cause of their economies’ 
unsatisfactory performance with respect to employment, and whether changes in 
government trade and investment policies might help restore better employment 
conditions. This perception is magnified for the lack of research in the area at the 
regional level, and filling this gap is the objective of this study. 
Understanding the effects of FDI on employment rates requires the recognition of 
the existence of factors that inherently cause employment rates to vary. Among the 
structural factors that determine the rate at which participants enter and leave the labor 
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market and the ease with which they can find employment are the sociodemographic 
characteristics (such as age, fertility, and education) and institutional aspects (such as 
labor laws, minimum wage, etc), while among the cyclical factors related to fluctuations 
in aggregate economic activity are the domestic aspects (such as changes in interest rates 
and productivity) and international aspects (such as changes in the terms of trade and 
openness of the economy). While the structural factors become of special importance in 
the determination of employment participation at the micro level, the increasing degree 
of international trade and FDI flows have contributed significantly to the innovation of 
production techniques, and consequently has had an important role in the determination 
of employment rates too. This internationalization of production is thus associated with 
reassignments of labor resources owing to changes in the composition of production, 
production techniques, and methods of work organization.  
Acknowledgment of the importance of these international linkages has guided 
current research towards international trade theory to understand its influence on labor 
markets and employment generation. The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model 
predicts that an increase in trade will increase the demand for the products that use the 
relatively more abundant factor more intensively, and consequently its relative price too, 
normally presumed to be labor in the developing countries – particularly unskilled labor. 
In the context of a full employment model of the labor market, this implies that there 
will be a reallocation of output towards labor-intensive goods, implicitly increasing the 
demand for unskilled labor. While this is commonly taken to mean that H-O predicts 
employment growth in developing countries, it is not strictly true. Since in H-O all 
markets clear with macroeconomic equilibrium and full employment throughout, a rise 
in trade can only cause an inter-sectoral shift towards labor-intensive activities (and so 
higher wages), not greater employment.  
Once labor market rigidities and unemployment are allowed, an increase in trade 
between the relatively labor-abundant developing countries and the relatively labor-
scarce developed countries is predicted to result in an increase in employment in the 
former, a result that is usually recognized for manufacturers (Lall (2004)). But this 
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prediction of a rise in employment from greater openness to trade is based on strong 
simplifying assumptions, curtailing important facts of competitive advantage. Rapid 
exposure to market forces in a world of falling natural protection – i.e. lower transaction 
costs – may in fact reduce employment and freeze comparative advantage in stagnant or 
low-return activities. Even more, although the internationalization of production shifts 
employment to relatively labor-intensive activities, it may not raise net employment if it 
destroys local enterprises without stimulating the growth of new, more efficient ones.  
While recent extensions and developments on these types of models were not 
able to overcome conflicting result on employment generation, researchers have 
embraced the new trade theory – best exemplified by Grossman and Helpman (1990). 
This approach takes technological differences, scale economies and externalities into 
consideration, providing further insight into the subject but still producing ambiguous 
predictions for employment. The specific pattern of comparative advantage is 
indeterminate to a large extent and opening up to trade does not show how factor use 
will change, leaving the effect on employment creation to a large degree unsolved.  
Consequently, the effect of trade on aggregate employment cannot be predicted 
theoretically a priori for developing countries. The only thing that can be said is that the 
probability of aggregate employment rising is significantly higher for developing 
countries because growth on export oriented industries are more labor-intensive than 
other industries, sector particularly affected as trade openness and foreign investment 
tend to be export-oriented to a high degree. This export expansion stimulates output 
growth in other industries of the economy also, including in import-competing 
industries. 
While the theoretical link between trade liberalization and employment presents 
its own problems, the search for answers though empirical studies has been proved to be 
more difficult than initially perceived. Most studies are country specific, if not industry 
specific, and consequently the results are highly dependent in the specific characteristics 
of the economy and of the relevant labor market. In addition, the time dimension of such 
studies has brought additional complications to reach a consistent result, as studies of 
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Mexico by Revenga and Maloney (1994) and Revenga (1997) show. While in the first 
study they find that a reduction in tariffs decreased employment by 2 to 3 percent, in her 
latter study (using a more recent sample period) she shows that the reduction of 
restrictions on imported inputs (including capital goods) had a positive effect on 
employment – perhaps implying that labor and the constrained input are complements in 
the production process – at the industry level, while the reductions in the licensing 
coverage of inputs and output quotas are associated with increases in employment at the 
firm level.  
An additional difficulty in the examination of the effects of trade liberalization 
on employment generation arises from the fact that employment tends to move in the 
same direction as industry product demand, but employment movements could be 
dampened depending on the wage adjustments incurred in the process. Consequently, if 
workers are able to absorb the bulk of the effect through wage concessions – which is 
difficult to measure – the magnitude of the effect can be minimized, but if workers 
choose to maintain the wage level, we would expect to see the full employment effect. 
This seems to be at work in Lang’s (1998) study of New Zealand, as he finds no 
statistically significant impact of liberalization on employment, and while liberalization 
decreased employment in protected industries somewhat, its significant effect on wages 
diminished the effect of liberalization on employment in previously protected industries 
and thus reduced the post liberalization shift in the industrial composition of 
employment.   
Further results on the effect of trade liberalization on employment generation 
have not been able to narrow down the direction of such effect. For example, while 
Ghose’s analyses (2000 and 2003) of trade liberalization and manufacturing employment 
find that higher trade in manufactured products has resulted in a large positive effect on 
manufacturing employment, the study of Currie and Harrison (1997) finds no 
statistically significant effect of trade reform on employment in Morocco.  
Another point that has become controversial is the identification of the 
employment sector that is supposed to benefit and the sector that is supposed to be 
 62 
harmed. Contrary to theoretical predictions, while it is expected that trade will increase 
the relative demand of unskilled workers, the fact that most export-oriented industries 
upgrade their technology in the process suggests that the higher requirement of skill 
causes firms to increase their demand for skilled labor. In addition, the skill-intensive 
(import-competing) industries do not necessarily decline in the wake of trade 
liberalization as predicted by theory, but instead the evidence seems to suggest that 
growth of export-oriented industries stimulates growth in all other industries including 
import-competing industries, increasing demand for both skilled and unskilled workers.  
Ghose (2000) argues that, in developing countries, job gains seem to accrue to 
both skilled and unskilled workers though unskilled workers generally derive larger 
benefits (because more of them work in the export-oriented industries). However, results 
on the increases of skilled workers’ employment are also found in studies for Mexico. 
Wood (1997), Hanson and Harrison (1999), and Robertson (2000), among others, show 
that the relative employment of skilled workers increased after trade liberalization in this 
country. These results could be driven by the fact that unskilled labor-intensive 
industries were the ones that have been more heavily protected than the skill labor-
intensive industries, contrary to trade theory, so that one of the effects of trade 
liberalization has been a relative decline of unskilled labor-intensive industries.  
But trade reforms usually come together with accompanying policies that also 
affect employment levels. For example, while the usual relaxation of the foreign 
exchange constraint induces a growth in exports, it also creates second-order effects on 
employment in import-competing industries, raising employment in these industries and, 
more importantly, raising the growth rate of the economy as a whole, which could 
encourage further investment in export-oriented as well as import-competing industries. 
Also used with liberalization – for the promotion of exports – is the gradual depreciation 
of the domestic currencies, which are intended to give specific sectors a competitive 
edge against international rivals. While some empirical studies find that manufacturing 
employment increases in response to depreciation of the real exchange rate (i.e. Lora and 
Olivera (1998), Klein et. al. (2003)), others find that such depreciations have no effect 
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on employment rates in Latin America (Marquez and Pages (1997)), but that the 
negative effect of trade reforms on employment has been lessened by the depreciation of 
the real exchange rate.  
While trade liberalization and the accompanying policies were geared to achieve 
gains from trade, the subsequent awareness about the importance of new technologies 
for economic growth has further expanded the liberalization movement to include 
foreign investment, with most emerging economies also reducing barriers to FDI. This 
further liberalization was encouraged by the leading international organization pursuing 
development and stabilization efforts, as noted before. MNC’s bring relatively new 
technology, so its impact on employment depends on the interaction between 
productivity growth, output growth, and the specialization of labor. Also, the perceived 
importance of FDI on the generation of employment is magnified by the fact that MNCs 
are usually large, and large firms are the ones that have the greatest effect on 
employment creation (Levinsohn (1999)).  
According to the theory of relative comparative advantage, FDI should take 
advantage of the relative abundance of labor in the developing countries and trigger a 
trend of specialization in domestic labor-intensive activities and so involve an expansion 
in local employment. But whether FDI is induced by lower production costs in the host 
country or the relative abundance of “unskilled” labor, foreign firms have shown to have 
a tendency to invest in relatively high-wage industries within a host country, in high-
wage locations within the country, or to hire higher-wage higher-skill workers, so the 
sector where it exerts its greater impact it still unresolved.   
Further complications for the prediction of its effect on employment are brought 
by the chosen mode of entry. While “greenfield” FDI – which entails the creation of new 
manufacturing plants – is assumed to have the greater and most direct positive effect on 
employment, it potential to introduce labor-saving technologies and its tendency of 
crowding-out non-competitive and previously sheltered domestic firms can diminish its 
expected positive effect. The alternative mode of entry that takes advantage of already 
established assets – through mergers and acquisitions – is broadly conceived to be 
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neutral to employment in the short run, as it is just a transfer of ownership, or even 
negative as many MNCs attempt to cut costs and increase efficiency through downsizing 
and layoffs in the newly acquired subsidiaries. However, the presumed greater efficiency 
induced by the takeover should lead to better quality – and perhaps more – jobs in the 
long run. These concerns on the mode of entry, together with the fact that privatization 
programs accounted for about 20 percent of the foreign direct investment in Latin 
America and that mergers and acquisitions account for 75-80 percent of investment 
flows (Andersen and Hainaut (1998)), makes the employment effect of FDI highly 
uncertain.  
However, while Blomstrom et. al. (1997) corroborates the idea that MNCs 
allocate the more labor-intensive stages of production to the foreign operations, implying 
a relative increased demand for unskilled labor, the recognition that the classification of 
skill and unskilled labor varies somewhat between developed and developing countries 
can explain why the relative demand for low-skill workers did not increased in host 
countries as predicted by theory. In the more developed countries, the division is usually 
done between those with education of high school or less, and those with education of 
some college or more. In developing countries, however, high school graduates are often 
grouped with those with more education into the skilled worker group. Thus, a 
significant portion of skilled workers in developing countries would be considered less 
skilled workers in the more developed countries (Lora and Olivera (1998)). 
In addition, the acceleration in the transfer of skill-biased technology brought 
about by FDI forces domestic firms to invest in advanced technology in order to 
compete, further increasing the relative demand for skilled labor. Results about the effect 
of FDI on the employment by skill groupings also show an ambiguous impact. While 
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) corroborate the existence of positive effects on the demand 
for skilled labor in Mexico, Lall (2004) finds instead that no general conclusions can be 
made about the correlation between FDI and domestic employment skills.23  
                                                 
23 However, when adequate absorptive capacities are present, FDI was seen to have a positive impact on domestic 
employment. 
 65 
Despite the growing importance of FDI and the increased desire of many 
countries to attract FDI, the impact of FDI on aggregate employment at the regional 
level has received scant attention in the empirical literature. To my knowledge, the only 
two studies that explicitly account for the effect of FDI and examine its impact on 
economy-wide aggregate employment are the studies of Braunstein and Epstein (2002) 
and Spiezia (2004).24 Braunstein and Epstein (2002) find that FDI has no independent 
effect on employment in Chinese provinces, and even if a positive effect is found by 
adjusting their investment measure, the potential impact of FDI on employment is 
nonetheless very small. Spiezia (2004) finds that the impact of FDI on employment is 
increasing with per-capita income for a group of 49 countries, but its effect is not 
significant for low-income developing countries. 
So, while the quantification of the overall impact of FDI on employment is still 
uncertain from both theoretical and empirical points of view, the need to determine the 
direction and magnitude of such effect becomes more pressing as governments 
increasingly rely on FDI to generate growth, and, at the same time, promote employment 
generation. Aggressive policies in Latin America have fostered increases in FDI that 
have presumably caused renewed economic growth. This should indirectly have 
promoted employment generation through greater output levels. To the extent that FDI 
contributes to economic growth, it may be contributing indirectly to the creation and 
improvement of employment. 
Since my examination of the effect of FDI on aggregate employment is rather 
narrow, I abstract from the implications of varying and changing labor laws and the 
inherent aggregation problems of the employment measures used in the paper, and 
concentrate in explaining how aggregate employment is affected in the short run by 
changes in FDI. This task is done in the following sub-sections. 
 
 
                                                 
24 Lee and Vivarelli (2004) point out that even if trade and FDI are expected to positively affect employment, 
employment creation can not be automatically assured, as the employment effect can be very diverse in different areas 
of the world. 
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4.2 Data and Methodology 
 
The data for this study comes from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 2004 (WDI), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) 2004 Statistical Yearbook, and the International Labour Office’s (ILO) Key 
Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM). The sample is based on a subset of the 17 
Latin American countries used in the previous sections, covering the period 1980-2002, 
with yearly observations. It excludes countries that serve as offshore financial centers, 
are too small, have special governmental controls, or lack adequate data. These countries 
are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, México, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
While it is not possible to control directly for the evolving structure of domestic 
labor laws and policies geared to promote employment, which affect the employment 
rate performance, the use of panel data methods allows one to control for unobservable 
time-invariant country-specific characteristics that determine the employment rate. With 
respect to the nature of the observations, while it is argued that yearly observations 
introduce noise from the cyclical dynamics of some explanatory variables, the potential 
benefit of obtaining better estimates through such dynamics gives me a reason to use 
them instead of few-years averages. 
The econometric specification is based on Revenga’s empirical model (1997) and 
considers the influential variables commonly used in the labor literature, but also 
considers macroeconomic effects specifically. The employment rate specification 
includes measures of both domestic and foreign investment, and measures that account 
for international factors through the inclusion of exports, terms of trade, and openness of 
the economy. The econometric model is: 
titititititi EXDIwagesRGDPempemp ,5,4,3,21,10, ln αααααα +++++= −  
 tittititi FDIOPENTOT ,,8,7,6 εβτααα +++++  
where tiemp ,  denotes the employment rate in country i in period t, tiRGDP ,ln   is the 
output measure given by the natural logarithm of the GDP of country i in period t, 
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tiwages ,  is the measure for average wage in each country given by real remunerations, 
tiDI ,  is the ratio of domestic investment to GDP, tiEX ,  is the share of exports to GDP, 
tiTOT ,  is the terms of trade measured as the ratio of price of exported goods over the 
price of imported goods, tiTRADE ,  is the traditional measure of trade openness (imports 
plus exports over GDP),  and tiFDI ,  is the ratio of FDI to GDP. As is usually done with 
panel data, the subscript i denotes the country and the subscript t the year. The vector of 
time dummy variables that controls for common time-varying effects is denoted by tτ , 
and the error term follows the standard one-way error specification 
  tiiti ,, νµε +=  
where iµ  denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and ti,ν  denotes the 
remainder disturbance. 
The employment rate is assumed to depend positively on the prior employment 
rate and on the average wage in the country, while it is expected to also be positively 
associated with the output level. The expected effect of investment, both domestic and 
foreign, is to increase the level of the productive capacity as well as its efficiency, so its 
impact should be positively related to employment. But, as discussed in the previous 
section, and particularly for foreign investment, it could also be neutral or even negative 
if the higher levels of investment are geared to technological upgrades. In the case of 
FDI, its effect also depends on the mode of entry and whether the market being serviced 
is the domestic or international one. 
International aggregate shocks are expected to affect employment levels by 
altering the terms of trade and the magnitude of exports, both positively as improves the 
cost advantages of the economy in the first case and induces higher production for 
foreign markets – and consequently employment – in the second case. The inclusion of 
these two measures indirectly accounts for the effect of the stabilization policies that 
manipulate the exchange rate following large capital inflows. The effect of trade policies 
that open up the domestic economies to international trade is indeterminate at priori, as a 
 68 
decrease in trade distortions could lead to an expansion of labor-intensive sectors, 
sectors that have competitive advantage given the new set of prices, but this positive 
effect could also be hindered because it affects the level and composition of aggregate 
demand, because of allocation costs that slows down the shrinking of non-competitive 
sectors, or because workers do not find attractive to reallocate to emerging sectors 
because of nominal rigidities. Therefore, the question about whether more openness 
increases or reduces employment has to be examined empirically. 
Although the econometric specification is dynamic in nature, because the linear 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator obtained after first differencing has 
been found to have large finite sample bias and poor precision when the autoregressive 
parameter is moderately large (or the relative variance of the fixed effects increases), the 
series are persistent, or the number of time series is moderately small (Arellano and 
Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple (2001)), and 
because the sample data used in the study is suspect of at least one of the previous 
characteristics, testing will determine if system GMM estimation is used in this study. 
The system GMM estimator exploits additional initial conditions and generates efficient 
estimators for dynamic panel data models when the above problems are present. The 
system GMM estimator is composed of equations both in first-differences and levels, 
and uses instruments in first differences for equations in levels and instruments in levels 
for equations in first differences. 
Given the nature of the data, and to detect whether serious finite sample biases 
are present, a comparison of the first-differenced GMM results to alternative estimates of 
the autoregressive parameter is first conducted. As it is well known, the OLS on levels 
will give an estimate of the autoregressive parameter that is biased upwards in the 
presence of individual-specific effects. The within group estimator will give an estimate 
of the autoregressive parameter that is seriously biased downward in relatively short 
panels. From the above specification25 we obtain an estimate of 0.89671 for the 
autoregressive parameter using OLS, and an estimate of 0.66329 for the autoregressive 
                                                 
25 Complete results are included in the Appendix in Table A.5. 
 69 
parameter using fixed effects. The autoregressive parameter estimate using the 
traditional first-differenced Arellano and Bond (1991) method is 0.62636, which lies 
below the within group estimate, a signal that biases due to weak instruments may be 
important in the first-difference estimator. 
The parameter estimate of the autoregressive coefficient using system GMM is 
0.77275, which lies comfortably above the fixed-effects estimate and below the OLS 
estimate. The additional instruments from the system GMM seem to be valid and highly 
informative in this context. In addition, neither the Hansen’s over-identification test nor 
the tests for second-order serial correlation detect any problems with neither instrument 
validity nor the serial correlation assumptions (see footnote 19). The results suggest that 
there is a finite sample bias problem caused by weak instruments in the first-differenced 
GMM results, which I address in the remaining analysis by using the system GMM. 
The estimate of the FDI variable is statistically significant in the OLS and the 
dynamic panel data system GMM estimations. When I account for the cross section and 
time series nature of the data and the inherent problems of the sample at hand and 
estimate the dynamic specification with the system GMM, the estimate of FDI is 12% 
lower than the OLS estimate. 
I focus on the system GMM estimator, as it is asymptotically more efficient 
relative to either of the alternatives. Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple (2001) also note the 
considerable strength of the system GMM estimator to obtain consistent parameter 
estimates even in the presence of measurement error and endogenous variables, so that 
endogeneity concerns arising from independent variables like the level of the economic 
activity (output) or average wages can be disregarded. The remainder of the analysis 
addresses the finite sample bias problem caused by weak instruments in the first-
differenced GMM results and makes use of system GMM on the estimations in the 
following section. 
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4.3 Results 
 
The results obtained in this study have limitations because many details and 
dynamics of the labor markets of the sample countries cannot be fully addressed. One of 
the main difficulties is that existing surveys do not collect the relevant information in a 
sustained base, nor in the necessary depth to be able to study adequately the topic at 
hand. Another important limitation is the lack of data to discern the industry 
participation of foreign investment, as it is hypothesized that FDI could have a 
significantly different effect on employment according to the industry where it is 
injected. In addition, because employment creation is of great concern for domestic 
governments, and policies are continuously used to expand it, the adequate measurement 
of the effect of FDI on employment rates becomes illusive. These limitations are taken 
into account when interpreting the results and I exercise caution when making 
generalizations. 
As the emphasis of the empirical analysis is to estimate the effects of FDI on 
employment rates26, and because one of the main determinants of employment is not 
available for the sample (the yearly average wage), I use real remunerations to proxy for 
average wages. While the main regression has the total employment rate as the 
dependent variable, given that female participation rate has increased significantly in 
Latin America – while male participation rate have stagnated – and that some researches 
attribute this increase to the greater employment opportunities brought by foreign 
investment, I also estimate FDI’s effect on each of these employment rates.  
In Table 4.1 below the main regression results are presented. One can 
immediately observe the high degree of persistence that the employment rate presents. 
The main specification – in column one – shows that FDI has a positive and significant 
impact on total employment rate, indicating that a 10 percentage point increase in 
foreign investment raises employment in the host country by almost 1.3 percentage 
                                                 
26 I will also stress the channels through which FDI may influence employment generation in Latin American 
countries. In particular, through the estimation of the main economic sectors I will try to disentangle the main channels 
through which FDI potentially has an effect on domestic employment. 
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point. It also shows that domestic investment also has a positive and significant effect on 
employment, rising by almost 1 percentage point in response to a 10 percentage point 
increase in FDI. These results suggest that independently of the type of investment, any 
additional investment in the domestic economy contributes to the generation of 
employment. With respect to the changes in exports, the results show that its effect is 
also positive and significant, with its impact being between the impacts of the two 
investment measures – an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of exports to 
GDP raises total employment rate by 1 percentage point. With regards to real 
remunerations, its effect is marginal but positive and statistically significant. The three 
remaining explanatory variables are not statistically significant at any conceivable level. 
 
Table 4.1 – Effect of FDI on Employment Rate 
 
 Total Male Female 
Constant 25.791**   
(10.687) 
28.366**   
(10.202) 
21.673*   
(11.522) 
Lagged Employment .77275***   
(.03952) 
.77519***   
(.05269) 
.77089***   
(.02975) 
Real Remuneration .00802**   
(.00271) 
.00792***   
(.00228) 
.00913**   
(.00364) 
FDI  .12957**   
(.05268) 
.11745**   
(.05143) 
.14688**    
(.06112) 
Dom. Investment .08658***   
(.02105) 
.07761***   
(.02223) 
.09701***   
(.02767) 
Exports .10206*   
(.05744) 
.10643*   
(.05324) 
.09270   
(.06665) 
RGDPln  -.11668   
(.25054) 
-.19055   
(.23034) 
.00691   
(.27080) 
Trade Openness -1.9134   
(1.5768) 
-2.1932   
(1.4073) 
-1.4898   
(1.8511) 
Terms of Trade -.00515   
(.00591) 
-.00413   
(.00607) 
-.00768   
(.00565) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.009 0.009 0.015 
AR(2) Test 0.916 0.109 0.361 
N. Observations 264 264 264 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence 
level, and * for 10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not reported. 
Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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These results suggest that the implemented policies in the region to attract FDI 
have indeed increased the domestic employment rates. Also, finding that both types of 
investment exert a positive effect on employment is consistent with the results found by 
Spiezia (2004), indicating that increases in productive capacity – investment – are 
important for employment generation. 
The estimation using the employment rate of males as the dependent variable is 
presented in the second column. The results show that while the effect of FDI on the 
employment rate is also positive and statistically significant, it is slightly smaller than 
the effect on total employment rate – almost 10 percent smaller. Domestic investment 
also has a positive and statistically significant effect on male employment rate, with its 
effect also being around 10 percent smaller than its effect on total employment rate. I 
also find that real remunerations and exports exert a positive and statistically significant 
effect on male employment rate, effects of similar magnitude as the ones observed on 
total employment rate.  
The results in the third column are those for the specification using the 
employment rate of females, and shows that FDI has a stronger impact on the 
employment generation of this gender group. The estimates indicate that a 10 percentage 
point increase in FDI results in almost 1.5 percentage point increase in female 
employment rate, slightly more than 13 percent of its effect on total employment rate 
and almost 25 percent larger than its effect on male employment rate. For this group, the 
effect of both real remunerations and domestic employment are also statistically 
significant, being somewhat stronger than their effect on total employment rate. The 
effect of exports on employment is still positive and of similar magnitude than its effect 
on total employment rate – and on male employment rate – but it is not statistically 
significant at any conceivable level. 
The results of Table 4.1 add an additional determinant to the rise in female labor 
force participation rate observed in the late 1990s by Duryea, Cox, and Ureta (2004), 
placing FDI as another force in increasing labor employment, in addition to their 
findings about the positive role that increases in education, in participation rates at given 
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schooling levels, and in female wages play in the increases in female employment in 
Latin America. The results above show that while FDI exerts a positive effect on total 
employment rate, it does so relatively more in female employment rate than in male 
employment rate.  
Also, since the estimated effect of FDI above is for current flows, and since there 
are some arguments that FDI’s effect on employment should be delayed, I have also 
estimated the same specification using lagged FDI by one and two years. The results 
show that lagged-one-year FDI has a larger and statistically significant positive effect on 
employment rates, on total as well as on male and female employment rates (0.15278, 
0.12400, and 0.19295 respectively). This provides support to the idea that the full effect 
of foreign investment on employment materializes only after one year. The lagged-two-
year FDI effect on employment continues to be positive but is no longer statistically 
significant, for total as well as for male and female employment rates.27 Clearly, FDI’s 
effect on female employment rate gets even larger after one year relative to its effect on 
male employment rate, becoming 50 percent larger.  
In order to exploit the dimensionality of the data and investigate the robustness of 
these results, in Table 4.2 below I also consider the potentially different effects that FDI 
could have on employment according to the level of development of the receiving 
country, as less developed countries are hypothesized to be able to reap greater benefits 
from FDI than do more developed countries, with its corresponding repercussion on 
output and consequently employment. This is done with the introduction of the dummy 
variable DEV  that takes the value of one for countries that had a real GDP per capita 
higher than U.S. $2,500 in the year 1980, and zero otherwise. While the effect of the 
control variables on employment rates are similar than those of Table 4.1, when I 
account for the level of development I find that FDI’s  effect on the employment rates of 
both genders are more close in magnitude to the effect on total employment rate. 
Another interesting insight is that domestic investment’s effect continues to be positive 
and significant for all employment rates. 
                                                 
27 See Table A.6 for magnitudes and standard errors of all FDI estimates. 
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Column one shows that when one accounts for the level of development the 
effect of FDI on total employment rate is almost 20 percent larger in less developed 
countries relative to the overall effect. An increase in FDI of 10 percentage points – in 
less developed countries – results in slightly more than a 1.55 percentage point increase 
in total employment rate. While the effect of FDI on total employment rate seems to still 
be positive for the more developed countries by adding up the individual coefficients, 
statistical testing of both  estimates  together  reveal  that  this  effect  is  not  statistically  
  
Table 4.2 – Effect of FDI on Employment Rate by the Level of 
Development 
 
 Total Male Female 
Constant 22.325**   
(10.079) 
25.705**   
(9.8679) 
18.685   
(11.129) 
Lagged Employment .77417***   
(.03811) 
.78006***   
(.05231) 
.76816***   
(.02784) 
Real Remuneration .00803**   
(.00291) 
.00770***   
(.00247) 
.00929**   
(.00377) 
Dev  -.00167   
(.42938) 
.16843    
(.26846) 
-.24545  
(.74727) 
FDI  .15512***   
(.03649) 
.15157***   
(.03780) 
.15445***   
(.04589) 
DevFDI *  -.07500    
(.09663) 
-.10499   
(.08101) 
-.01911   
(.12816) 
Dom. Investment .08145***    
(.01630) 
.07379***   
(.01730) 
.09334***   
(.02437) 
Exports .09744*   
(.05054) 
.10263*   
(.04768) 
.09249   
(.06069) 
RGDPln  -.00900   
(.24301) 
-.12582   
(.22971) 
.12610   
(.28195) 
Trade Openness -1.6104   
(1.4259) 
-1.9587   
(1.2917) 
-1.2901   
(1.7163) 
Terms of Trade -.00607   
(.00585) 
-.00481   
(.00594) 
-.00853   
(.00557) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.010 0.010 0.015 
AR(2) Test 0.938 0.121 0.359 
N. Observations 264 264 264 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence 
level, and * for 10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not reported. 
Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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different than zero. 
With respect to the specification for male employment rate (column two), the 
results show that an increase in FDI of 10 percentage points in less developed countries 
results in a 1.51 percentage point increase in the employment rate, and while FDI’s 
effect in the more developed countries seem to impact positively male  employment  rate 
when adding the individual coefficients,  further  testing  indicates  that  its  effect  is  not 
statistically different than zero. These results show that FDI’s effect on male 
employment is only 2 percent smaller than the effect on total employment rate for less 
developed countries. 
In the last column I present the results for the effect of FDI on female 
employment rate, and it shows that while such effect is also larger than its effect on male 
employment rates for less developed countries, it is slightly smaller than its effect on 
total employment rate. Also, while the effect of FDI on female employment rate for the 
more developed countries seems positive when the estimates are added together, it is 
also statistically not different than zero when tested together. These results show that 
while FDI still exerts a positive effect on total employment rates, it does so on less 
developed countries, and while this impact is stronger for female employment, its 
differential effect relative to male employment is much smaller than the overall impact 
found in Table 4.1 – 2 percent larger rather than 25 percent.  
As it is known that many Latin American countries have experienced 
hyperinflationary pressures during the sample period, and that is possible that such 
abrupt changes in the inflation level could potentially affect the macroeconomic 
fundamentals of the economies being examined, and consequently employment 
generation, I now allow for the slope of FDI to vary according to the level of inflation. 
The dummy variable used for this purpose is HY and it has the value of one for years 
when inflation reached levels higher than 50 percent, and zero otherwise. 
Table 4.3 below presents the results. Here I find that the effect of the main 
determinants of employment that were found to be statistically significant in the base 
specification – Table 4.1 – continue to be significant when one accounts for the level of 
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inflation, with the exception of the effect of exports on total employment rate, which 
maintains its magnitudes but loses its statistical significance. The effect of FDI on total 
employment rate is positive and significant for periods with low inflation level, 
suggesting that a 10 percentage point increase in FDI results in almost a 1.4 percentage 
point increase in the employment rate. The effect of FDI on total employment rate for 
periods with high inflation levels is small but positive when both estimates are added, 
but statistical testing shows that such effect is not statistically different than zero. 
 
Table 4.3 – Effect of FDI on Employment Rate by the Level of 
Inflation (Yearly Inflation less than 50% and greater than 50%) 
 Total Male Female 
Constant 25.423**   
(10.825) 
28.166**   
(10.373) 
22.030*    
(11.807) 
Lagged Employment .77250***   
(.04348) 
.76819***   
(.05879) 
.77639***   
(.03075) 
Real Remuneration .00802**   
(.00296) 
.00812**   
(.00264) 
.00879**    
(.00345) 
HY  .28550   
(.53080) 
.43695    
(.44672) 
-.09775   
(.70368) 
FDI  .13819**   
(.05648) 
.13040**    
(.05519) 
.14415**   
(.06356) 
HYFDI *  -.11518   
(.17351) 
-.15288    
(.13032) 
-.01800   
(.24763) 
Dom. Investment .08640***   
(.02078) 
.07771***   
(.02194) 
.09766***   
(.02634) 
Exports .10047   
(.06004) 
.10342*   
(.05746) 
.09625   
(.06570) 
RGDPln  -.11453   
(.25544) 
-.18019    
(.23254) 
-.01143   
(.27935) 
Trade Openness -1.8282   
(1.7225) 
-2.0376     
(1.5625) 
-1.6196   
(1.9592) 
Terms of Trade -.00506   
(.00564) 
-.00423   
(.00582) 
-.00738   
(.00555) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.009 0.009 0.015 
AR(2) Test 0.850 0.124 0.362 
N. Observations 264 264 264 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence 
level, and * for 10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not reported.  
Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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In column two we observe that FDI’s effect on male employment rate is slightly 
smaller than its effect on total employment rate for low inflation years – around 5 
percent smaller. As the results show, a 10 percentage point increase in FDI in low 
inflation years results in 1.3 percentage points increase in male employment rate When 
we add the estimates that show FDI’s effect on employment  rate  for  periods  with  high 
inflation levels we find a small and negative effect for this gender group. However, 
statistical testing of both estimates together reveals that FDI’s effect it is not statistically 
different than zero. 
When controlling for inflationary periods I also find that the effect of FDI on 
female employment rate is positive and significant for low inflation years. Column three 
shows that FDI’s effect on female employment rate is larger than its overall effect on 
total employment rate, and almost 10 percent larger than its effect on male employment 
rate. This indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in FDI results in almost 1.5 
percentage point increase in female employment rate in periods with low inflation.  
While FDI’s effect of female employment rate for periods of high inflation also seem to 
be positive (adding both estimates), statistical testing of both estimates together show 
that such effect is not statistically different than zero. 
Table 4.3 also shows that FDI exerts its greater effect on female employment rate 
even after one controls for the level of inflation, reinforcing the results found in the 
previous tables. It also shows that both domestic investment and real remunerations have 
a consistent positive and statistically significant effect on total, as well as on male and 
female, employment rates. 
Another interesting aspect that affects the employment rate is the growing 
percentage of workers that end up holding jobs in the informal sector, particularly in 
Latin American labor markets. Many Latin American countries suffer from high levels 
of employment in the informal sector, and that such high levels of informal activity may 
affect how enacted policies – and the other determinants of employment – affect the 
employment rate. In order to control for the degree of informality in employment I 
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introduce the dummy variable Infor that takes the value of zero for countries with an 
informality level below 50 percent, and one otherwise.  
Table 4.4 below presents the results, and shows similar effects of the main 
determinants of employment than those found in the base specification – Table 4.1 – 
even after the level of the informal sector is accounted for. In column one I find that 
FDI’s effect on total employment rate is negative in countries with low levels of 
employment in the informal sector, but  such  effect  is  statistically  insignificant  at  any  
 
Table 4.4 – Effect of FDI on Employment Rate by Level of 
Informality (Average Informality less than 50%  
and greater than 50% of Economic Activity) 
 Total Male Female 
Constant 22.873*   
(10.779) 
24.985**   
(10.021) 
19.977    
(12.238) 
Lagged Employment .77728***   
.03745() 
.78278***   
(.05108) 
.77028***   
(.02682) 
Real Remuneration .00802**   
(.00290) 
.00787***   
(.00248) 
.00914**   
(.00385) 
Infor  -.27922   
(.42045) 
-.28114   
(.32798) 
-.21814   
(.63208) 
FDI  -.02219   
(.08668) 
-.03153   
(.07851) 
.01187   
(.11082) 
InforFDI *  .20006**   
(.08048) 
.19696**   
(.07365) 
.17738*   
(.09883) 
Dom. Investment .08426***   
(.01646) 
.07461***    
(.01677) 
.09659***   
(.02501) 
Exports .10532*   
(.04968) 
.10816**   
(.04717) 
.09978   
(.05888) 
RGDPln  -.03062   
(.26979) 
-.10101   
(.23726) 
.07368   
(.31686) 
Trade Openness -1.7121   
(1.4701) 
-1.9545   
(1.3219) 
  -1.4123   
(1.7482) 
Terms of Trade -.00604   
(.00601) 
-.00502   
(.00604) 
-.00842    
(.00594) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.011 0.011 0.016 
AR(2) Test 0.942 0.119 0.372 
N. Observations 264 264 264 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence 
level, and * for 10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not reported.  
Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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conceivable level. However, for countries with high levels of employment in the 
informal sector I find that  a  10  percentage  point  increase  in  FDI  results in almost 
1.8 percentage points increase in total employment rate, and this positive effect is 
statistically significant. This positive effect on total employment rate perhaps reflects the 
fact that while greater foreign investment increases production in the formal sector, the 
readily available pool of labor available in countries with high levels of activity in the 
informal sector makes the generation of further employment easier. This is related to the 
positive effect of FDI on taxes on goods and services of the previous section, result that 
emanates from the formalization of economic activity brought about by higher 
participation of MNCs in the production process. 
In column two I find that FDI also exerts a negative impact on male employment 
rate in countries with informality levels below 50 percent, but this effect is not 
statistically significant. However, FDI’s effect of male employment rate is positive and 
statistically significant for countries with informality levels above 50 percent, 
significance that is corroborated when testing both estimates together. The results show 
that a 10 percentage point increase in FDI in countries with informality levels above 50 
percent raise male employment rate by slightly more than 1.6 percentage points. Also, 
the results of column three show that while FDI’s effect on female employment rate is 
small but positive for countries with low levels of informality, its effect is not 
statistically significant at any conceivable level. However, such effect on female 
employment rate is positive and statistically significant for countries with informality 
levels above 50 percent, indicating that a 10 percentage point increase in FDI results in 
almost 1.9 percentage points increase in the employment rate of this gender group.  
Table 4.4 again shows that the effect of FDI on female employment rate is almost 
5 percent larger than its effect on total employment rate and almost 20 percent larger 
than its effect on male employment rate. This tendency of FDI affecting female 
employment rate relatively more when one accounts for the degree of informal sector 
could be due to the traditionally higher pool of female workers ready to be introduced in 
the formal sector, the increase in labor force participation rate, and the formalization of 
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employment brought about by the higher rates of production done by MNCs, all 
resulting in the employment improvement in this gender group. 
I also examine the potentially different effect that FDI can exert on the 
employment rate according to level of foreign investment that each country was able to 
attract. This is done by dividing the sample into two comparatively distinct groups of 
countries based on the average share of FDI to GDP that they were able to attract, which 
account for inherently better investment prospects. To this end, the dummy variable 
More is introduced, which takes the value of zero for countries with average FDI inflows 
below 1.8 percent of GDP, and one otherwise. 
The results are shown in Table 4.5, and show that both real remunerations and 
domestic investment continue to exert a positive and significant effect on total, male, and 
female employment rates, and also shows that – when one controls for the degree of FDI 
inflows – exports also exert a positive and significant effect on employment rates, both 
on the overall employment rate as well as on the employment rate of each gender group. 
Column one shows that FDI has a positive and significant effect on total employment 
rate in countries with average foreign investment below 1.8 percent of GDP, which 
implies that a 10 percentage point increase in FDI results in around 1.7 percentage points 
increase in total employment. When the average foreign investment is above 1.8 percent 
of GDP, the effect is almost half this size but still positive, but statistical testing shows 
that is not different than zero. 
 With respect to the specification for male employment rate (column two), the 
results show that an increase in FDI of 10 percentage points in countries receiving an 
average of foreign investment below 1.8 percent of GDP result in a 1.53 percentage 
points increase in the employment rate, and while FDI’s effect in countries with an 
average of FDI inflows above 1.8 percent of GDP seem to impact positively male 
employment rate when adding the individual coefficients, further testing indicates that 
its effect is not statistically different than zero. These results show that FDI’s effect on 
male employment is almost 15 percent smaller than the effect on total employment rate 
for countries with low levels on FDI inflows. 
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In the last column of Table 4.5 I present the results for the effect of FDI on 
female employment rate, and it shows that for countries with low foreign investment 
levels such effect is larger than its effect on total employment rate – by 20 percent – and 
than its effect on male employment rate – by almost 40 percent. An increase in FDI of 
10 percentage points in countries with low levels of foreign investment results in a 2.11 
percentage point increases in female employment rate. While the effect of FDI on female 
 
Table 4.5 – Effect of FDI on Total Employment by Magnitude of 
Flows of Foreign Investment (Average Inflows less  
than 1.8% of GDP and greater than 1.8% of GDP) 
 Total Male Female 
Constant 28.868**   
(9.8893) 
31.036***   
(9.5399) 
25.579**    
(10.773) 
Lagged Employment .76075***   
(.03693) 
.76286***   
(.05041) 
.76568***   
(.02859) 
Real Remuneration .00949***   
(.00178) 
.00922***   
(.00156) 
.01106***   
(.00255) 
More  .77723   
(.49213) 
.79164*   
(.43108) 
.73528   
(.60928) 
FDI  .17618*   
(.09238) 
.15305*   
(.07649) 
.21157*    
(.11905) 
MoreFDI *  -.09723   
(.08877) 
-.08648   
(.07290) 
-.11490   
(.12079) 
Dom. Investment .09342***   
(.02236) 
.08377***   
(.02440) 
.10435***   
(.02566) 
Exports .11948**   
(.05450) 
.12144**   
(.05029) 
.11539*   
(.06339) 
RGDPln  -.14365   
(.23832) 
-.20329   
(.22384) 
-.06656   
(.25793) 
Trade Openness -2.5062*   
(1.4151) 
-2.7331**   
(1.2169) 
-2.2370   
(1.6943) 
Terms of Trade -.00677   
(.00557) 
-.00580   
(.00576) 
-.00899   
(.00532) 
    
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.009 0.009 0.015 
AR(2) Test 0.927 0.106 0.351 
N. Observations 264 264 264 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence 
level, and * for 10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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employment rate – for countries with high levels of foreign investment – also seem 
positive when the estimates are added together, it is not statistically different than zero 
when tested together. These results show that while FDI still exerts a positive effect on 
total employment rates, particularly in countries with average inflows of FDI below 1.8 
percent of GDP, and this impact is stronger for female employment than for total or male 
employment rates. 
To conclude this robustness check, I have also examined the potentially different 
effect of FDI on employment generation by dividing the sample into two comparatively 
distinct time periods, to account for the considered “lost decade” for economic 
development in Latin America. The results are shown in the Appendix in Table A.7, and 
shows that the effect of FDI on total, male, and female employment rates is not 
statistically significant in the earlier period of the sample (1980s), and while such effect 
seems also not significant in the later period of the sample by examining the individual 
coefficients, statistical testing of both estimates together reveal that FDI has a positive 
impact on the overall as well as on the employment rate by gender. Here I find again that 
FDI’s effect on female employment rate is almost 5 percent larger than its effect on total 
employment rate and almost 15 percent larger than its effect on male employment rate. 
This positive effect on the later period of the sample should reflect the greater flows on 
foreign investment flowing into the region, and its consequent positive effect on 
economic growth, production, and employment. 
While general conclusions cannot be drawn on how each of the determinants of 
the employment rate exerts their effect in general, we can clearly see the measures which 
affect employment generation in a consistent way. Real remuneration and domestic 
investment are found to affect the employment rates positively, irrespective of the way 
in which one controls for the peculiarities of the sample (controlling for level of 
development, inflation level, degree of informal sector, averages of FDI inflows, or time 
periods). Another measure that has in general a positive and statistically significant 
effect on total employment rate is the level of exports of the host country, suggesting 
that increases in exports are given way to higher levels of employment, as expected. In 
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accord with findings of both Braunstein and Epstein (2002) and Spiezia (2004), I find 
that both domestic and foreign investment have a positive and significant effect on total 
employment rate. The positive effect of FDI on employment is particularly important for 
the female labor force, group that achieves the largest gains from higher levels of foreign 
investment. It is also important for the less developed Latin American economies, for 
periods with low inflation levels, countries with large activity in the informal sector, 
countries with low levels of foreign investment, and for the later portion of the sample.  
While the results are insightful, some caveats need to be taken into consideration. 
One common problem in the empirical work that examines the effect of FDI on 
aggregate employment is that it is often difficult to control for the impact of all relevant 
regional characteristics, the firm specific level of employment, and the changing 
structure of the labor market in each country. Also, while many researchers take as 
granted that the larger flows of FDI have had the effect of boosting aggregate 
employment in developing countries, the dualistic economic structure of Latin America 
introduces specific challenges into the quantification of the effect on employment. 
Although labor participation is adequately quantified in the formal sector, the 
employment fluctuations in the informal sector are much more complicated to follow.  
Because most studies use industry-level data, or economy wide data, there are a 
number of important issues that simply cannot be addressed, or for which we obtain 
misleading answers. While we are able to obtain net employment changes of the 
employment rate, the reshuffling of jobs can potentially create significant reallocation 
costs that are not being explicitly picked up by the results. Furthermore, aggregate 
employment measures do not pick up participation changes that occur through changes 
in worked hours. 
Whether FDI induces changes in net employment through job creation or job 
destruction is qualitatively important too, as it can lead to quite different results. A 
reduction in job creation affects individual employment prospects only indirectly, but 
increases in job destruction have more deleterious effects. Job destruction inherently 
raises worker layoffs that, if permanent, involve the depreciation of human capital and a 
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costly search and relocation process that often leaves dislocated workers with much 
lower subsequent earnings (Klein et. al. 2003). 
To conclude this sub-section, it is noteworthy to point out that econometric 
methods may ignore the potential heterogeneity of the slope parameters of the data, as 
well as of other panel data used to analyze structurally different countries (Pesaran and 
Smith (1995), and Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997)), and thus produce results that are 
biased. However, given that the sample period of this study is relatively short, the 
individual country equations cannot be estimated separately to calculate explicitly the 
best possible parameters from the averages of the estimated country-specific parameters. 
While this problem is inherent in the sample data, the use of interactive groups for the 
main variable of interest and time dummy variables ameliorates this bias. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
This section shows that FDI has a positive and significant effect on the 
employment generation in Latin American countries, in addition to the positive effect of 
real remunerations, domestic investment, and exports. Such beneficial impact of FDI is 
larger on female employment than on male employment rates. This larger impact of FDI 
on female employment rate is around 13 percent larger than its effect on total 
employment rate and almost 25 percent larger than its effect on male employment rate in 
the overall estimation, but such differential effect can be as small as only 2 percent 
higher than male employment rate when one accounts for the level of development and 
as large as 40 percent when one accounts for the level of foreign investment flowing into 
the host country.  
This positive effect of FDI on employment is especially important for the less 
developed economies, for periods with low inflation levels, for countries with high 
levels of activity in the informal sector, for countries attracting low average inflows of 
FDI, and for the later period of the sample. The results found about the positive impact 
on employment rates for countries with high levels of informality is somewhat in 
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agreement with the idea that higher levels of foreign investment induce businesses 
operating in the informal sector to expand and formalize their activities (see section 3). 
The positive impact on employment rates in less developed countries and on periods 
with low inflation levels are in accord with the expectations that the expected 
externalities of FDI can be maximized in stable investment environments and countries 
with significant underutilized resources.  
FDI affects the employment rate through direct hiring of people for their plants, 
through indirect employment as they create links with suppliers and service providers as 
well as with other affiliates that are attracted to the country by their entry, and through 
their contribution towards higher incomes, which can also increase employment through 
higher levels of consumption, savings and investment. In addition, the formalization of 
the domestic economy brought about by the increase of MNCs presumably also bring 
better condition in the work place and improved – if even present before – benefits for 
the participants. 
These results give support to the economic policies implemented in Latin 
America for the last decades in order to spur economic growth. With this section I find 
evidence that the larger flows of FDI into the region not only contributed to 
improvements of real GDP per capita growth rates and to increases in government tax 
revenues, but it also contributes to increases in employment rates in Latin America, 
factors that are perhaps more relevant to the governments and people of the region. The 
fact that this period of higher levels of FDI has been accompanied by a significant 
inclusion of women in the labor market also is significant to close the gender gap. 
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5. MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF REMITTANCES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Remittances have been on the rise for the last several decades. International 
estimates of official remittances flows suggest that the total amount of remittances 
received by developing countries has reached 167 U.S. billion dollars in 2005, up by 73 
percent from 2001 (World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects). Moreover, remittances 
constitute a significant share of some countries’ gross domestic product (Neyapti (2004) 
and Heilman (2006)). The apparent increase in remittances may in part be attributed to 
the rapid growth of money transfer institutions, making the money flows more visible 
and decreasing the average transaction cost of remitting.  However, the increase in 
measured remittances is also indicative of an actual increase in these monetary flows, 
with remittance flows growing from only satisfying basic needs to also providing 
durable goods for the recipient households. 
Remittances gain their significance not just from their size but from the potential 
and actual effects of these money flows on both the society and the individual. 
Remittances affect labor market decisions, school retention levels, export sector 
competitiveness, and create moral hazard problems (Funkhouser (1992), Glytsos (2002), 
Edwards and Ureta (2003), Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo (2006) and Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2005)). 
The increasing volume of monetary remittances has led to an interest in studying 
the effects of remittances. Several studies have documented that for several developing 
countries total remittances already exceeded foreign aid and compete in size with foreign 
direct investment or FDI (Connell and Brown (2004), De Haas (2006), Heilmann (2006) 
and Chami et. al. (2006)). While FDI flows are assumed to be profit driven and therefore 
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considered as a source of development, the increase in remittances also has the potential 
to promote economic growth.  
Remittances may be motivated by many factors.  Lucas and Stark (1985) look at 
remittances as motivated by either altruism or self-interest. The principal motivation 
behind remittances may have important implications for the effect of remittances on 
output in the recipient country. Some researchers believe that altruistically motivated 
remittances are countercyclical with domestic output, while others consider remittances 
as procyclical with domestic output when they are mainly motivated by self-interest 
plans.  
Figure 5.1 indicates the increasing importance of remittances in selected Latin 
American countries, comparing remittances and FDI as shares of GDP.  Remittances 
have surpassed FDI in magnitude starting in about 1999, and remittances have been 
growing while FDI is shrinking. 
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Figure 5.1: Trends of FDI and remittances for a sample of Latin American countries 
 
Most of the remittance literature focuses on the microeconomic implication of 
such flows, for the sender or the receiver of these funds.  The literature on the 
macroeconomic impact of remittances on the recipient country is sparse. This section 
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explores the impact of remittances flows on output, consumption, interest and exchange 
rates in the recipient country. In particular, I explicitly model remittances in a small open 
economy and analyze the impact of shocks to money, remittances, and technology on 
these main macroeconomic measures.  I expand a limited participation model that 
requires that money balances be held to finance certain types of purchases and agents 
incur adjustment costs on money holdings. These two requirements generate a large and 
persistent liquidity effect consistent with the stylized facts (Hairault et. al. (2004)). The 
impact of the adjustment costs on the predetermined allocation of money cash available 
for consumption is then analyzed to see how the main real variables of the economy 
respond to a remittances shock. 
The main contribution of this section is the ability to examine the impact on the 
main economic variable when one allows for different end uses of remittances, and 
monetary injections. In fact, many domestic governments are currently trying to develop 
policy tools to direct a portion of remittances towards investment. Thus I am able to 
distinguish between the direct effect of remittances on output through investment and the 
indirect effect through consumption and its multiplier effects. Being able to distinguish 
the end use of remittances is crucial in looking at the final effect on output in the 
economy (Burgess and Haksar (2005), Heilmann (2006) and Sayan (2006)). 
Residents of labor exporting countries receive substantial annual flows of 
remittances. Countries like India and Mexico received documented remittances of more 
than 9 billion U.S. dollars in 200128 (IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook).  Figure B.1 
in the Appendix shows that remittances were 40% of GDP in Guatemala by 2004, 
approaching 15% in Honduras, above 8% in Ecuador, and over 30% in El Salvador.  
Even in larger economies such as Mexico remittances approached 1% of GDP by 2004. 
Durand et. al. (1996) argue that remittance can stimulate the economic activity 
both directly through investment and indirectly through consumption. Even if the large 
percentage of remittances is used for private consumption, some smaller portion is used 
in productive investment. When applied to large sums of remittances this investment 
                                                 
28 Several researchers believe that undocumented remittances are twice the recorded amounts. Refer to Freeman 
(2006) for more details.  
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portion may be significant. Furthermore the authors argue that large use of remittances 
for consumption stimulates the demand for goods and services in the receiving country, 
leading to increases in production, employment and disposable income. 
 Widgren and Martin (2002) include remittances with FDI and foreign aid as 
possible sources of accelerating economic growth, although they warn about the nature 
of remittances.  Remittances are not profit driven and are often thought to be intended to 
mitigate the burden of poor economic performance on the local recipients.  Chami, 
Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2005) also suggest that remittances are compensatory in nature, 
and document a negative correlation between remittances and GDP growth 
Heilmann (2006) argues that remittances differ from other capital flows. 
Remittances consist of a transfer of ownership between two individuals, and one 
objective is to increase the recipients’ disposable income.  Further, remittances are not 
evenly distributed. Heilmann outlines the case for remittances promoting a sustainable 
level of development but also warns of potential inflation due to stimulation of internal 
demand for imports due to remittances.  
Chami et. al. (2006) develop a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that 
includes government policies to study the implication of remittances for monetary and 
fiscal policy in the recipient country. They explore the behavior of a subset of real and 
nominal variables in remittance-dependent economies and in economies where 
remittances are not significant.  The authors demonstrate that optimal monetary policy 
will differ between the remittance-dependent economy and an economy with no 
significant remittances.   
The literature seems to present two opposing positions concerning the effects of 
remittances on the economy of the receiving country (Keely and Tran (1989), Leόn-
Ledesma and Piracha (2004) and De Haas (2006)). On the one hand, remittances do 
increase the standard of living of receiving households.29  These flows of funds are spent 
on consumption, health and education.  On the other hand, remittances are mainly spent 
                                                 
29 Djajić (1998) show that remittances can also increase the welfare of all residents in the labor exporting countries not 
just those receiving positive amount of remittances.  
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on consumption and rarely directly invested in productive projects. Remittances increase 
dependency and may increase economic instability.  
In the following sub-sections I develop a theoretical model to investigate the 
effect of remittances on key variables in a small open economy, and then the impulse 
response functions of monetary, technological, and remittances shocks are analyzed.  
 
5.2 Model 
 
This sub-section presents a Limited Participation Model that requires money 
balances be held to finance certain types of purchases, and agents incur an adjustment 
cost when altering their money holdings.  This model has been used to rationalize a large 
and persistent liquidity effect.  I assume that any monetary shock occurs after 
households have decided on their deposit balances, and therefore these will generate a 
liquidity effect.  This is not sufficient to yield a persistent liquidity effect, however, so an 
adjustment cost on cash money holdings, c
tM , is also introduced.   
I model the cost of changing money holdings similarly to Hairault et. al. (2004), 
who take into account the time spent on reorganizing the flow of funds.  The adjustment 
cost equation is given by: 
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M 1+ is zero in the steady state. The cost of changing ctM  
is an increasing function of the parameterξ . 
The cost of adjusting money holdings implies that bank deposits would not 
change significantly following a monetary shock, and consequently, the firm will have 
more funds to absorb as the decrease in the interest rate is stronger and more persistent. 
Given uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) this large and persistent fall in the interest rate 
 91 
differential generates an overshooting in the exchange rate in accord with the stylized 
facts.  
The model is described in the following sub-sections. 
5.2.1 Timing of Decisions 
I model a small open economy that includes a representative consumer-household, 
a goods-producing firm, a central bank, and a financial intermediary.  I have a market for 
goods, labor, loanable funds, foreign assets, and a money market.  Within each period 
the timing of decisions follows these five stages: 
 At the end of period 1−t  the representative household decides the amount of 
deposits it wants to hold during the next period, and also the amount of cash.  
When the household chooses these variables, deposits ( btM ) and cash (
c
tM ), it 
does so taking into account that changing money cash holdings ( ctM ) is costly. 
 At the beginning of period t , migrants living abroad remit funds to agents in the 
small country. After observing the remittances flow, the Central Bank decides on 
a monetary injection in order to achieve its desired level of money in the 
economy. 
 The credit market then opens. Bank deposits are available in quantity btM  and 
the firm determines its demand for capital and labor to produce an internationally 
identical good. The firm borrows from the financial intermediary to finance the 
needed investment for production. 
 The perfectly competitive goods market then opens, and both production and 
purchasing decisions are made. 
 Finally, the foreign asset market opens at the end of the period, and the 
representative household makes its decision to purchase or sell foreign assets, 
with returns given by the exogenous world interest rate. Labor gets paid at this 
stage, and firms pay off their loans to the financial intermediary. As the 
household owns both the bank and the firm, household receive dividend 
payments from the bank and firm as part of household income. 
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It is assumed that the evolution of money follows the time line presented below in 
Figure 5.2, with the flow of remittances (ℜ ) happening before the Central Bank decides 
on the monetary injection ( X ) necessary to achieve the desired monetary growth (M ) 
of the small open economy. Consequently, the money growth rate is a function of the 
remittances flow into the economy. 
 
t-1           t           t+1 
 
     1−tM                   tM                 ttt XMM +=+1  
       1−ℜ t                   tℜ  
       1−tX        tX  
Figure 5.2: Evolution of money 
 
5.2.2 Structure of the Model 
The goods market is characterized by perfect competition, as the domestic firms 
and the rest of the world compete in the production of an identical good, whose price in 
domestic currency is given by tP . The law of one price holds. Letting te denote the price 
of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, and keeping in mind that the small 
open economy assumption implies that the price of the good in foreign currency ( *P ) 
and the foreign interest rate ( *i ) are exogenous, then purchasing power parity is given 
by: 
   *PeP tt =       (2) 
The Household 
The representative agent’s objective is to choose a path for consumption and 
asset holdings to maximize 
   ∑
∞
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where C  is consumption and L  is leisure hours. We normalize the time endowment to 
unity, so leisure is given by 
   ttt HL Ω−−= 1  
where H is worked hours. The per-period utility function is log-linear in consumption 
and leisure, as in Hairault et. al. (2004), given by  
   )1log(log),( ttttt HCLCU Ω−−+= γ   (4) 
When the goods market opens – in the fourth stage – the cash-in-advance (CIA) 
constraint takes the form: 
   tt
c
ttt XMCP ϕφ +ℜ+≤     (5) 
where ctM  denotes the amount of cash hold by the household for consumption purchases 
at the beginning of the period, tℜ  is the amount of money received as remittances by 
the household, and tX  is the amount of money being injected by the central bank. Here 
φ  and ϕ   are parameters that take values between 0 and 1, the first one determining the 
percentage of remittances available for consumption – as opposed to being held as bank 
deposits – and the second one determining the percentage of the monetary injection 
available for consumption – as opposed to being first channeled through the financial 
intermediary.30 These parameters allow us to change the channel in which remittances 
and monetary injections affect the economy, and to see how the end use of remittances 
and monetary injections matter.   
The household can hold foreign assets that yield a risk-free nominal interest rate  
*i .  In each period the household buys foreign assets 1+tB (denominated in the foreign 
currency). Because these foreign assets are denominated in the foreign currency, the 
nominal exchange rate becomes a key variable in the portfolio decision of the household. 
 
 
                                                 
30 I introduce φ  to allow for the possibility of policies that induce (force) agents to keep a certain amount of 
remittances as deposits (increasing funds available for investment) and ϕ  to allow for different channels through 
which money is injected by the central bank, helicopter drops directly to households or through banks. 
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The household budget constraint is given by: 
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thus at time t the household determines consumption tC  and labor supply tH , as well as 
the amount of money deposited in banks, btM 1+ , the amount of money kept as cash, 
c
tM 1+ , and the foreign asset position 1+tB . Household income is determined by the real 
wage tw , and the profits (or dividends) received at the end of the period from the firm 
and the bank, ftD  and
b
tD .  The nominal interest rate on deposits is given by tR . 
The household’s maximization problem can be represented by the value function   
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subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (5) and the budget constraint (6). Letting tλ  
denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint, the first order 
necessary conditions for the household’s choice of consumption, labor, money deposits, 
money-cash holdings, and foreign assets take the form 
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Equation (7) requires equality between the costs and benefits of bank deposits, 
while equation (8) requires equality between the marginal disutility of working and the 
marginal benefit – the real wage multiplied by the Lagrange multiplier.  Equation (9) 
requires equality of the current marginal cost of buying foreign assets (in terms of 
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wealth) with the gains in the following period from holding such assets today, and 
equation (10) equates the costs and benefits related to the choice made at time t of 
money holdings available for consumption in the following period. It is clear that if the 
adjustment costs are zero (ξ =0) then equation (10) will just equate the household’s cost 
of holding money in the current period to the marginal utility of consumption in the 
following period, properly discounted. However, when adjustment costs exist ( 0≠ξ ), 
the household will compare the cost of changing money holdings (cash) today to the 
benefits accrued in the next period with respect to the purchasing power of money 
holdings and the in-advance time saved rearranging the household portfolio. 
The Firm 
The production technology of the firm is given by the Cobb-Douglas function 
   αα −= 1tt
z
t HKeY
t      (11) 
where ]1,0[∈α . K is the usual physical capital. The firm’s objective is to maximize the 
discounted stream of dividend payments, where we consider the value of this discounted 
dividend stream to its owner, the household.  Thus the firm’s decision trades off paying 
dividends at the end of the current period versus reinvesting those dividends in physical 
capital of the firm.  The firm receives its profits at the end of the period, so the firm 
borrows funds from the bank to invest in physical capital at the beginning of the period, 
with the cost of borrowing given by the nominal interest rate tR .  Consequently, the 
profits of the firm are given by31 
  tttttttt
f
t IRPHwPYPD )1( +−−=     (12) 
with investment evolving according to the law of motion of the stock of physical capital, 
ttt KKI )1(1 δ−−= +      (13) 
where δ  is the (constant) depreciation rate. The decision about the use of dividends, 
either payments to households or reinvestment in the firm, is captured by the ratio of the 
multipliers associated with the budget constraint of the household in the value function 
                                                 
31 Note that I assume that firms can only borrow for incremental investments, which need to be paid off completely by 
the end of the period. 
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(see equation (7)), as it reflects the consumer’s variation in wealth. The value function of 
the firm is then 
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Note that the discount factor 
t
t
λ
λ
β 1+  can be written as 11)]1([
−
++ tt RE , reflecting 
the fact that the appropriate discount rate is time varying and reflects the market- 
determined interest rate.  
The first order necessary conditions for the household’s choice of labor and 
capital take the form: 
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equation (15) indicates that the cost of hiring an additional worker should equal that 
worker’s marginal productivity, and equation (16) requires equality between the cost and 
benefit of the marginal investment. 
The Central Bank 
In each period the economy’s monetary authority first observes the remittances 
flow and then injects a given amount of money into the loanable funds market, tX .  
Thus the money stock evolves according to 
   ttt XMM +=+1      (17) 
where the Central Bank’s money injection is defined as 
   ttt MX )1( −= θ      (18) 
and where tθ  represents the monetary growth factor, itself possibly a function of the size 
of the remittances flow. Equation (17) indicates that money growth in the economy 
depends on the existing stock of money tM  and the monetary injection implemented by 
the Central Bank tX .  
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The monetary growth factor tθ   is allowed to respond to remittances flows 
(sterilization, etc.) and is written as: 
 1,1 )log()log()log()1()log( ++ +++−= ttgtt g θθθ ερθρθρθ   (19) 
We also define tg  as the growth factor for remittances, which evolves according 
to the first order autoregressive process 
 1,1 )log()log()1()log( ++ ++−= tgtggt ggg ερρ     (20) 
and we specify the shock to the production function in its usual form 
 1,1 )log()log()1()log( ++ ++−= tztzzt zzz ερρ    (21) 
Here 1, +tgε , 1, +tθε , and 1, +tzε  are white noise innovations with variance 
2
gσ ,
2
θσ , 
and 2zσ , respectively. 
The Financial Intermediary 
At the beginning of the period, the commercial bank (our financial intermediary) 
receives deposits from the household btM , receives a portion of remittances as deposits, 
and receives a portion of the monetary injection from the monetary authority, tX .
32 
These funds are then available for lending to the firm to pay for the firm’s investment in 
physical capital. At the end of the period, the firm repays its loans, and the bank returns 
deposits to the household along with the appropriate interest payment.  
To make this clearer, the bank’s asset balance is given by 
  tt
b
ttt XMIP )1()1( ϕφ −+ℜ−+=     (22) 
where tt IP  are the loans made to the firm and the right hand side lists sources of funds 
including deposits, a portion of remittances, and a portion of the monetary injection. 
Bank profits per period are equal to the interest on loans minus interest paid on 
deposits and on remittances deposited in banks.  Note that the monetary injection 
directly into banks is a subsidy to the bank in that there is no interest on those funds. 
                                                 
32 The monetary injection tX  is a helicopter drop with the additional condition that (i) can be injected into the 
financial intermediaries at the beginning of the period, they can lend it out, and then are distributed to the households, 
together with the earned interest, (ii) can be injected directly to the household for consumption, or (iii) any 
combination of (i) and (ii). 
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Putting both expressions together results in profits of the intermediary depending 
only on the money injection provided by the monetary authority 
  tt
b
t XRD )1)(1( ϕ−+=      (24) 
5.2.3 Closing the Model 
 To complete the model specification it is worth to note that there is an uncovered 
interest rate parity condition (UIP) from combining equations (7) and (9):   
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Since I am modeling a small open economy with international assets freely 
traded, the no-arbitrage condition leads to UIP.   
Remittances are defined as follow.  I assume that remittances are based on the 
income of the receiving economy, and I further assume that remittances are negatively 
correlated with output – income – deviations from the steady state.  Thus remittances 
increase when the receiving country experiences an economic downturn.  The 
specification follows Chami et. al. (2006), and is written as 
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5.2.4 Equilibrium 
The system’s equilibrium is characterized by the set of prices and quantities 
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and the vector of exogenous foreign variables },{ ** iP .  Given these prices and 
quantities, the set of quantities CΩ  maximizes the household’s expected inter-temporal 
utility subject to (5) and (6), the set of quantities QΩ  maximizes the profits of the firm 
subject to (11) and (14), and the set of prices PΩ  ensures that the labor market, the 
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loanable funds market, and the money market all clear, all while satisfying purchasing 
power parity. 
Note that the household can hold any quantity of foreign assets that it finds 
optimal, subject only to its budget constraint.  From equation (6) and market equilibrium 
we can infer that foreign asset holdings evolve according to 
 tttttttttt RICYPBieBe ℜ−+−+−−=+−+ ))1)(1(1()()1(
*
1 φ   (27) 
Equation (27) relates domestic production and absorption to an economy’s 
foreign asset position, giving the balance of payments equilibrium. If a country’s 
production is greater than its absorption, that country has a balance of trade surplus and a 
negative capital account, so its foreign asset holdings will increase. 
The set of equations given by the first order conditions, the market equilibriums, 
and the laws of motion for physical capital, domestic money supply, foreign assets, and 
the monetary growth factor constitute a non-linear dynamic stochastic system. The 
system of equations is presented in the Appendix (B.1) together with the log-linearized 
system following Uhlig’s (1997) methodology. To solve this system we calibrate certain 
basic parameters and find the steady state values of the relevant variables to characterize 
the long-run equilibrium of the economy.   
 
5.3 Calibration and Steady State Equilibrium 
 
The calibration of the standard parameters is based in part on Hairault et. al. 
(2004), supplemented with specific parameters that are derived from the sample of 
countries used in this section: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru.  
Table 5.1 below lists the values that are assigned to the basic parameters.  The 
first three parameters have a standard calibration.  The capital share,α , is set to 0.35.  
The subjective discount factor β  is set at 0.952, implying a real interest rate equal to 
4.8% per year.  The depreciation rate on capital is set to roughly 10% per year.  We set 
the parameter γ  to 1.99, which implies that the representative household devotes 80% of 
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its time endowment to non-working activities. The remaining parameters are derived 
from data from the sample of Latin American countries covering the period 1990 to 
2004.  The data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
The parameter v  represents the average of the trade balance to GDP, and is used to 
determine the long-run real debt-to-GDP ratio in our steady state calculation. The long-
run inflation factor is given by π , and is based on the average inflation factor of the 
countries in our sample (θ ). Remittances are calibrated to be 5 percent of GDP. The 
persistence coefficient of the remittance’s shock, gρ , and the standard deviation of the 
remittance’s innovation, gσ , are obtained from regressions on the remittance’s base of 
the countries in the sample.  Similarly, the persistence coefficient of the monetary shock, 
θρ , and the standard deviation of the monetary innovation, θσ , are obtained from 
regressions on the adjusted monetary base of the countries in the sample33.  Finally, I 
also calibrated the technology shock, persistence and variance, to match the parameters 
of Chami et. al. (2006). 
 
Table 5.1 – Steady State Values 
     
     
     
 
 
I explicitly consider two values for the adjustment cost parameter, ξ .  I first 
examine the benchmark case of no adjustment cost, 0=ξ , but I also examine the case of 
a small adjustment cost, 20=ξ , which represent around 8 minutes per week of lost time 
rearranging the portfolio (Karame et. al. (2003)).  
The equations are written to describe a stationary system and are the ones 
presented  in  the  beginning  of  B.1  in  the  Appendix.   Nominal  variables  are  made 
                                                 
33 The relevant monetary base is the country’s monetary base minus the monetary inflows of remittances, such that the 
Central Bank decides on the monetary growth after it sterilizes the monetary inflows. 
36.0=α 99.1=γ 2408.1=g 1143.0=gρ 0575.0=θσ
952.0=β 0012.0=ϑ 1626.1=θ 000034.0=gσ81.0=zρ
1.0=δ 99.0=φ 03.0−=v 193.0=θρ 007.0=zσ
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stationary by dividing them by the lagged domestic price level. The main variables are: 
111111 ;;;; −−−−−− ℜ=Γ==== ttttttttttt
b
t
b
tttt PPBebPPPMmPMm π  
In order to evaluate the implications of the positive exogenous shock in the 
limited participation model, different adjustment costs are introduced to observe the 
behavior of the nominal interest rate, output, nominal exchange rate, and consumption 
following such shocks, both in terms of impulse response functions as well as in 
quantitative terms. 
I outline the calculation of steady state equilibrium values for the remaining 
variables below.  Obviously adjustment costs disappear in the steady state, and steady 
state values do not need time subscripts.  In the long-run equilibrium I assume the 
domestic inflation rate is given by the money growth rate, see equation (40), so that 
θπ = .  
In the steady state the domestic and foreign inflation levels are the same, so 
equation (35) implies that the change in the nominal exchange rate, 
1−
=∆
t
t
e
e
e , is 
constant and equal to unity.  Consequently the uncovered interest rate parity condition 
implies that the domestic and the foreign interest rates are equal ( *iR = ).  Finally, 
combining equations (30) and (32) and, after some manipulation, one has that the 
domestic nominal interest rate in steady state is 
1−=
β
π
R  
One can derive the steady state level of remittances from equation (26) as 
ϑπ=Γ  
To find the steady state capital/output ratio (denotedκ ), from the stationarity of 
equation (39) one gets: 
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Then from the production function we can solve for the output/labor ratio 
α
α
κ −= 1
H
Y
 
which can be used in equation (38) to solve for the real wage 
H
Y
w )1( α−=  
Solving for H in equation (29), and substituting Λ  from equation (32), we can 
solve for the consumption/output ratio 
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Letting 
π
φ
Γ
−+−+−−= ))1)(1(1( RICYTB  to be the domestic trade balance, 
and using the calibration for YTBv = , we obtain the long-run real debt-to-GDP ratio 
that is equal to the domestic trade balance as a share of GDP 
ν
π
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This and equation (42), together with the capital/output ratio, allows us to write 
the steady state output as 
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Then the steady state physical capital stock will be given by YK κ= , and the steady 
state investment rate will be given by KI δ= .  
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The steady state stock of foreign assets in real terms is derived from the balance 
of payments equilibrium (42), so the household’s stock of foreign assets in real terms is 
vY
i
b












+
−
=
π
*1
1
1
 
Consequently, the steady state consumption level is given by: 
b
i
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Given that real money balances is defined by equation (33), its steady state level 
is:  
    cb mmm +=  
Combining equations (34) and (41), the steady state for real money balances is: 
       ICm +Γ−=
θ
1
 
Then using (34), the household’s steady state deposit balances are 
Γ

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 −−
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θ
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From the definition of preferences, the marginal utility of wealth in the steady 
state is given by 
Cπ
β
=Λ  
The steady state values of these variables are presented in Table B.1 in the 
Appendix, and gives the steady state values under two alternative calibrations of 
remittances: one with remittances equal to 5% of GDP, and the other with remittances 
equal to 10 % of GDP. The nominal interest rate is 22.12% in either instance, and the 
capital output ratio is unaffected by the level of remittances. I have the same inflation 
rate for either level of remittances – which is only dependent on the steady state money 
growth rate, and thus independent of the level of remittances. Output is affected 
somewhat by remittances, and falls almost 4% when remittances rise from 5% to 10%.  
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This occurs because the capital stock and labor hours worked are also about 4% lower.  
Meanwhile consumption is higher by about 1%.  Thus a steady flow of outside 
purchasing power results in households choosing more leisure while also having more 
consumption.  Remittances are good for households but do not necessarily lead to an 
increase in steady state domestic production.    
 
5.4 Results 
 
Given the steady states values from the previous sub-section, I analyze the 
aggregate dynamics of the nominal interest rate, output, the nominal exchange rate, and 
consumption following expansionary monetary, technological, and remittances shocks. I 
examine such dynamics under the assumption that remittances depend on the level of 
output of the receiving economy, thus being endogenously determined. Also, as the 
model with no adjustment costs does not generate the large and persistent liquidity effect 
observed in the data, I introduce adjustment costs equivalent to 8 minutes per week 
rearranging money deposits ( 20=ξ ). Since I consider a small open economy, foreign 
variables are constant. 
The model allows a variety of specifications for the percentage of remittances 
going to consumption and investment, and similarly for the monetary injection.  It turns 
out that the main dynamics can be observed in our baseline specification, with 
remittances going almost entirely for consumption ( 99.0=φ ) and the monetary 
injection going first through the financial intermediary for investment ( 0=ϕ ).  
Therefore, in the interest of a concise exposition, I present only the impulse responses 
for this case here.  I briefly discuss at the end of each sub-section how different 
assumptions on the distribution of remittances and monetary injections – between 
consumption and investment – will affect the magnitude of the impulse responses of the 
main variables studied here. 
 
 
 105 
5.4.1 Monetary Shock 
The impulse response functions presented in this sub-section are those following 
a 1% increase in the home money growth factor in period 0, under the assumptions 
described above.  The cases when there are no adjustment costs is illustrated with dashed 
lines, and the case when there is an adjustment cost with solid lines. 
Nominal Interest Rate Response 
The monetary injection leads to a drop in the nominal interest rate, falling on 
impact by 6 basis points when there is no adjustment cost ( 0=ξ ), and by 43 basis 
points when there is adjustment cost ( 20=ξ ).  At the time the shock occurs, the 
increased monetary injection increases the money supply, increasing inflation and 
putting downward pressure on the nominal interest rate because households cannot 
withdraw their deposits within the period.  This is the liquidity effect, and its persistent 
effect on the interest rate can be observed below in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Nominal interest rate dynamics following a monetary shock 
 
The monetary shock raises inflation momentarily, which reduces the value of real 
money balances and induces households to increase their holdings of money cash the 
following period to satisfy their consumption level, thus reducing its money deposits 
( btM 1+ ). The magnitude of the drop in the interest rate is determined by the cost of money 
adjustments. However, even if the household reduces its money deposits the following 
period, the liquidity effect is persistent because firms raise their investment the period of 
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the shock to take advantage of the lower interest rate and in anticipation of the relatively 
lower money supply that would result from the expected deposit withdrawals. This 
increased investment results in a larger capital stock, which lowers its marginal 
productivity, and forces firms to reduce their demand for loans more than the 
household’s reduction of money deposits the following period, maintaining the nominal 
interest rate below its steady state level and producing a persistent liquidity effect.  
Output Response 
The output dynamics following a monetary shock are in accord with the 
dynamics observed in the data, but as the adjustment cost increases the recovery in 
output is less strong, and full recovery does not occur in the medium term when 20=ξ . 
After an initial decline below its steady state level resulting from the instantaneous fall 
in labor, the subsequent increase in labor and the increase in the capital stock resulting 
from the greater investment lead to an increase in output, as shown in Figure 5.4. The 
initial fall in output is much larger when we introduce the adjustment cost, as labor falls 
700 percent more at impact, and it peaks below the initial steady state value at a later 
period and at a lower level than when there is no adjustment cost34. 
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Figure 5.4: Output dynamics following a monetary shock 
 
The expansionary monetary shock generates a positive wealth effect, which is 
allocated to increase leisure in the first period because of the cash-in-advance constraint 
                                                 
34 When adjustment costs are equivalent to 4 minutes per week rearranging money balances ( 10=ξ ), output 
becomes temporarily positive after 3 years from the shock. 
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and adjustment cost of money holdings. However, from the second period onwards, 
when there is no adjustment costs the increase in real wages induce agents to increase 
labor above the initial steady state level, which combined with the surge in capital from 
the second period onwards due to the lower cost of investment explains the increase in 
output in the short run. When adjustment costs are as large as 20, work hours recover 
slightly but never reaches its initial steady state level, while the surge in investment that 
leads to increases in capital the following period is much weaker, not enough to 
outweigh the fall in labor and thus results in a momentary output recovery that does not 
returns to its initial steady state level. 
Nominal Exchange Rate Response 
The monetary injection leads to the instantaneous fall in the nominal interest rate, 
reducing the return on domestic savings, and inducing households to hold more foreign 
assets. This leads to an instantaneous depreciation of the nominal exchange rate on 
impact, depreciating by 1.3 percent on impact when there is no adjustment cost ( 0=ξ ), 
and by 4.5 percent when there is adjustment cost ( 20=ξ ). The overshooting of the 
nominal exchange rate shown in Figure 5.5 is due to the uncovered interest rate parity 
(equation (25)), which requires the interest rate differential to be equal to the expected 
rate of appreciation, leading to the subsequent appreciation until it reaches its new steady 
state, as the liquidity effect is expected to be persistent. 
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Figure 5.5: Nominal exchange rate dynamics following a monetary shock 
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The overshooting of the nominal exchange rate is accentuated by the existence of 
adjustment costs, as it creates a larger and persistent liquidity effect that requires a more 
accentuated appreciation. In fact, the higher ξ  the more limited the withdrawal of 
private deposits, the farthest the fall in the interest rate, and the larger the initial 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Also, even if agents respond to the below-steady-state 
domestic interest rate with a continuously increase in their holdings of foreign bonds, the 
initial overshooting of the exchange rate is strong enough to allow for the subsequent 
appreciation, even if the demand for the foreign asset is still rising. 
Consumption Response 
The consumption dynamics following a monetary injection is primarily generated 
from the inflationary pressure during the period of the shock. Given that the 
consumption level is determined by the cash-in-advance constraint, and since the amount 
on money-cash can not be changed during the period of the shock, the inflation 
generated by the larger money supply reduces consumption instantaneously, mimicking 
the inverse dynamics of inflation when there is no adjustment costs, but returning to 
steady state more monotonically when there is an adjustment cost. The consumption 
dynamics from the second period onwards arises from the rearrangement between 
money-cash and money deposits. Since agents anticipate inflation, and in order to 
preserve their consumption in the future, households increase their future amount of 
nominal money balances the period of the shock ( ctM 1+ ). However, while it is relatively 
inexpensive to change the ratio 
c
t
c
t
M
M 1+ when there is no adjustment cost, thus adjusting 
consumption quickly, this ratio would be adjusted smoothly when there is adjustment 
cost, thus inducing persistence in the adjustment of consumption. This is shown below in 
Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Consumption dynamics following a monetary shock 
 
The model allows one to consider the influence, if any, of how we specify the 
channel by which remittances first impacts the economy.  I can specify that remittances 
first end up in the hands of households as cash, loosening the cash in advance constraint.  
I can also specify that some portion of remittances end up in banks as deposits, which in 
the period of impact will mean additional funding available for bank loans to fund firm 
investment.  However, it is worth to note that the impact of a monetary shock is not 
influenced by this modeling choice.  The method by which remittances first enter the 
economy has almost nothing to do with the responses of the economy to a monetary 
shock.   
The model also allows one to consider the influence, if any, of how the channel 
by which a monetary injection first impacts the economy is specified.  I consider 
monetary injections that are basically helicopter drops on households, loosening the cash 
in advance constraint, and helicopter drops on banks.  As the fraction of a monetary 
injection that is initially channeled through the financial intermediary is reduced, so that 
monetary injections directly fall to households and hence impact household 
consumption, the impulse response functions show very similar patterns that vary only 
slightly in magnitude but not in qualitative impact or in timing.35  For example, as one 
increases the fraction of the monetary injection that goes to the household for 
                                                 
35 Results are available upon request. 
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consumption, the initial decline in the nominal interest rate and the exchange rate 
overshooting are reduced in magnitude, while the output and consumption responses are 
also reduced in magnitude, with the ‘hump’ in the output response also slightly delayed.  
These smaller dynamic responses also occur if the fraction of remittances available for 
consumption is reduced.   
These results we find here are similar to those obtained in related papers (i.e. 
Hairault et. al. (2004), Chari et. al. (2001), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)). 
5.4.2 Technology Shock 
Since technological change and international links can bring abrupt changes in 
production, which can potentially affect the behavior of the representative household, I 
now analyze the behavioral response of the main macroeconomic variables to a positive 
1 percent technology shock.  From the specification of the production function and the 
modeling of technological upgrading, equation (21), its effect is examined using the 
baseline specification: more specifically, under the assumption that remittances go 
almost completely into consumption ( 99.=φ ) and monetary injections go completely 
into investment through the financial intermediary ( 0=ϕ ). 
Following the previous sub-section, impulse response functions are presented 
with dashed line for the case of no adjustment cost, and with solid lines for the case 
allowing adjustment costs. 
Nominal Interest Rate Response 
The introduction of the technology shock has a direct effect on output, which 
outweighs the fall in inflation to put upward pressure on the nominal interest rate. On 
impact, the nominal interest rate increases by 62 basis points when there is no 
adjustment cost ( 0=ξ ), and increases by 88 basis points when there is adjustment cost 
( 20=ξ ). The increase in output brought about by the technology shock lowers inflation 
and raises consumption the period of the shock, which fuels a 2 percent increase in 
investment to raise physical capital. This higher demand for loans exerts the pressure to 
raise the nominal interest rate above its initial steady state level as shown below in 
Figure 5.7. 
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   Figure 5.7: Nominal interest rate dynamics following a technology shock 
 
The dynamics of the nominal interest rate after the period of the shock is 
determined by the adjustment of cash balances. When there is no adjustment cost, the 
period fallowing the shock is still dominated by the further increase in investment to 
satisfy the above-steady-state consumption level, and while the rise in inflation 
contributes to the continuous upward pressure on the interest rate, the larger increase in 
money deposits exerts a stronger pressure on the opposite direction, forcing the nominal 
interest rate down. The fall of the interest rate towards its steady state continuous 
thereafter as investment, inflation, and money deposits returns to their initial steady state 
levels. These dynamics are also observed for the case of positive adjustment cost, but the 
nominal interest rate returns to the initial level at a much lower pace, which is mainly do 
to the much smaller increase in money deposits, whose continuous increase for couple 
more periods is enough to outweigh the much lower decline in investment. 
Output Response 
The technology shock increases output by almost 1.5 percent on impact, 
irrespective of the existence of adjustment costs or not. The positive impact on physical 
capital is reinforced by the increase in hours worked fueled by the rise in real wages. 
Since these two factors are the main determinants of the production function, their rise 
results in an increase in output that continues for another 4 years, peeking at almost 2.5 
percent above the initial steady state level before starting to decline. These subsequent 
dynamics arise from the continuous increase in both physical capital and hours worked 
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during these years, with the increase in physical capital being fueled by the above-
steady-state levels of investment and the increase in labor supply being brought about by 
the direct effect on the real wage. 
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Figure 5.8: Output dynamics following a technology shock 
 
The positive effect on output shown above in Figure 5.8 is in accord with 
existing analyses of technological shocks, with its long lasting effect being determined 
by the continuous investment brought about by the large increase in money deposits that 
outweighs the higher than steady state interest rate. 
Nominal Exchange Rate Response 
The initial nominal exchange rate response to the positive technology shock is 
determined by the rise of the nominal interest rate, which is only partially neutralized by 
the fall in inflation. The nominal exchange rate appreciates by 2 percent on impact when 
there are no adjustment costs ( 0=ξ ), and by almost the double when there are 
adjustment cost ( 0=ξ ), as shown in Figure 5.9. The overshooting of the exchange rate 
is governed by the uncovered interest rate parity condition that requires that the interest 
rate differential is equal to the expected rate of depreciation, which is accentuated when 
there is a positive adjustment cost. Since the increase in the nominal interest rate is 
expected to be persistent ( 01 >+ttRE ), the persistent positive interest rate differential 
generates the expected further depreciation of the exchange rate ( 0ˆˆ 1 >−+ ttt eeE ).  
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Figure 5.9: Nominal exchange rate dynamics following a technology shock 
 
From a balance of payments perspective, the above steady state domestic interest 
rate induces agents to reduce the holdings of foreign bonds, forcing the initial 
appreciation in the process. As the domestic interest rate return to its initial level, the 
rearrangement of foreign bonds gets reversed, with the resulting higher demand for 
foreign bonds pressuring the nominal exchange rate upwards and producing its 
continuous depreciation. The higher the adjustment cost the slower return of the nominal 
interest rate to its initial level, causing a larger and longer fall in the demand for foreign 
bonds. 
Consumption Response 
The effect of the positive shock to technology on consumption is primarily 
determined by the cash-in-advance constraint, which is mainly influenced by the 
inflation dynamics and the flexibility to adjust the money balances. In the period of the 
shock, and since the amount of money-cash can not be changed during the period, the 
fall in inflation is almost fully translated in an increase in consumption, rising by almost 
2 percent when there are no adjustment costs and by almost 4 percent when there are 
adjustment costs. However, the consumption dynamics following the period of the shock 
are affected by other factors. In the case of no adjustment costs, while consumption 
drops immediately in response to the rise in inflation to levels above the initial steady 
state, the downward pressure is somewhat ameliorated by the holding of higher money 
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cash (which can be adjusted immediately), maintaining consumption at levels above 
steady state. From the second period onwards the higher money cash holdings get only 
reinforced by the return of inflation to steady state levels, giving way to a monotonic 
increase in consumption that leads to a higher steady state consumption level.  
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Figure 5.10: Consumption dynamics following a technology shock 
 
The consumption dynamics following the period of the shock are much more 
stable when there is an adjustment cost, which is clearly expected when we take into 
account the much milder adjustment in money balances. In this case, while the inflation 
dynamics are only enhanced, the fact that money cash is brought back to its initial steady 
state level only slowly allows for levels of consumption above steady state that only 
return to the new and somewhat higher steady state at the same rate that money cash. 
This is why consumption falls only monotonically and slowly in this case, as shown 
above in Figure 5.10. 
The effect of the positive technology shock on the model is in accord with the 
existing literature, with the representative agent being able to increase output and 
consumption, which raises the domestic nominal interest rate and allows agents to 
reduce their holdings of foreign bonds at least in the short run, which produces the initial 
nominal exchange rate appreciation described above. These results are robust to the 
alternative distributions of remittances and monetary injection, as described in the 
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monetary shock sub-section, and the dynamics are only affected by small changes in 
magnitude. 
5.4.3 Remittances Shock 
Since continuous remittances flows can alter the behavior of the representative 
household, I analyze the behavior of the main macroeconomic variables to a positive 1 
percent remittances shock.  As modeled in equation (19), the monetary growth factor is 
assumed to respond to remittances flows, and consequently it is also affected by the 
remittances shock36. Again, the baseline analysis is done under the assumption that 
remittances go almost completely into consumption ( 99.=φ ) and monetary injections 
go completely into investment through the financial intermediary ( 0=ϕ ). 
Nominal Interest Rate Response 
The introduction of a remittances shock also increases the money supply through 
the monetary growth specification, although to a much lower degree, and consequently 
also raises inflation momentarily during the period of the shock. This higher inflation 
produces a continuous depreciation of the nominal exchange rate when there is no 
adjustment cost, and an overshooting of the nominal exchange rate when there is an 
adjustment cost, leading to a slight increase in the interest rate in the first case and a fall 
in the interest rate in the second case. This is shown below in Figure 5.11. 
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Figure 5.11: Nominal interest rate dynamics following a remittances shock 
 
                                                 
36 I also analyze the dynamic response of the main variables when the remittances shock does not affect the monetary 
growth factor. 
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The dynamics of the nominal interest rate after the period of the shock are 
governed by the dynamics of investment and money deposits. When there is no 
adjustment cost ( 0=ξ ), the partial recovery in investment combined with the reduction 
in money deposits in the subsequent period further increases the nominal interest rate. 
However, as investment continues to return to its steady state level in the following 
periods, real money deposits recover at a faster pace, thus creating downward pressure 
on the nominal interest rate that continues from then on. When there is an adjustment 
cost ( 20=ξ ), the increase in investment in the period following the shock, combined 
with the reduction in money deposits, exerts a positive pressure on the nominal interest 
rate, which is counteracted by inflation below steady state, so that the nominal interest 
rate is almost unchanged from its previous level.  It is only when money deposits also 
start to increase that there is upward pressure on the nominal interest rate. In fact, both 
investment and money deposits bounce back to levels above their initial steady state two 
periods after the remittances shock, and inflation rises slowly back to its steady state 
level, forcing the interest rate to rise back to its original level monotonically, creating a 
persistent liquidity effect. 
Output Response 
The remittances shock decreases output irrespective of the existence of 
adjustment costs, but its long term dynamics are affected by the adjustment cost. When 
there is no adjustment costs the remittances shock slightly increase the real wage in the 
period of the shock, lowering the amount of time spend working, and as the capital stock 
is fixed, output also falls slightly. However, since labor further decreases in the next two 
periods, as well as the capital stock, output continues to decline. This decline on labor 
and capital is only reversed three periods after the remittances shock, partly in response 
to the rise in the real wage and partly in response to the recovery of investment, 
increasing both labor and physical capital, and consequently monotonically raising 
output as shown below in Figure 5.12. 
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Figure 5.12: Output dynamics following a remittances shock 
 
When adjustment costs are introduced into the model the decrease in output in 
the period of the shock is much larger, which is due to the much larger fall in labor 
resulting from the larger increase in the real wage. In fact, the real wage stays above its 
steady state levels for the remaining periods, causing labor to remain around 1 percent 
below its initial steady state level. This fall in labor combined with the fall in the capital 
stock below its steady state level for the periods following the remittances shock 
decreases output. While capital recovers somewhat for a few years, both labor and 
capital remain below their steady state values, thus overturning the temporary output 
recovery and pulling output to a lower long-run steady state. It is worth noting that 
downward pulling gets accentuated as adjustment costs increase. 
Nominal Exchange Rate Response 
The initial exchange rate response to a positive remittances shock is mainly 
determined by the inflationary pressure emanating from the monetary growth factor 
specification, which leads to a proportional depreciation of the exchange rate on impact. 
In particular, the positive 0.14 percent deviation from steady state in inflation is directly 
translated in a 0.14 percent depreciation from steady state in the nominal interest rate 
when there is no adjustment costs, while the positive 0.5 percent deviation from steady 
state in inflation is directly translated in a 0.5 percent depreciation from steady state in 
the nominal exchange rate when there is an adjustment cost, as observed in Figure 5.13 
below. 
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Figure 5.13: Nominal exchange rate dynamics following a remittances shock 
 
Note that while subsequent dynamics are determined by the uncovered interest 
rate parity condition, they are dependent on the existence of adjustment costs. When 
there is no adjustment costs the increase in the nominal interest rate resulting from larger 
fall in real money deposits is expected to be persistent ( 01 >+ttRE ), and this persistent 
positive interest rate differential in counterbalanced by the expected further depreciation 
of the exchange rate ( 0ˆˆ 1 >−+ ttt eeE ). When a positive adjustment cost is introduced, 
and with a liquidity effect that is expected to be persistent ( 01 <+ttRE ), the persistent 
negative interest rate differential in counterbalanced by the expected appreciation of the 
exchange rate in this case ( 0ˆˆ 1 <−+ ttt eeE ), given rise to an overshooting of the exchange 
rate. 
The remittances shock induces agents to hold more foreign bonds in both cases, 
following interest parity condition. With no adjustment costs, the initial rise in the 
domestic interest rate gets outpaced by the return on foreign bonds brought about by the 
depreciation of the exchange rate, thus inducing agents to increase their holdings of 
foreign bonds the first two periods after the shock, but then starts to slowly decline as the 
interest rate returns to its initial level while the exchange rate continues to depreciate at a 
much slower rate. In the case of positive adjustment costs, the increase in foreign bonds 
is accentuated by the fall in the domestic interest rate during the period of the shock, but 
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it then decelerates as the domestic interest rate begins to rise while the return on foreign 
bonds decreases as the exchange rate appreciates.  
Consumption Response 
The consumption dynamics following a remittances shock – shown below in 
Figure 5.14 – are primarily generated from the inflationary pressure during the period of 
the shock, which emanates from the monetary growth factor specification discussed 
above. Even if remittances are assumed to go in its entirety for consumption ( 99.0=φ ), 
the increase in inflation by 0.14 percent the period of the shock (when there is no 
adjustment cost) and the fall in real money balances depress consumption by less then 
0.01 percent, but it then quickly recovers the following period and ends up slightly 
above the initial steady state level, staying above that level for the following periods. 
However, when there are adjustment costs ( 20=ξ ), the increase in inflation is almost 4 
times larger, which outweighs the increase in remittances and fall in real money 
balances, resulting in a fall in consumption of about 0.4 percent. The following periods 
show consumption rising monotonically as a result of the subsequent fall in inflation to 
below-steady state levels and the recovery in both real money balances and money cash. 
This recovery is not strong enough to pull consumption back to its original steady state. 
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Figure 5.14: Consumption dynamics following a remittances shock 
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These dynamics can be explained by the rearrangement of money cash and 
money deposits. When there are no adjustment costs, the representative household 
reduces real money cash the period fallowing the remittances shock, enough to outweigh 
the greater consumption power brought by the remittances shock, but in the following 
periods it quickly increases money cash holdings above its steady state while inflation 
drops below its initial level, allowing the household to start to consume at levels slightly 
higher than steady state.  
When there are adjustment costs, the reduction of real money cash the period 
following the remittances shock is much larger and outweighs the positive remittances 
shock.  While it then increases monotonically, it stays below its initial steady state for 
the rest of the periods we graph, as consumption does. 
When the amount of remittances and money injection used for consumption and 
investment is altered, the resulting dynamics are similar to those reported here, differing 
only in magnitude37.  In particular, as one lowers the amount of remittances available for 
consumption, the nominal interest rate response becomes smaller, and even turns 
negative for fractions of remittances earmarked for investment greater than 20 percent. 
Output responses also show these dynamics, becoming smaller as one increases the 
fraction of remittances used for investment, and turning positive for fractions above 20 
percent. The consumption’s dynamic response also becomes smaller, dropping below 
steady state for a period, but then quickly recovering and staying above the initial steady 
state level as one increases the fraction of remittances used for investment, while the 
nominal exchange rate dynamics after the initial depreciation also slowly turns to a small 
appreciation as the fraction of remittances used for investment increase. All these 
dynamic responses are also affected by the size of the adjustment costs, becoming more 
pronounced as adjustment costs increase but maintaining their qualitatively effects. 
To further investigate these relative small responses to various distributions of 
remittances and monetary injections for consumption and investment, I also allowed for 
remittances to be 10 percent of GDP, a magnitude that reflects a doubling in importance 
                                                 
37 Results are available upon request. 
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of remittances in the receiving economy. However, while the rise in the nominal interest 
rate is 15 percent smaller and the fall in consumption is 30 percent smaller when there 
are no adjustment costs, the dynamics of all the variables are somewhat stable when 
there are adjustment costs.  
While the impact of a remittances shock on the main macroeconomic variables of 
the small open economy provides an adequate understanding of its effect at the macro 
level, its overall impact on the welfare of the representative agent is still somewhat 
allusive. In order to obtain the agent’s welfare gain from a remittances shock, I now 
analyze the utility of the representative agent under our previous cases. In the base case 
assuming that remittances are 5 percent of GDP, the steady state utility is -1.742.38 When 
I introduce the positive one percent remittances shock utility falls in the period of the 
shock by 0.05 percent when there is no adjustment costs and by 17 percent when there is 
an adjustment cost. However, while utility bounces back in both cases to levels above its 
initial steady state level the following period, and remain above for the remaining 
periods as shown below in Figure 5.15, the discounted utility after five years continues 
to be 0.007 percent below the discounted utility if there was not any remittances shock in 
the case of no adjustment cost, and around 2.7 percent below the discounted utility 
without any remittances shock in the case of positive adjustment costs.  
This gap in utility falls even further as one considers a longer period, being a 
mere 0.002 percent below the discounted utility without if there was not any remittances 
shock and around 1.13 percent below the discounted utility if there was not any 
remittances shock after 10 years in the case of no adjustment cost, while it gets even 
closer after 15 years, with discounted utility being only 0.0008 percent below the 
discounted utility if there was not any remittances shock when there is no adjustment 
cost and only 0.724 percent below the discounted utility if there was not any  remittances  
shock  when  there  is  a  positive adjustment cost. 
 
                                                 
38 Note that utility will be negative in our model since the steady state values of consumption and leisure are less than 
1. 
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Figure 5.15: Utility dynamics following a remittances shock 
 
When I assume that remittances are 10 percent of GDP, the steady state utility is 
-1.711. When I introduce the positive one percent remittances shock utility falls in the 
period of the shock by 0.022 percent when there is no adjustment costs and by 17.754 
percent when there is an adjustment cost, relative to the utility if there was no 
remittances shock. However, while utility bounces back in both cases to levels above its 
initial steady state level the following period, and remain above for the remaining 
periods as shown above, the discounted utility after five years continues to be 0.0008 
percent below the discounted utility if there was not any remittances shock in the case of 
no adjustment cost, and around 2.953 percent below the discounted utility without any 
remittances shock in the case of positive adjustment costs. This gap in utility disappears 
in the case of no adjustment costs as one considers a longer horizon, becoming 0.0015 
percent above the discounted utility if there was not any remittances shock, and 
continues to decrease in the case of a positive adjustment cost, getting to 1.296 percent 
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below the discounted utility if there was not any remittances shock after 10 years in the 
case of no adjustment cost. After 15 years, the discounted utility continues to rise in the 
case of no adjustment cost, being 0.0021 percent above the discounted utility if there 
was not any remittances shock and becomes closer to the discounted utility if there was 
not any remittances shock when there is a positive adjustment cost, being only 0.841 
percent below. 
While in the period of the shock it is observed a decrease in utility in all the cases 
above, utility quickly recovers to levels above steady state, allowing the discounted 
utility to recover to levels closer to the discounted utility levels of the small open 
economy that does not experiences a remittances shock. In particular, the results show 
that economies with remittances levels as large as 10 percent of GDP in fact improve 
their discounted utility in the medium term when there is no adjustment cost in the 
rearrangement of money balances. Also, the impact of the introduction of adjustment 
costs in the discounted utility deteriorates welfare, irrespective of the share of 
remittances relative to output. This is expected since it is a restriction in the adjustment 
of money balances, so agents can not quickly rearrange their consumption portfolio. 
Also interesting to examine is the impact of the positive remittance shock to the 
behavior of the trade balance. In Figure 5.16 below I show the dynamics of the trade 
balance, with the first column showing the cases of no adjustment cost followed by the 
case of a positive adjustment cost under the basic assumption of remittances being 5 
percent of GDP, and with the second column showing the same two cases under the 
alternative assumption that remittances are 10 percent of GDP. It is clear that the 
remittances shock has a positive impact on trade balance in the short run. When 
remittances are 5 percent of GDP, the trade deficit falls in the period of the shock by 
5.35 percent in the case of no adjustment cost and by 17.3 percent in the case of a 
positive adjustment cost, while when remittances are 10 percent of GDP, the trade deficit 
falls in the period of the shock by 4.4 percent of GDP in the case of no adjustment cost 
and by 17.3 percent in the case of a positive adjustment cost.  
However, this initial improvement in the first couple periods is  quickly  reversed 
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Figure 5.16: Trade balance dynamics following a remittances shock 
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couple periods before monotonically decrease in the case of no adjustment costs, and 
increasing at a decreasing rate in the case of positive adjustment costs.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
This limited participation model for a small open economy with remittances 
explicitly incorporated is able to capture important features from observed empirical 
responses of economic variables to monetary shocks.  In particular, I am able to capture 
important aspects in the dynamic response of the nominal interest rate, output, the 
exchange rate, and consumption.  The introduction of adjustment costs on money 
holdings accentuate the persistence of the liquidity effect, and consequently expands the 
overshooting dynamics of the nominal exchange rate, both in accord with existing 
empirical evidence on the result of monetary innovations. The technology shock results 
are also in accord with existing findings, in particular with those regarding the 
overshooting exchange rate appreciation in response to a positive shock.  
A novel contribution of this study comes from the ability to examine the dynamic 
response of major macroeconomic variables – namely the nominal interest rate, output, 
the nominal exchange rate, and consumption – to remittances shocks.  I find that a 
remittances shock in the model without adjustment costs will slightly increase the 
nominal interest rate, while there is a slight drop in output and consumption, and a small 
but continuous depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.  When there are adjustment 
costs the dynamic response of the nominal interest rate is reversed in sign and increased 
in magnitude.  The response of output and consumption is also magnified, with 
consumption smoothly returning to its initial steady state due to the adjustment cost on 
money balances. In addition, adjustment costs produce the expected overshooting 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.  
I also investigated the impact of different modeling assumptions with respect to 
the initial impact of remittances on the economy, whether to loosen the cash in advance 
constraint facing households or to increase the supply of loanable funds at financial 
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intermediaries.  The findings show that these alternative specifications have scant impact 
on the dynamic responses of the variables we examine to a monetary shock, but these 
alternatives do affect the dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables to a 
remittances shock. The size of the adjustment cost magnifies the influence the 
remittances shock, but not the direction. 
Perhaps more important is the welfare response to a positive remittances shock. 
The results show that utility falls as a result of a one percent positive remittances shock 
irrespective of the existence of adjustment costs or the share of remittances in the 
economy, but it quickly recovers to levels above the initial utility level and remains 
higher thereafter. This means that while the positive remittances shock has a negative 
effect on utility the period of the shock, the negative effect slowly decreases as we 
discount future utility, and can even result in a welfare improvement as shown in the 
case of no adjustment cost for the economy with remittances being 10 percent of GDP. 
With regards to the impact of the remittances shock on the trade balance, I find that the 
positive remittances shock decreases the trade deficit the period of the shock irrespective 
of the existence of adjustment costs or the share of remittances in the economy, but that 
while the trade deficit quickly returns to levels beyond the initial deficit when there are 
no adjustment costs, the improvement in the trade deficit is long lived when there are 
positive adjustment costs, having smaller deficits for up to 10 periods.  
I have also examined the impact of a change in remittances on the steady state of 
the economy.  As remittances change from 5 percent of output to 10 percent of output, I 
find that both output and work hours fall by almost 4 percent while consumption 
increases by slightly more than 1 percent. Physical capital also falls by almost 4 percent. 
The distribution of real money balances also becomes affected by the doubling of the 
share of remittances, with real money cash decreasing by almost 4 percent while real 
money deposits decrease by almost 4 percent. It can be observed that the representative 
household increases its leisure as the share of remittances increases, which together with 
the fall in physical capital reduces output. This negative effect is counterbalanced by the 
increase in consumption brought about by the doubling of remittances. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment and Remittances are capital flows usually from rich to 
poor countries that are immensely interesting because they can finance investment and 
consumption in the receiving economies. They can stimulate economic growth, rise tax 
revenues to implement public projects, generate employment opportunities, and provide 
funds for domestic households to invest in their human capital and self-started economic 
endeavors. Moreover, since a key aspect in economic development relies in the 
acquisition of financial and physical assets to incorporate advance technologies and 
create wealth, the reliance on foreign capital helps bridge the gap between savings and 
investment in capital-scarce economies. These capital inflows are also believe to 
encourage technological upgrade and financial modernization, and contribute to the 
growth and productivity of countries with enough human capital and infrastructure. All 
these characteristics of these capital flows have the potential of rising the standard of 
living and increasing welfare in the developing world. 
These two capital flows have clearly outpaced the other components of 
international capital movements, and multinational development institutions have 
become the main advocates in the promotion of FDI – and of remittances to a lesser 
extent – to induce faster and more efficient growth of less developed economies, after 
intense investigation of their potential links to economic growth. The great 
intensification of global trade and increased FDI – which are profit driven – has been 
accompanied by the increasingly accepted belief that these flows are strongly related, 
directly and indirectly, to growth and development. However, recent research also points 
out to immigrants’ remittances as an additional source of growth, which despite not 
being profit driven also can promote economic growth by fueling domestic demand and 
improving human capital.  
Independently of the way in which these capital flows can generate economic 
growth, the understanding of the channels through which they can affect growth efforts 
in developing countries become crucial for policy enactment, and understanding the way 
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in which they impact the receiving economies of Latin America is the contribution of 
this dissertation. 
The first part of this dissertation deals with the effects of FDI on economic 
growth and development in the region. A large fraction of empirical studies find a 
positive and significant relationship between FDI and economic growth, suggesting that 
FDI does in fact spur growth. Yet, an important fact that has been so far overlooked in 
the economic literature is the way in which this improvement in economic performance 
translates in real improvement in the standards of living in the host countries, by some 
palpable measure. This is why the validity of those concepts of growth and development 
heavily measured by traditional national economic terms, like GDP, are being 
increasingly challenged. Assessing the influence of FDI on developing countries should 
consequently include the effects on factors that impact the standard of living more 
directly, such as on the collection of tax revenues and the generation of employment.  
This dissertation fills this gap. I go beyond the increasingly accepted notion that 
FDI positively affects economic growth, measured as improvements in GDP or GDP 
growth rates, to empirically show how such positive relationship translates into palpable 
benefits for the host country, specifically measuring its effect on employment generation 
and collection of central government tax revenues in the host country. This part starts 
from the view that FDI’s effect on economic growth should not only be measured 
through its effect on the level and growth rate of real GDP per capita, but also through 
its influence on other factors that are relevant to domestic governments, like on 
government tax revenues and employment levels.  
The second section establishes the positive relationship between FDI and 
economic growth in Latin America, verifying that the endogenous relationship found by 
Li and Liu (2005) also holds for the Latin American sample of 17 countries over the 
period 1980-2002. Both single equation and simultaneous equation system techniques 
were applied in the estimation, and the results show that there exists a strong 
complementary connection between FDI and economic growth in the region, showing 
 129 
that foreign direct investment does contribute to the economic growth of Latin American 
countries, at least in terms of improvements in the real GDP per capita growth rate. 
The third section examines the effect of FDI on tax revenue performance for the 
same group of Latin American countries and time period. Estimation of the dynamic 
panel model was performed with system GMM, and the results show that FDI has a 
positive impact on central government tax revenues, which is mainly channeled through 
its effect on taxes on goods and services. This confirms the conventional wisdom that 
FDI’s positive effect on economic growth indeed translates on improvements in the 
collection of tax revenues. In addition, FDI is found to be beneficial to less developed 
countries, and its positive effect became significant in the later period of the sample. 
Interestingly, it is also found that inflation has a positive and significant effect on total 
tax revenues and on taxes on goods and services, representing a reverse Tanzi effect due 
to the hyperinflationary episodes experienced in the region. 
The fourth section examines the effect of FDI on employment generation for the 
same group of Latin American countries and time period. I control for the main 
determinants of the employment rate, and use real remunerations to proxy for the effect 
of average wages. The estimation of the dynamic panel model was performed with 
system GMM, and the results show that FDI has a positive and significant effect on the 
employment rate in host countries, and that this positive effect is larger for females than 
for males. In addition, this positive impact is particularly beneficial for less developed 
economies and countries with high level of informality, as well as for periods with low 
levels of inflation and foreign investment. Here I also find that this positive effect 
became significant the later period of the sample, period of renewed inflows of foreign 
investment. 
The second part of the dissertation deals with the macroeconomic effect of 
remittances on the receiving economies. Remittances play a large and important role in 
certain economies, where they may exceed 5% or even 10% of GDP.  Indeed, remittance 
flows in certain nations exceed FDI in magnitude.  In section 5 I use a stochastic limited 
participation model with cash in advance constraints and costly adjustment of cash 
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holdings to examine the impact of remittances on the steady state of the economy and on 
the dynamic response of variables to shocks, including money shocks, output shocks, 
and shocks to remittance flows. The model performs well in terms of monetary and 
technology shocks, providing results in accord with the existing literature. In terms of 
remittances shocks, the results show that a positive remittances shock forces the 
exchange rate to depreciate and lowers both output and consumption in the period of the 
shock, irrespective of adjustment costs on money balances. Agents then quickly adjust to 
maximize their utility when there are no adjustment costs in money balances, but this 
adjustment is much more monotonic and slower then there is a positive adjustment cost. 
The results also show that the positive shock lowers utility, both during the period of the 
shock and for the near future (discounted utility), but that discounted utility improves 
after 10 years when remittances are as big as 10 percent of GDP and there are no 
adjustment costs. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Table A.1 – Bias Comparison for Different Estimators of Total Tax Revenues 
 OLS Fixed 
Effects 
DPD 
First Diff. 
DPD 
System 
Constant -.69762   
(2.5374)     
-11.885   
(12.869)     
-1.1767   
(.71935)     
-2.6562   
(2.5698)     
Taxlag .88970***   
(.02846)     
.62156***   
(.04582)     
.62673***   
(.06956)      
.76880***   
(.05242)     
Inflation .00028***   
(.00009)      
.00025***    
(.00009)     
.00026***   
(.00008)      
.00032***   
(.00008)      
Gov. debt .01134 **  
(.00549)      
.01189***   
(.00304)      
.01126***   
(.00237)      
.01174***   
(.00199)      
Gov. debt -1 -.01211**   
(.00579)     
-.00890***   
(.00271)     
-.00854***   
(.00184)     
-.00858***   
(.00178)     
FDI  .06691   
(.04804)      
.15926***   
(.05876) 
.15207**   
(.06102)      
.11108**   
(.03978)      
ln of GDP per capita .14818   
(.22187)      
.26229    
(.95305)      
.12188   
(1.0464)      
.61434*  
(.35818)      
Agricultural Share -.01524   
(.02661)     
.03637   
(.04889)      
.04867   
(.09605)      
-.04900   
(.03901)     
ln of Population -.21085   
(.13371)     
-1.3466   
(2.6777)     
-.64364   
(3.6544)     
-.37826   
(.35906)     
Urbanization .00684   
(.01076)      
.23945***   
(.05948)      
.29794**   
(.13037)      
.00689   
(.01170)      
Budget Surplus  -.01727   
(.02178)     
.00018   
(.02029)      
.00123    
(.01587)      
-.00411   
(.01955)     
Trade .21691    
(.26564)      
.52129   
(.51269)      
.85765   
(.54312)      
.45243   
(.45598)      
     
R-square 0.8895 0.6561 ----- ----- 
Hansen Over-Id. ----- ----- 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test ----- ----- 0.001 0.001 
AR(2) Test ----- ----- 0.273 0.281 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence level, and * for 
10% confidence level. Time dummies are omitted. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.2 – Dynamic Effect of FDI on Tax Revenues 
 Current Lagged-
one-year 
Lagged-
two-years 
Total Tax Revenues .11108**   
(.03978) 
-.02353   
(.06217) 
-.03856   
(.04971) 
Taxes on Individuals, 
Profits, and Corporations 
.01280     
(.01560) 
-.06910   
(.07874) 
-.01805   
(.03858) 
Taxes on Goods and 
Services 
.06407**   
(.02747) 
.03294    
(.03337) 
.01016   
(.02456) 
Taxes on International 
Trade 
-.00302   
(.02071) 
-.00196   
(.01917) 
-.01829   
(.01993) 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence 
level, and * for 10% confidence level. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.3: Effect of FDI on Total Tax Revenues and Main Components 
Controlling for the Level of Inflation (Inf<20 and Inf>20) 
 Total Tax 
Revenues 
Taxes on 
Individuals, 
Profits, and 
Corporations 
Taxes on 
Goods and 
Services 
Taxes on 
International 
Trade 
Constant -2.7229    
(2.7409) 
-3.3461*   
(1.8056) 
-2.6574   
(2.1487) 
-1.7596   
(1.0621) 
Taxlag .76570***   
(.05349) 
.71634***    
(.07390) 
.67289***   
(.04516) 
.70003***   
(.09977) 
HI .09081   
(.59951) 
-.71156   
(.64204) 
.09390   
(.37490) 
-.14200    
(.11323 
Inflation .00559   
(.02145) 
-.02978   
(.02618) 
.01202   
(.02258) 
____ 
Inflation*HI -.00527   
(.02146) 
.02973    
(.02616) 
-.01191   
(.02256) 
____ 
Gov. debt .01189***   
(.00208) 
.00495***    
(.00062) 
.00576***   
(.00098) 
.00227***   
(.00048) 
Gov. debt-1 -.00859***   
(.00178) 
-.00361***   
(.00076) 
-.00431***   
(.00100) 
-.00067   
(.00055) 
FDI .12084***   
(.03493) 
.01543    
(.01842) 
.06416**   
(.02846) 
-.02249   
(.01995) 
FDI*HI -.06326   
(.10645) 
-.06016   
(.06945) 
.01318   
(.05263) 
.11998**   
(.05553) 
ln of GDP per capita .62674*   
(.34815) 
.37353    
(.21797) 
.23577   
(.25800) 
-.01281   
(.10964) 
Agricultural Share -.05033   
(.04009) 
-.03077   
(.03136) 
____ ____ 
ln of Population -.37214   
(.36441) 
.39562    
(.23026) 
-.24651   
(.26031) 
-.10039   
(.09481) 
Urbanization .00603   
(.01229) 
-.02290   
(.01547) 
.02956**   
(.01082) 
.00673   
(.00534) 
Budget Surplus -.00384   
(.02053) 
-.00867   
(.00976) 
-.02182   
(.02998) 
.02878**    
(.01197) 
Trade .45751   
(.48706) 
.78904    
(.50223) 
.31887   
(.50619) 
.52005**   
(.20210) 
Terms of Trade ____ ____ ____ .00294   
(.00196) 
Exchange Rate ____ ____ ____ -.00004   
(.00007) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.001 0.106 0.003 0.020 
AR(2) Test 0.277 0.317 0.610 0.584 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence level, and * for 
10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not presented. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.4: Effect of FDI on Total Tax Revenues and Main Components 
Controlling for the Level of Inflation (Inf<100 and Inf>100) 
 
 Total Tax 
Revenues 
Taxes on 
Individuals, 
Profits, and 
Corporations 
Taxes on 
Goods and 
Services 
Taxes on 
International 
Trade 
Constant -2.7415   
(2.6797) 
-2.8346   
(1.7296) 
-2.7307   
(1.9909) 
-1.8972*   
(1.0073) 
Taxlag .76530***    
(.05023) 
.74267***    
(.04101) 
.68415***    
(.05449) 
.70658***   
(.10061) 
HI -.11709   
(.56787) 
-.84159*   
(.39935) 
-.51956   
(.51710) 
.14720   
(.17516) 
Inflation -.00027   
(.00608) 
-.00462   
(.00396) 
-.00255   
(.00451) 
____ 
Inflation*HI .00061    
(.00606) 
.00462    
(.00396) 
.00270   
(.00454) 
____ 
Gov. debt .01165***    
(.00205) 
.00490***    
(.00059) 
.00592***   
(.00094) 
.00198***   
(.00046) 
Gov. debt-1 -.00841***   
(.00173) 
-.00360***   
(.00081) 
-.00448***    
(.00102) 
-.00050   
(.00048) 
FDI .11278***    
(.03802) 
.00598    
(.01561) 
.05777**   
(.02494) 
  .00046   
(.01986) 
FDI*HI -.23402   
(.63548) 
.08554    
(.23329) 
.39623   
(.71430) 
-.33227   
(.38254) 
ln of GDP per capita .63602*    
(.35787) 
.33030*    
(.17145) 
.24594   
(.24961) 
.01492   
(.11993) 
Agricultural Share -.05016   
(.03746) 
-.02821   
(.02436) 
____ ____ 
ln of Population -.37194   
(.37098) 
.29842*    
(.14407) 
-.23875  
(.25702) 
-.06807   
(.08738) 
Urbanization .00738    
(.01203) 
-.01676*   
(.00844) 
.02834**   
(.01134) 
.00477    
(.00480) 
Budget Surplus -.00575   
(.01615) 
-.01608*   
(.00887) 
-.02191   
(.02354) 
.02865*   
(.01515) 
Trade .42771    
(.45756) 
  .55758   
(.34129) 
.31865   
(.49804) 
.50857**   
(.19440) 
Terms of Trade ____ ____ ____ .00292   
(.00195) 
Exchange Rate ____ ____ ____ -.00001   
(.00007) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.001 0.119 0.003 0.023 
AR(2) Test 0.255 0.314 0.689 0.448 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence level, and * for 
10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not presented. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.5 – Bias Comparison for Different Estimators of Employment Rate 
 OLS Fixed 
Effects 
DPD 
First Diff. 
DPD 
System 
Constant 6.8380   
(4.7563)      
-65.920***   
(34.401) 
-.19260**   
(.08626) 
25.791**   
(10.687) 
Lagged Employment .89671*    
(.03905)     
.66329   
(.04687)     
.62635*   
(.02778)     
.77275***   
(.03952) 
Real Remunerations .00221   
(.00238) 
.00461    
(.00308)      
.00407   
(.00460)      
.00802**   
(.00271) 
FDI  .11154**   
(.05343)      
.05328    
(.06807)      
.01455   
(.05256)      
.12957**   
(.05268) 
Dom. Investment .05109   
(.03184)      
.09864*   
(.03325) 
.14657*    
(.03908) 
.08658***   
(.02105) 
Exports .03569   
(.03442)      
.10414**   
(.04930)      
.13509**    
(.05481)      
.10206*   
(.05744) 
RGDPln  .05686   
(.10228)      
4.2402*   
(1.4656)      
3.3097   
(2.2085)      
-.11668   
(.25054) 
Trade Openness -.27968   
(.87195)     
-2.5318**   
(1.1882)     
-2.8265***   
(1.4908)     
-1.9134   
(1.5768) 
Terms of Trade -.00162   
(.00348)     
-.01024**   
(.00414)     
-.01706**   
(.00848)     
-.00515   
(.00591) 
 
R-square 0.8320 0.7719                         ----- ----- 
Hansen Over-Id. ----- ----- 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test ----- ----- 0.0092 0.009 
AR(2) Test ----- ----- 0.6285 0.916 
Note: Statistical significance given by * for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence level, and *** for 
10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.6 – Dynamic Effect of FDI on Employment Rates 
 Current Lagged-
one-year 
Lagged-
two-years 
Total Employment Rate .12957**   
(.05268) 
.15278***   
(.02932) 
.05120   
(.08149) 
Male Employment Rate .11745**   
(.05143) 
.12400***   
(.02768) 
.02747   
(.08261) 
Female Employment Rate .14688**    
(.06112) 
.19295***   
(.04124) 
.10197   
(.07762) 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence 
level, and * for 10% confidence level. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.7 – Effect of FDI on Employment Rate by Time Periods 
(1980-1991 and 1992-2002) 
 Total Male Female 
Constant 25.944**   
(10.584) 
28.459**   
(10.158) 
21.739*   
(11.344) 
Lagged Employment .77086***   
(.04061) 
.77324***   
(.05338) 
.77010***    
(.03043) 
Real Remuneration .00762**   
(.00309) 
.00750**   
(.00256) 
.00894*   
(.00409) 
Later  -1.5709   
(.99641) 
-1.1373   
(.81736) 
-2.0624    
(1.3020) 
FDI  .00505   
(.16982) 
-.00952   
(.13410) 
.09321   
(.25527) 
LaterFDI *  .14209   
(.18130) 
.14489   
(.14044) 
.06120   
(.26643) 
Dom. Investment .08776***   
(.02204) 
.07869***   
(.02305) 
.09753***   
(.02872) 
Exports .10613*   
(.05732) 
.11023**   
(.05424) 
.09448   
(.06418) 
RGDPln  -.10687   
(.25348) 
-.17872   
(.23032) 
.01108   
(.27984) 
Trade Openness -1.9457    
(1.5745) 
-2.2169   
(1.4179) 
-1.5040   
(1.8241) 
Terms of Trade -.00503   
(.00594) 
-.00403    
(.00612) 
-.00762   
(.00562) 
 
Hansen Over-Id. 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) Test 0.009 0.009 0.016 
AR(2) Test 0.871 0.120 0.349 
N. Observations 264 264 264 
Note: Statistical significance given by *** for 1% confidence level, ** for 5% confidence 
level, and * for 10% confidence level. Time dummies are included but not reported. 
Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX B 
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Figure B.1: Evolution of remittances in sample countries 
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Table B.1 – Steady State Values 
 Remittances 5% GDP Remittances 10% GDP 
 
Nominal Interest Rate  
Capital/output ratio  
Output  
Remittances  
Capital  
Investment  
Bonds  
Consumption  
Real Money Balances  
Real Money deposits  
Real Money Cash  
Real Wages  
Lambda  
Labor (hours worked) 
Discounted Utility 
Trade Balance 
 
0.2212 
1.9598 
0.3376 
0.0169 
0.6616 
0.0662 
0.1955 
0.2956 
0.3473 
0.0203 
0.3270 
0.9344 
2.7701 
0.2312 
-1.741968 
-0.0099 
 
0.2212 
1.9598 
0.3259 
0.0320 
0.6386 
0.0639 
0.1887 
0.2987 
0.3350 
0.0194 
0.3156 
0.9344 
2.7415 
0.2232 
-1.710935 
-0.0005 
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B.1. LPM Model 
We denote the shadow price associated with the household real wealth by ttt Pλ=Λ .  
The relevant equations in the LPM model are defined the following way: 
(26) [ ]tgttss
t
t eYYE
ττ πϑ −=Γ )(  
(28)     




 Λ
+=Λ
+
++
+
1
11*
1)1(
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
e
e
iE π
β  
(29) ttH wU t Λ=− '  
(30) 





+
Λ
=Λ +
+
+ )1( 1
1
1
t
t
t
t
t RE π
β  
The following variable is introduced for technical convenience 
  
c
t
c
tc
t
M
M
M 1+≡∆  
which can be stationarized (to be used in the next equation)  as 
(31)     
c
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t
c
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t
m
m
M
π1+=∆  
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



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−
+ )]1)(1(1[)1(
*
1
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(43) 11 )log()log()log()1()log( ++ +++−= ttgtt g θθθ ερθρθρθ  
(44) 11 )log()log()1()log( ++ ++−= gttggt ggg ερρ  
(45) 11 )log()log()1()log( ++ ++−= zttzzt zzz ερρ  
Consequently, the log-linearized system of equations, following Uhlig’s methodology, is 
given by     
(26’) [ ]tttt
t
gYE ˆˆˆˆ0 +−Γ−= τπ  
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   ttt R
b
R
b
R
I
b
I ˆ)1(ˆ))1)(1(1(ˆ
π
φ
π
φ Γ−
−Γ




 Γ+−−+−  
(43’)  11 ˆ
ˆˆ
++ ++= ttgtt g θθ ερθρθ  
(44’)  11 ˆˆ ++ += gttgt gg ερ  
(45’)  11 ˆˆ ++ += zttzt zz ερ  
 
B.2. Solving 
The system is given by 19 equations with 19 variables. The endogenous state variables 
{ tt
c
tttt emKbm Λˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ } include lambda and the nominal exchange rate in addition to the 
standard four variables, as Uhlig’s toolkit suggests that variables dated t-1 or earlier 
should be considered state variables (in the case of teˆ ) while the matrix of other 
endogenous variables should be non-singular in order for its pseudo-inverse to exists, 
allowing to redeclare tΛˆ  as other endogenous state variable instead. The other 
endogenous variables of the system are { t
c
ttttttt
b
tt MIYHwRCm Γ∆
∧
ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,πˆ }, and the 
exogenous state variable are { ttt zg ˆ,ˆ,θˆ }. 
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